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INTRODUCTION

A bankruptcy trustee is armed by statute with a number of
powers to avoid prebankruptcy transfers made by the now bankrupt debtor. Probably none of these powers is of more concern to
prebankruptcy transferees than the trustee's power to avoid preferential transfers. This Article examines the content of and the
reasons for the concept of a preferential transfer as it has evolved
over the centuries.
We inherited the notion of the preferential transfer from England; but, as elsewhere, we frequently have concluded that we
*
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could improve on the English model. Substantial differences exist,
therefore, between the English law of voidable preferences and the
American approach. Taking a brief look at English antecedents
will contribute to an understanding of our own concept.
II.

THE ENGLISH CONCEPT

As early as 1571, Parliament acted to outlaw transfers of property by a debtor with the intent and effect of hindering, delaying,
or defrauding creditors.' The Statute of 13 Elizabeth made such a
transfer a crime and punished the parties to it, except for transferees for "good consideration and bona fide. ' '2 Punishment consisted
of imprisonment and forfeiture of one year's value of real property
and "the whole value" of personalty involved in the transfer, with
one half of the recovery going to the "party or parties grieved."3
But King's Bench promptly concluded that, under this statute, a
judgment creditor could treat a fraudulent conveyance as void and
levy execution on the property as if the conveyance had not been
made.4
Many states either reenacted this ancient English statute or
treated it as a part of their inherited common law. 5 In half of the
states, the matter is now covered by the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA).6 The UFCA does not limit the ability to
avoid fraudulent conveyances to creditors with judgment. Courts
in many states not adopting the UFCA have reached the same result, because of the merger of law and equity or through the aid of
a rule similar to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(b).'
The concept of a voidable fraudulent conveyance outside of
bankruptcy, however, never embraced the concept of voidable
preference. The "good consideration" that protected the bona fide
transferee under the Statute of Elizabeth and the "fair considera1. 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Mannocke's Case, 73 Eng. Rep. 661 (K.B. 1571).
5. See 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 58 (rev. ed. 1940).
6. 7A U.L.A. 161 (1918). The UFCA was promulgated in 1918 and in 1984 was revised
in a new Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 7A U.L.A. Supp. 67 (1985).
7. "Whenever a claim is one heretofore cognizable only after another claim has been
prosecuted to a conclusion, the two claims may be joined in a single action .... In particular, a plaintiff may state a claim for money and a claim to have set aside a conveyance
fraudulent as to him, without first having obtained a judgment establishing the claim for
money." FED.R. Civ. P. 18(b). Rule 38 also preserves the right to jury trial on all issues for
which that right exists. FED. R. Cxv. P. 38.
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tion" that protects him under the UFCA include antecedent debt
paid or secured by the debtor's transfer." There are probably two
reasons for this limitation on the coverage of fraudulent conveyance doctrine. First, if the debtor's voluntary 9 transfer to a creditor
leaves the debtor with sufficient assets to pay his other creditors,
the creditor receiving the transfer has been "preferred" only in the
sense that he is not put to the inconvenience of litigation to enforce his claim. Second, the common-law system provides a series
of "grab law" remedies for the collection of claims through attachment, garnishment, execution, and similar remedies under which
the race is to the swift. Furthermore, the common-law system provides those remedies without regard to the debtor's financial condition. Such a system hardly could be expected to require the creditor to return what he had received if he collected or obtained
security without resort to litigation.' 0 Only when the legal system
provides, as an alternative to the creditors' unilateral grab-law system, a procedure for collective administration of the debtor's estate with a prescribed order of distribution to all creditors, can we
expect the lawmakers to become concerned about the debtor's
preadministration transfers that will frustrate the prescribed order
of distribution.
Lawmakers, however, did not anticipate the preference problem. England's first bankruptcy act," enacted almost thirty years
before Parliament addressed the problem of fraudulent conveyances, said nothing of preferences. The act provided for bankruptcy proceedings that only creditors could initiate. 12 In these
8. See G. GLENN, supra note 5, § 289. Section 3 of the UFCA does require that the
debt paid be a "fair equivalent" of, and that the debt secured not be "disproportionately
small" as compared with, the value of the property the debtor transfers.
9. In this context, a transfer is voluntary if the law does not compel it.
10. The UFCA in § 7 allows creditors to avoid transfers that the debtor makes with
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. 7A U.L.A. 242 (1918). Creditors, however, may not avoid such transfers if the debtor makes them for "fair consideration" to
purchasers who have no knowledge of the fraud. Id. §§ 8-9. The UFCA goes beyond the
common law, however. Disregarding the debtor's intent, the UFCA allows creditors to avoid
transfers that the debtor makes without fair consideration and that leave the debtor either
insolvent or with an unreasonably small capital for a business or transaction in which he is
engaged or about to engage. Id. §§ 4-5. Also, a creditor may avoid the debtor's transfer
without fair consideration if the debtor intends or believes he will incur debts beyond his
ability to pay as they mature. Id. § 6. "Fair consideration" was given for the property transferred by the debtor when the transferee in good faith either gave a "fair equivalent" or
when he took the property in good faith to secure a present advance or an antecedent debt
"not disproportionately small." Id. at § 3.
11. 34 & 35 Hen. 7, ch. 4 (1542).
12. Id.
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proceedings, all of the debtor's property was seized and distributed
to the creditors; the debtor was imprisoned; and the unpaid balances of creditors' claims were not discharged.' 3 Subsequent laws
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were also silent on
prebankruptcy preferential transfers; although, after the Act
of
14
bankruptcy.
in
avoidable
were
conveyances
1604, fraudulent
But King's Bench became concerned early with the preference
problem. A decision in 1584 held that the debtor's postbankruptcy
transfer of his goods to a single creditor in partial payment of that
creditor's claim would not prevent the commissioners who administered the Bankruptcy Act from later passing good title to the
same goods to a bona fide purchaser.' 5 The court supported its decision principally by reading the act to vest exclusive power to dispose of the bankrupt estate in the commissioners." But the court
also emphasized that the Act directed the commissioners "to make
disposition 'amongst the creditors, . . . to everyone a portion, rate
and rate alike, according to the quantity of their debts"' and observed "if, after the debtor became a bankrupt, he may prefer one
. . . and defeat and defraud many other poor men of their true
7
debts . . . it would be a great defect in the law.'
Thereafter, Lord Mansfield took up the matter in cases concerning prebankruptcy transfers by the debtor to a creditor. Mansfield noted two types of fraudulent conveyances: those made "to
defraud creditors" in violation of the Statute of Elizabeth, which
did not include preferences, and those made "to defraud the public
law of the land," which did include preferences in a bankruptcy
context.' 8 First, he held that when a debtor "on the eve of bankruptcy" transferred property to a creditor who had not demanded
payment, or threatened or brought suit, the debtor's purpose was
"manifestly to defeat the law" and "the equality intended by the
law."' 9 Consequently, the transfer was made "to defraud the...
Statutes of Bankruptcy" and was "absolutely void. ' 20 Later he
reached the same conclusion about a transfer of security "in contemplation of . . . bankruptcy" that a debtor gave to a creditor
13. Id.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See 1 Jac., ch. 15, § 5 (1604).
The Case of the Bankrupts, 36 Eng. Rep. 441 (K.B. 1584).
Id. at 473.
Id.
See Alderson v. Temple, 96 Eng. Rep. 384, 385 (K.B. 1768).
See id.
See id.
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whose claim was not yet due.2 Clearly, Mansfield was concerned
only with the debtor's purpose in paying or giving security.2 2 In a
later case, when the debtor on the day before bankruptcy paid a
creditor under a mistaken apprehension that the creditor was
about to resort to legal process, Mansfield found no preference.23
He stated that a debtor generally does not make a voluntary preference if he transfers "under fear of legal process. '24 But the
debtor here, "acting from mistake was under the same apprehensions of legal process as if the defendant had actually threatened
suit," so that the payment "was not a voluntary act. '2 5 Mansfield
apparently viewed as mutually exclusive the case in which the
debtor paid in response to the creditor's demand on a due debt to
which the debtor had no defense, and the case in which the debtor
acted solely on his own initiative. In the latter case, the debtor
acting "on the eve" or "in contemplation of' bankruptcy must
have intended to change the distribution among creditors in
2
bankruptcy.
Mansfield's views obviously influenced Parliament when it finally acted on the preference problem in 1869. Although the "eve
of bankruptcy" became any time within three months of bank21. Rust v. Cooper, 98 Eng. Rep. 1277, 1280 (K.B. 1777). The creditor did not demand
payment or threaten suit, and the transfer was made "with no other view whatsoever but to
defeat the equality of the bankruptcy laws." Id. at 1279-80.
22. "A general question has been started [sic], whether a man may or may not, on the
eve of bankruptcy, give a preference to a particular creditor? I think he may and he may
not. If one demands it first, or sues, him, or threatens him, without fraud, the preference is
good. But where it is manifestly to defeat the law, it is bad." Alderson, 96 Eng. Rep. at 385.
"If, in a fair course of business, a man pays a creditor who comes to be paid, notwithstanding the debtor's knowledge of his own affairs,. . . yet, being a fair transaction in the course
of business, the payment is good; for the preference is . . . not the object. . . ." Rust, 98
Eng. Rep. at 1280.
23. See Thomason v. Freeman, 99 Eng. Rep. 1026, 1028 (K.B. 1786).
24. "A bankrupt when in contemplation of his bankruptcy cannot by his voluntary act
favour any one creditor; but if under fear of legal process he gives a preference, it is evidence that he does not do it voluntarily." Id.
25. Id. Mansfield knew that the legal process to which an impatient creditor might
resort included a capias writ under which the debtor would be clapped into debtor's prison.
For more detail, see Countryman, A History of American Bankruptcy Law, 81 Cos- L.J.
226, 226-28 (1976).
26. At the time of Mansfield's decisions, only creditors could initiate bankruptcy proceedings on an involuntary petition. Their petitions had to allege the commission by the
debtor of an "act of bankruptcy." Many of those acts, however, enabled the debtor, if not to
avoid the petition, at least to affect its timing-failing to pay debts of $100 or more, abscon-

ding, taking sanctuary, or keeping to one's house. See 8 W.

HOLDSWORTH,

A

HISTORY OF

ENGLISH LAW 237-38 (2d ed. 1937). In Alderson v. Temple, the debtor "committed several
acts of bankruptcy" three days after the transfer. 96 Eng. Rep. at 385. In Rust v. Cooper,
the debtor stopped payments one day after the transfer. 98 Eng. Rep. at 1277-78.
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ruptcy, Parliament declared that every payment or other transfer
within the three month period to a creditor made or suffered by
one unable to pay his debts as they became due "with a view of
giving such creditor a preference over the other creditors" should
"be deemed fraudulent and void against the trustee of the bankrupt. '27 As reenacted in 188328 and again in 1914,29 the English
concept of preference remains virtually unchanged today,3 0 except
for a 1947 amendment that extended the preference period from
three to six months prior to bankruptcy. 31 Although the preference
in the English statute still is "deemed fraudulent and void" against
the bankruptcy trustee, fraud is no part of the definition. If the
debtor's "dominant" intent was to prefer the creditor, then the
good faith of the creditor is irrelevant. Moreover, since Mansfield's
time, courts have recognized that a creditor's demand for payment
will not preclude a finding that the debtor's "dominant" intent in
paying a debt was to prefer the creditor paid.2 Under the English
concept, therefore, a preference, which is not voidable outside of
bankruptcy, is a culpable act of the debtor with or without the
preferred creditor's complicity, who can be compelled to surrender
the property even though he received it in all innocence. This culpable act, like a fraudulent conveyance, is also an "act of bankruptcy" that will support a creditor's involuntary petition and will
forfeit the debtor's bankruptcy discharge.3 3
III. EARLIER AMERICAN CONCEPTS
Our first and short-lived federal Bankruptcy Act of 1800 followed the English model of that time. The Act was confined to
"traders" or merchants, and only creditors could initiate the bankruptcy proceeding on a petition alleging that the debtor committed
an "act of bankruptcy. ' 34 The statute gave the debtor a limited list
of exempt property and a limited discharge of the unpaid balances
27. 32 & 33 Vict., ch. 71, § 92 (1869).
28. 46 & 47 Vict., ch. 52, § 48 (1883).
29. 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 44 (1914).
30. Although the 1869 Act protected a "purchaser, payee, or incumbrancer in good
faith and for a valuable consideration," the 1883 and 1914 Acts made clear that the protection was confined to such a person claiming "through or under" the preferred creditor. 46 &
47 Vict., ch. 52, § 48 (1883); 4 & 5 Geo. 5, ch. 59, § 44 (1914).
31. 10 & 11 Geo. 6, ch. 47, § 116(3) (1947).
32. See R. WLiAms & M. HUNTER, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF BANKRUPTCY 346-50
(19th ed. 1979).
33. See id. at 123-25, 131-32.
34. 2 Stat. 19-21 (1800), repealed by 2 Stat. 248 (1803).
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of his debts.3 5 Fraudulent conveyances were acts of bankruptcy
and were avoidable,36 but the act said nothing about preferential
transfers.
Our second and equally short-lived Bankruptcy Act of 184111
went beyond the contemporary English practice. The Act not only
authorized creditors' involuntary proceedings for merchants but
also authorized voluntary proceedings on the debtor's own petition
for both merchants and nonmerchants.38 Both fraudulent conveyances and preferential transfers were voidable if made within two
months of bankruptcy or if made at an earlier time to a transferee
who had notice either of the debtor's commission of an act of
bankruptcy or of his intent to become a bankrupt.3 9 The Act defined the voidable preference as transfer to a creditor from a
debtor "in contemplation of bankruptcy, and for the purpose" of
giving the transferee a "preference or priority over the general
creditors.

40

The debtor who made either a preferential or a fraud-

ulent transfer forfeited his bankruptcy discharge. 41 But, even
though the fraudulent
conveyance was an act of bankruptcy, the
42
preference was not.

Our third and somewhat longer-lived Bankruptcy Act of
1867,'4 in its concern for the state of mind of the transferee, departed even further from the English concept of a preference. That
Act defined the voidable preference in two steps. First, a debtor
who was "insolvent, or in contemplation of insolvency" must have
made a transfer within four months before bankruptcy "with a
view to give a preference to any creditor.

4

4

Second, the creditor

must have possessed "reasonable cause to believe [the debtor] insolvent" and the transfer to be in fraud "of the provisions of this
act."4 5 The definition also covered judicial seizures of the debtor's

property under creditors' process that the debtor "procure[d]"
35. Id. This "fresh start" policy had been initiated in England in 1705. 4 Anne, ch. 17
(1705).
36. 2 Stat. at 21.
37. 5 Stat. 440 (1841), repealed by 5 Stat. 614 (1843).
38. Voluntary proceedings did not come in England until 1844, but its law was still
confined to merchants. 7 & 8 Vict., ch. 96 (1844). Parliament abolished the voluntary petition in 1869, 32 & 33 Vict., ch. 71 (1869), but restored it in 1883, 46 & 47 Vict., ch. 52 (1883).
39. 5 Stat. 440, § 2 (1841).
40. Id.
41. Id. § 4.
42. Id.
43. 14 Stat. 517 (1867), repealed by 20 Stat. 99 (1878).
44. 14 Stat. 517, § 35 (1867).
45. Id.
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within four months of bankruptcy. 46 Any such preferential transfer
or seizure, or any fraudulent conveyance, also constituted an act of
47
bankruptcy and barred the debtor's discharge.
Under the 1867 Act, the Supreme Court in Toof v. Martin4 8
sustained a finding of voidable preference when a merchant debtor
within six weeks of bankruptcy, after being presented with a creditor's bills which he could not pay, transferred real estate to the
creditor in exchange for partial credit on the unpaid bills and the
creditor's promise to continue supplying goods on credit. 49 Noting
that the Act did not provide a definition of insolvency, the Court
suggested that, for merchants, insolvency might mean the inability
to pay debts as they mature; 50 and for nonmerchants, the "general
and popular meaning" of insolvency was "the insufficiency of the
entire property . . . to pay . . . debts."51 The Court concluded,
however, that the debtor knew that he was insolvent under both
definitions at the time of the transfer.2 And, since everyone was
presumed to intend the necessary and probable consequences of
his acts, the Court ruled that the prebankruptcy transfer was "conclusive evidence that a preference was intended, unless the debtor
[could] show that he was at the time ignorant of his insolvency,
and that his affairs were such that he could reasonably expect to
pay all his debts. The burden of proof [was] on [the debtor] in
-53
such a case ....
The Court also found the creditor to have reasonable ground
to believe the debtor insolvent.5 4 Consequently, the creditor had
reasonable ground to believe that the debtor made the transfer "in
fraud of the provisions of the bankrupt [sic] act. ' 55 The Court reasoned that "any transfer made with a view to secure the property,
or any part of it, to one, and thus prevent an equal distribution, is
a transfer in fraud of the act. ' 56 Thus, our Court found a prefer46. Id.
47. Id. §§ 29-30. Parliament included the
English Act. 32 & 33 Vict., ch. 71; see also 32
48. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 40 (1871).
49. Id. at 41-42.
50. Id. at 47. This test is known as the
q 101.26 [1], [5] (L. King 15th ed. 1980).
51. Tool, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 47.
52. Id. at 47-48.
53. Id. at 48.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 51.
56. Id. After Toof, Congress amended the

same acts of bankruptcy in § 48 of the 1869
& 33 Vict., ch. 62, § 13(2) (1869).

equity test. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

1867 Act to require that the creditor "know"

that the debtor made the transfer in fraud of the provisions of the Act, even though he still
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ence when Lord Mansfield would not."'
Our fourth bankruptcy act, the Act of 1898,58 substantially revised by the Chandler Act of 1938," 9 remained in effect more than
eighty years until the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197860 repealed
and replaced it. Under the 1898 Act, if the debtor either made a
fraudulent conveyance or transferred any property while insolvent
to one or more creditors "with intent to prefer such creditors over
his other creditors," then the debtor committed an act of bankruptcy that would support a creditor's involuntary petition."1 Although such an intentional preference was characterized as one
embodying "an unworthy motive, 6 2 an intentional preference, unlike a fraudulent conveyance, would not bar a discharge.6
In defining the bankruptcy trustee's power to avoid preferences, it apparently occurred to someone, at least with respect to
some preferences, that the debtor's culpability was not important
and that some definition of the preference was in order. Hence,
section 60a provided:
[A debtor] shall be deemed to have given a preference if, being insolvent," he
has procured or suffered a judgment to be entered against himself [sic] in
favor of any person, or made a transfer of any of his property,6 5 and the effect
of the enforcement of such judgment or transfer [would] be to enable any one
of his creditors to obtain a 66greater percentage of his debt than any other such
creditor of the same class.
needed only reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent. At the same time, Congress
reduced the four month period to two months in involuntary cases. 18 Stat. 180 (1874).
57. See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.

58. 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
59. 52 Stat. 840 (1938).
60. 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982). The Reform Act became
effective on October 1, 1979.
61. 30 Stat. 544, § 3(a) (1898).
62. H.R. REP. No. 1228, 54th Cong., 1st Seas. 39 (1896).
63. 30 Stat. 544, § 14(b) (1898).
64. Section 1 defined insolvency to mean that the debtor's property was not "at a fair
valuation," "sufficient in amount to pay his debts." The definition excluded property that
the debtor conveyed or concealed with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors.
65. The House Committee on the Judiciary had recommended that the judgment be
procured or suffered or the transfer be made with "intent (1) to defeat the operation of this
act; or (2) to enable anyone of his creditors to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than
any other of such creditors of the same class," H.R.REP.No. 65, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess. 21
(1897), but the intent requirement was eliminated in Conference Committee. See S. Doc.
No. 294, 55th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1898).
66. 30 Stat. 544, § 60a. The 1898 Act, like the 1978 Reform Act, identified classes of
creditors in bankruptcy. By § 67d valid liens were recognized; by § 57h the collateral was
valued, that amount was deducted from the creditor's claim, and a dividend was paid only
on any unsecured deficiency; and by § 64 certain prepetition unsecured claims were given
priority in distribution.
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Section 60b further provided that if the preference occurred within
four months of bankruptcy and the creditor receiving it "had reasonable cause to believe that it was intended thereby to give a
preference," then the preference should be voidable by the
trustee.8
This earliest version of old section 60 seemed to say that the
debtor's intent in procuring or suffering the judgment or in making
the transfer was immaterial, but that the trustee could not avoid
the preference unless the creditor receiving it had reasonable cause
to believe that the debtor intended to give a preference. A separate
provision dealt with certain kinds of preferences: those judicial
liens obtained within four months of bankruptcy by attachment,
garnishment, execution, or other creditors' process. The trustee
could avoid the lien under section 67c if: (1) a creditor obtained
the lien while the debtor was insolvent and the lien "[would] work
a preference"; (2) the creditor "had reasonable cause to believe the
defendant [sic] was insolvent and in contemplation of bankruptcy"; or (3) the lien "was sought and permitted in fraud of the
provision of this Act." 8
Finally, section 57g provided that the "claims of creditors who
have received preferences shall not be allowed unless such creditors surrender their preferences." The Supreme Court construed
this last provision to apply to any creditor who had received a
preference as defined in section 60a 9 even though the preference
was not voidable under section 60b because the creditor did not
have reasonable cause to believe the debtor intended to give a
preference.7 0 Congress promptly amended section 57g to forbid the
allowance of claims of creditors who did not surrender "preferences voidable under" section 60b or fraudulent conveyances voidable under section 67e. 7 '
Another amendment in 191072 eliminated the anomaly of section 60b's requirement that the creditor have reasonable cause to
believe the debtor had an intent that section 60a did not require
the debtor to have. The amendment required preferential transfer67. 30 Stat. 544, § 60b.
68. Section 67f compounded confusion by authorizing the avoidance of all liens "obtained through legal proceedings against a person who is insolvent. . . within four months"
of bankruptcy. Cf. In re Tune, 115 F. 906, 911 (N.D. Ala. 1902) (suggesting that, because §
67f was "the latest utterance in point of time," it "destroys" § 67c).
69. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
70. Pirie v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 182 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1901).
71. 32 Stat. 797 (1903).
72. 36 Stat. 838 (1910).
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ees to have reasonable cause to believe that the enforcement of the
judgment or transfer "would effect a preference.

' 73

With this

amendment, the search for debtor culpability or other inquiry into
the debtor's state of mind disappeared from the American concept
of a voidable preference. The debtor's state of mind remained important only when the preference was treated as an act of bankruptcy supporting an involuntary petition7 4 or when section 67c
authorized avoidance of judicial liens within the four month period
' 75
if "sought and permitted in fraud of the provision of this Act."
The 1898 Act's definition in section 60a of a preferential effect
required that the preference enable the creditor to "obtain a
greater percentage of his debt than any other such creditor of the
same class."'7' The Supreme Court considered this definition in
Palmer Clay Products Co. v. Brown.77 Defendant, an unsecured,
nonpriority, general creditor, sought to defeat the bankruptcy trustee's preference action to recover partial payments made to defendant. He argued that the trustee must prove that the alleged preference left the debtor with insufficient assets to pay the same
portion of the claims of other creditors in defendant's class. The
Court, however, explained that defendant was talking about the
wrong time: defendant focused on the debtor's financial condition
immediately after the transfer; he should have focused on the
bankruptcy distribution to creditors of his class.78 The Court
reasoned:
The payment on account of say 10% within the four months will necessarily
result in [the creditor paid] receiving a greater percentage than other creditors [of his class], if the distribution . . .is less than 100%. For where the
creditor's claim is $10,000, the payment on account $1000, and the distribution in bankruptcy 50%, the creditor to whom the payment on account is
made receives $5500 [the $1000 paid plus 50% of the $9000 balance of his
claim], while another creditor [of the same class] to whom the same amount
was owing and no payment on account was made will receive only $5000. 79

This will always be true, no matter what class the preferred
creditor was in, as long as at least one other creditor in the class
was not similarly paid and the dividend to the class was less than
100%. Because a bankruptcy case in which the dividend to un73.
74.
75.
did not
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
The trustee could avoid even these liens under alternative provisions in § 67f that
implicate the debtor's state of mind. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
30 Stat. 544, § 60a (1898).
297 U.S. 227 (1936).
Id. at 229.
Id.

724

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:713

secured, nonpriority, general creditors was 100% was rare indeed,
this interpretation meant that the preferential effect test for voidable preferences offered little protection to this type of creditor."
But it worried some law professors, although the problem never
seemed to arise in the cases, that, by focusing solely on the preferred creditor's class, the statutory preferential effect test would
permit the debtor to prefer a junior class over a senior class.
The extensive revision in 1938 tidied up the 1898 Act, but
changed little in substantive preference law. The Act still required
the debtor's intent to prefer when the preference was treated as an
act of bankruptcy on an involuntary petition."' Courts were to disallow creditor's claims until they surrendered any transfers made
voidable under the Act.82 Congress dropped preferential judgments
from section 60a, which was confined to transfers that insolvent
debtors made to creditors within four months of bankruptcy "for
or on account of an antecedent debt" and with preferential effect."
Transfers covered by section 60a were voidable under section 60b
if the creditor had "reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent" when the debtor made the transfer.84 Finally, Congress replaced the conflicting provisions of section 67c and 67f"5 with a
new section 67a(1), which empowered the trustee to avoid judicial
liens that the creditor acquired within four months of bankruptcy
80. Even after the 1903 amendment to § 57g, see supra note 71 and accompanying
text, this interpretation also meant that the creditor who had received a voidable preference
for a part of his claim and who did not surrender it would receive no dividend in the bankruptcy case. If the creditor filed a claim for the unpaid balance, the trustee could object to
the allowance of the claim under § 57g and could get an order requiring a turnover of the
preference. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 330-31 (1966). Alternatively, the court might
order the claim disallowed unless and until the creditor surrendered the preference. Bronx
Brass Foundry, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 297 U.S. 230, 230-32 (1936). A problem remained
for the creditor whose claim was fully paid by a voidable preference because the creditor
had no claim to file unless he voluntarily surrendered or was compelled to surrender his
preference. Although § 57n limited the time for filing claims to six months after the date
first set for a creditors' meeting, a 1938 amendment added a proviso allowing a creditor to
fie a claim within 30 days of the trustee's recovery of a transfer, provided that the creditor
surrendered the property to the trustee within 30 days after final judgment for recovery. 52
Stat. 840, § 57n (1938).
81. 52 Stat. 840, § 3a (1938).
82. Id. § 57g.
83. HousE JUDICIARY COMM., 74th Cong., 2d Sess., AN ANALYSiS OF H. 12889 188
(Comm. Print 1936); HR. RFP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 675 (1937). Both documents
explained that the language on preferential effect remained substantially unchanged in
§ 60a to preserve the ruling in Palmer Clay Prods. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
84. 52 Stat. 840, § 60 (1938).
85. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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if the lien was (a) acquired while the debtor was insolvent or (b)
"sought and permitted in fraud of the provisions of this Act." 6
Congress also amended the definition of "transfer" in section 1 to
include every disposition of property or an interest therein "or of
fixing a lien upon property or upon an interest therein,. . . voluntarily or involuntarily, by or without judicial proceedings. 8 7 Because creditors usually acquired these liens for antecedent debt,
nearly all such judicial liens acquired within four months of bankruptcy were also subject to section 60 if the preferred creditor had
reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent. Furthermore, in
1952 Congress eliminated the debtor's intent to prefer as a requirement for the preference to be treated as an act of bankruptcy. The
new provision required only that the debtor made a preferential
transfer "as defined in" section 60a.88
Thus, for the last forty years under the old Act, the debtor's
state of mind was of no concern in establishing voidable preferences.89 But, for the entire history of the old Act, a trustee seeking
under section 60 to avoid a preference acquired within the four
month period prior to bankruptcy had to prove something about
the state of mind of the transferee-creditor. For the last forty
years, the trustee had to prove that the creditor had reasonable
cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent. But, oddly enough,
if the creditor had moved within the four month period under section 67a to obtain a judicial lien on the property of an insolvent
debtor-a case that Lord Mansfield would not regard as a "fraud
on the Act"s°0 -the trustee's case was easier. The Act required no
proof regarding the creditor's state of mind either.
86. 52 Stat. 840, § 67b(1) (1938).
87. Id. § 1.
88. 66 Stat. 420 (1952).
89. A possible exception existed when the trustee seeking to avoid a judicial lien was
unable to establish that the debtor was insolvent when the lien was acquired. The trustee
could attempt alternatively to establish under § 67a(1)(B) that the lien was "sought and
permitted in fraud of the provision of this Act." See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
In the one recorded instance of a trustee invoking this provision-as it earlier appeared in
§ 67c(3), see supra note 68 and accompanying text-the trustee succeeded in avoiding an
attachment obtained while the debtor was solvent, but within four months of bankruptcy.
The court did not consider the debtor's state of mind because the court read Toot v. Martin,
see supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text, to hold that "any proceedings disturbing the
equitable distribution of the debtor's estate" were "in fraud of the provisions of this Act"
and read "permitted" to require no more than "[m]ere passivity on the part of the debtor."
In re Pollmann, 156 F. 221, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1907).
90. See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE REFORM ACT AND LATER AMENDMENTS
A.

The Basic Concept

The draftsmen of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 addressed the difference in treatment of the two kinds of preferential
transfers by almost entirely eliminating any requirement that the
creditor have reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent. The
federal Commission that drafted the first version of the Reform
Act identified the following three goals for the preference section
of the Act: "First, it lessens the possibility of a scramble among
creditors for advantage; second, it promotes equality [among
classes]; and third, it eliminates the incentive to make unwise
loans in order to obtain a preferential payment or security.""1 The
Commission proposed a new preference section, which eliminated
the requirement that the creditor have reasonable cause to believe
the debtor insolvent. The section provided that the debtor was
presumed to be insolvent during the period of preference vulnerability, which was reduced from four to three months as a rough
trade-off for easing the trustee's evidentiary burden. To all of this
there was one exception. Preferences received by creditors who
were insiders of the debtor from one year to three months before
bankruptcy were voidable if the debtor was insolvent 92 at the time
of the transfer and if the insider-creditor had reasonable cause to
believe the debtor insolvent at that time.93 Because the Commission eliminated reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent as
a requirement for all transfers except transfers to insider-creditors,
providing a counterpart to old section 67a dealing with judicial
liens was unnecessary. The same section applicable to other preferential transfers could deal with these liens.94 Thus would disappear
from American bankruptcy law the concept of a "fraud on the Act"
91. Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H. Doc.
No. 137, pt. I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 202 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Commission Report]. The
Commission, with assistance from J. MAcLACHLAN, BANKRupTcY § 284 (1956), attributed the
third goal to Daniel Webster, who argued for a preference provision in an early Massachusetts insolvency law. But § 60c of the former Bankruptcy Act, enacted in 1898 and unchanged thereafter, provided that a creditor who had received a voidable preference could
set off in the trustee's avoidance action the amount of any unsecured credit he had extended
after the voidable transfer. This result does not seem fully consistent with the third goal.
92. No presumption of insolvency was applicable during this extended period.
93. See Commission Report, supra note 91, pt. II, at 166. The Commission did not use
the term "insider" but applied this provision to a creditor who was "a member of the immediate family, a partner, an affiliate, a director, an officer, or a managing agent of the debtor."

Id.
94.

See id., pt. I, at 204.
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embodied in old section 67a. 5
During congressional hearings on the Commission proposals,
no one stated opposition, and for that reason, the proposals received little attention. The National Bankruptcy Conference

6

fully

endorsed the proposals. In a written statement submitted in the
hearings, this organization defended the presumption of insolvency
as a feature that "will undoubtedly lessen litigation and achieve
more equality of treatment" because "[ilt is a rare bankruptcy case
in which the debtor was not insolvent during the. . . three month
period. '9 7 Also, the Conference's spokesman addressed elimination

of the requirement that the creditor have reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent:
95. In explanation of its proposal the Commission said:
The requirements of establishing insolvency and reasonable cause to believe the
debtor was insolvent have generated immense amounts of litigation. It can be seriously
questioned whether insolvency should be an element, in light of the fact that the
debtor is involved in a bankruptcy case. Such a requirement has nothing to do with
equality, avoiding the grab-bag effect, or preventing unwise loans. On the other hand, it
is justified on the basis of tradition and the fact that the payment is perfectly proper
but for the subsequent bankruptcy. The same cannot be said about reasonable cause to
believe. That requirement, more than any other, has rendered ineffective the preference section of the present Act.
Id. For an example of the obstacle the reasonable cause to believe requirement posed for the
bankruptcy trustee, see the most recent case on that point decided under the old Act: Bernstein v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 730 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1984).
As indicated supra note 89, the statutory formulation of "fraud on the Act" had received very little attention. In Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438 (1917), however, a mortgagee
took a mortgage from the debtor to secure a loan, even though the mortgagee knew that the
insolvent debtor would use the loan proceeds to prefer another creditor. The Court held
that the mortgage was a transfer "the intent (or obviously necessary effect) of which [was]
to deprive creditors of the benefits sought to be secured by the Bankruptcy Act" and was,
therefore, a transfer made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors within the
meaning of old § 67e. Id. at 444. Congress twice thereafter tried to codify this ruling in old
§ 67d(3). See 52 Stat. 878 (1938), 66 Stat. 428 (1952). Many believed, however, that neither
attempt was successful. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUTPCY 67.38 (14th ed. 1978). The Commission recommended that Congress drop the attempted codification and leave such transactions to other provisions that enabled the trustee generally to avoid transfers made with
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. See Commission Report, supra note 91, pt. I,
at 211-12; pt. II, at 177. Congress has followed that recommendation. But cf. In re Cushman
Bakery, 526 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 937 (1976) (in which I failed in an
attempt to obtain a modest extension of the approach taken in Dean v. Davis to a situation
not covered by § 67d (3)).
96. The National Bankruptcy Conference is an organization of bankruptcy practitioners, bankruptcy judges, and teachers of bankruptcy law. It was formed in 1932 in connection
with the 1938 revision of the Bankruptcy Act and has been active since that time on virtually all amendments to bankruptcy law. I have been a member since 1963.
97. Bankruptcy Act Revision: HearingsBefore Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Judiciary Comm. on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 1841
(1976).
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Logically and theoretically, the knowledge of the recipient of the preference
has nothing to do with equality of distribution. Equality is determined by the
fact that all creditors are being treated reasonably alike. So, if two creditors
received a payment. . . and one had knowledge and one did not of the insolvency of the debtor, that has really no relevance to equality of treatment.
Second, this element has been a constant source of litigation. It has been
used by creditors more or less as a shield. There are a great many cases where
the creditor was well aware of the financial difficulties of the debtor but managed to escape the recovery of a preference because the trustee just was not
able to meet the burden of proof.0 8

Congress accepted the Commission's proposals 9 in the definition of a voidable preference in new section 547(b) and in the presumption of insolvency in section 547(f), and defined the "transfer" to which section 547(b) applies to include involuntary
transfers such as judicial liens. 10 0
98. Id. at 1855 (statement of Mr. Leon Forman). As another experienced but less diplomatic witness later put it, the requirement "put a premium on lying, because if the recipient simply said: 'I know nothing,' how could the trustee get around that denial of knowledge?" Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Courts of the
Senate JudiciaryComm. on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 244
(1981) (statement of Mr. Leonard Rosen).
99. Congress, however, changed the three month period to a more precise 90 days. The
congressional draftsmen were acutely aware that all months are not of equal length, although they took no account of leap year.
100. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(48), 547(b), 547(f) (1982). The House Committee Report offered
the following explanation:
The purpose of the preference section is two-fold. First, by permitting the trustee to
avoid prebankruptcy transfers that occur within a short period before bankruptcy,
creditors are discouraged from racing to the courthouse to dismember the debtor during his slide into bankruptcy. The protection thus afforded the debtor often enables
him to work his way out of a difficult financial situation through cooperation with all of
his creditors. Second, and the more important, the preference provisions facilitate the
prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among creditors of the debtor. Any
creditor that received a greater payment than others of his class is required to disgorge
so that all may share equally. The operation of the preference section to deter "the
race of diligence" of creditors to dismember the debtor before bankruptcy furthers the
second goal of the preference section-that of equality of distribution.
The current preference section contains several impediments to the proper functioning of these two policies. First, the preference section requires the bankruptcy trustee to prove the debtor's insolvency at the time the preferential transfer was made.
Given the state of most debtor's books and records, such a task is nearly impossible.
Given the financial condition of nearly all debtors in the three months before bankruptcy, the task is also generally not worth the effort. Rarely is a debtor solvent during
the three months before bankruptcy. Thus, the preference section requires the trustee
to prove a fact that nearly always exists yet never can be proved with certainty. This
factor leads to far fewer preference recoveries than otherwise would be the case. Because of the difficulty of proof, creditors are not deterred from the race of diligence,
and the policy of equality is defeated.
Second, the trustee must show that the creditor for whose benefit the preferential
transfer was made had "reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent at the
time of the transfer." This provision was designed when the primary purpose of the
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Under section 502(d), 10 1 creditors must still surrender voidable
transfers before their claims will be allowed. Moreover, section
502(h) 10 2 and Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c)(3) still make provisions for
the creditor who has no claim to file until a voidable transfer is
recovered, just as under the old Act.10 3 "Acts of bankruptcy" have
disappeared in the Reform Act. Although the content of some former acts of bankruptcy remains, without the label, as grounds for
an involuntary petition under section 303(h), 0 that section includes neither preferences nor fraudulent conveyances. Finally, a
fraudulent conveyance will bar a discharge under section
727(a)(2),10 5 but a preference will not.10 6
One consequence of the Reform Act changes, as the reported
cases reveal, has been that, in most cases, the creditor-defendant in
preference section was to prevent the race of diligence. Whether or not a creditor
knows or believes that his debtor is sliding into bankruptcy is important if the only
purpose of the preference section is to deter the race. However, a creditor's state of
mind has nothing whatsoever to do with the policy of equality of distribution, and
whether or not he knows of the debtor's insolvency does little to comfort other creditors similarly situated who will receive that much less from the debtor's estate as a
result of the prebankruptcy transfer to the preferred creditor. To argue that the creditor's state of mind is an important element of a preference and that creditors should
not be required to disgorge what they took in supposed innocence is to ignore the
strong bankruptcy policy of equality among creditors. Finally, the requirement that the
trustee prove the state of mind of his opponent is nearly insurmountable, and defeats
many preference actions. The amount of litigation it causes is too great when the requirement itself does not further any necessary bankruptcy policy. It also defeats the
policy of the preference section by limiting recoveries to only the most egregious cases.
To remedy these two defects in the preference section, H.R. 8200 eliminates the
reasonable cause to believe requirement for transfers made during the 90-day period
preceding bankruptcy, and creates a presumption of insolvency during that period. The
presumption does not shift the burden of proof on the issue of insolvency away from
the trustee. Rather, it is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence, which state that
the presumption merely requires the party against whom it is directed (in this case, the
transferee of the preference) to go forward to present some evidence to overcome the
presumption. Once he does, the ultimate burden of proof remains with the bankruptcy
trustee. [See FED. R. EvID. 301]. These two changes should lead to a reduction in litigation and more efficient administration. They will further the goals of the preference
section and provide fairer results to all creditors of the debtor.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177-79 (1977).
101. 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (1982).
102. Id. § 502(h).
103. See supra note 80.
104. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h) (1982).
105. Id. § 727(a)(2).
106. In order to keep this Article within acceptable bounds, I will leave to another day
certain aspects of current preference law that do not seem fundamental to the basic concept:
(1) the definition of an "insider" in 11 U.S.C. § 101(25) and (2) the significance of the requirements in 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) that a voidable preference must be a transfer of an interest
of the debtor in property and "to or for the benefit of a creditor."
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a preference action makes no effort to rebut the section 547(f) presumption of the debtor's insolvency 0 7 within the ninety day
prebankruptcy period, and the presumption carries the day for the
trustee or other party attacking the preference18 on the insolvency
issue. 10 9 Also, several courts have held the defendant's evidence in107. The test of solvency under § 101(29) is still whether the debtor's assets "at a fair
valuation" exceed the sum of his debts. The Reform Act, however, excludes exempt property as well as that fraudulently conveyed or concealed from the calculation. Cf. supra note
64.
Under FED. R. EvD. 301, "a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but
does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion,
which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast."
108. The "other party attacking the preference" might be an individual debtor attacking an involuntary preference under 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(h) and 547 to claim exemption in the
transferred property when the trustee has not attacked the transfer under § 547. It might
also be a debtor in possession in Chapter 11 who, under 11 U.S.C. § 1107, has all the powers
of a trustee. Moreover, in some Chapter 11 cases, the court has allowed a creditor's committee to pursue preferences when the debtor in possession did not do so. See, e.g., In re Four
Seasons Sporting Goods, Inc., 46 Bankr. 528 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1985); In re Philadelphia
Light Supply Co., 39 Bankr. 51 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); In re Jones, 37 Bankr. 969 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1984); In re Joyanna Holitogs, Inc., 21 Bankr. 323 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re
Monsour Medical Center, 5 Bankr. 715 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1980); cf. In re Amarex, Inc., 36
Bankr. 59 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1984) (refusing permission to unsecured creditors to pursue
preferences in a Chapter 13 case); In re Bridges, 31 Bankr. 27, 29 Bankr. 716 (Bankr. W.D.
Ky. 1983) (court refused permission for unsecured creditors in a Chapter 11 case to pursue a
preference action and, additionally, refused to order the trustee to initiate a preference action). Also, In re J.E. Jennings, Inc., 46 Bankr. 167 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985), held that the
reorganized debtor could pursue preference actions after confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan
if the plan provided that the bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction for that purpose and if
any recovery was to be distributed to creditors.
109. See In re Barash, 658 F.2d 504, 507 (7th Cir. 1981); In re Economy Milling Co.,
37 Bankr. 914, 919 (D.S.C. 1983) (presumption not unconstitutional); In re Air Florida, Inc.,
48 Bankr. 437, 440 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); In re Jaggers, 48 Bankr. 33, 36 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1985); In re Property Leasing & Management, Inc., 46 Bankr. 903, 911, 916 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1985); In re Bob Grissett Golf Shoppes, Inc., 44 Bankr. 156, 158 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1984); In re R&T Roofing Structures & Commercial Framing, Inc., 42 Bankr. 908, 910
(Bankr. D. Nev. 1984); In re Crump, 42 Bankr. 636, 637 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1984); In re
Independent Clearing House Co., 41 Bankr. 985, 1011 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984); In re Harley,
41 Bankr. 276, 278-79 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984); In re Jorges Carpet Mills, Inc., 41 Bankr. 60,
62 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984); In re P.M.R.C. Corp., 39 Bankr. 912, 913 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1984); In re Kirk, 38 Bankr. 257, 259 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1984); In re General Office Furniture
Wholesalers, Inc., 37 Bankr. 180, 183 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984); In re Bennett, 35 Bankr. 357,
359 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984); In re Jameson's Foods, Inc., 35 Bankr. 433, 437 (Bankr. D.S.C.
1983); In re Cosmopolitan Aviation Corp., 34 Bankr. 592, 594 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); In re
Balducci Oil Co., 33 Bankr. 843, 846 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983); In re Kennesaw Mint, Inc., 32
Bankr. 799, 803 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983); In re Biddle, 31 Bankr. 449, 455 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1983); In re Ciavarella, 28 Bankr. 823, 824 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Vann, 26 Bankr.
148, 149 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983); In re Brame, 26 Bankr. 309, 312 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982);
In re Formaggio Mfg., Inc., 23 Bankr. 688, 692 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1982); In re Maytag Sales and
Serv., Inc., 23 Bankr. 384, 386 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982); In re Thomas Farm Sys., Inc., 18
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sufficient to rebut the presumption, with the same result. 110 In only
eight cases have courts held the defendant's evidence sufficient to
meet the presumption. In four of those cases, the courts held that
the trustee carried his burden of proof on insolvency;""" in the
11 2
other four, the courts held that he did not.
Bankr. 543, 544 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); In re Belize Airways Ltd., 18 Bankr. 485, 489-90
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); In re IMI, Inc., 17 Bankr. 784, 787 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1982) (although the trustee lost in an effort to avoid other preferential payments to an insider more
than 90 days before bankruptcy when the presumption does not apply); In re Lucasa Int'l,
Ltd., 14 Bankr. 980, 982 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Lucasa Int'l, Ltd., 13 Bankr. 596, 600
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Camp Rockhill, Inc., 12 Bankr. 829, 833 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1981); In re Amato, 10 Bankr. 120, 122 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); In re National Buy-Rite,
Inc., 7 Bankr 407, 410 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); In re Duffy, 3 Bankr 263, 265 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Butler, 3 Bankr. 182, 186 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980); In re Thrifty
Supermarket, Inc., 1 C.B.C.2d 823, 824 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980); cf. In re Brooks, 44 Bankr.
963, 965 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984) (creditor-defendant put in no evidence, but trustee's evidence showed solvency at the time of the transfer).
110. See In re Emerald Oil Co., 695 F.2d 833, 838 (5th Cir. 1983) (testimony of defendant's accountant that the trustee's accountant "may have" undervalued debtor's assets); In
re Pippin, 46 Bankr. 281, 284 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1984) (evidence that debtor was solvent five
months before bankruptcy); In re Group Dev. Corp., 43 Bankr. 665, 668 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1984) (debtor unable to pay debts as they came due); In re Keydata Corp., 37 Bankr. 324,
327 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (evidence that debtor was "current in its bills"); In re Goodman
Indus., Inc., 21 Bankr. 512, 521 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (even though trustee lost in an effort
to avoid a separate fraudulent conveyance made seven months before bankruptcy under 11
U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(i) because he failed to prove debtor's insolvency); In re Valles
Mechanical Indus., Inc., 20 Bankr. 350, 353 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982) (defendant's president
unaware of debtor's insolvency); In re K. Pritchard Co., 17 Bankr. 508, 509 (Bankr. S.D.
Ala. 1981) (defendant unaware of debtor's insolvency).
111. See In re A. Fassnacht & Sons, Inc., 45 Bankr. 209, 210 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984);
In re Rocky Mountain Ethanol Sys., Inc., 21 Bankr. 707, 709-10 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981); In re
Utility Stationery Stores, Inc., 12 Bankr. 170, 175-79 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981); In re Eichorn,
11 Bankr. 81, 83 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981).
112. See In re Brooks, 44 Bankr. 963, 965 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984); In re Debman
Corp., 21 Bankr. 858, 863 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); In re Thomas Farm Sys., Inc., 18 Bankr.
541, 542-43 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); In re Briarbrook Dev. Corp., 11 Bankr. 514, 519-20
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981). As indicated supra note 64, the definition of insolvency in the old
Bankruptcy Act excluded only property fraudulently concealed or transferred. In re Utrecht
Coal Co., 63 F.2d 745, 746 (2d Cir. 1933), and In re Doscher, 120 F. 408, 413-14 (E.D.N.Y.
1902), however, held that, in determining whether the debtor was insolvent at the time of
an alleged preference, the court must include property covered by the alleged preference. In
re Big Three Transp. Co., 41 Bankr. 16, 20 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1983), and In re Beck, 25
Bankr. 947, 953 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982), concluded that the same rule should apply under
the new definition, see supra note 107, but found the debtor insolvent even after including
the transferred property. See also In re Sportfame of Ohio, Inc., 40 Bankr. 42, 55 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1984). But in In re Smith, 21 Bankr. 345 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982), the challenged
transfer consisted of an execution levy on debtor's residence, which later was allowed to her
as an exempt homestead in the bankruptcy case. The court excluded the value of the homestead in determining insolvency at the time of the transfer and the preferential effect of the
transfer. Id. at 350-51. In In re Pereau, 37 Bankr. 902 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984), the court
found the debtor insolvent at the time of a preferential execution levy after excluding the
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Another consequence of the 1978 Act was that the trustee or
other person attacking a preference no longer had to concern himself with the creditor-defendant's state of mind, except when the
challenger aimed the attack at a transfer to an insider-creditor
made during the period ninety days to one year before bankruptcy.11 s But one of many amendments to the Reform Act made
in July 1984 eliminated that burden even for insider-transferees.
Apparently Congress did not eliminate the requirement as a deliberate policy choice, but as a matter of legislative accident. I have
elsewhere characterized the 1984 amendments as establishing a
record for "inept performance by Congress,"1 14 and this particular
115
amendment is a prize example.
value of the homestead exemption but including in his liability a debt secured by a mortgage on the homestead.
113. In re Caro Prods., Inc., 746 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1984), held that the trustee constitutionally could apply the new definition of a preference to a transferee-creditor who had no
reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent. Even though the transfer occurred before
the October 1, 1979, effective date of the Reform Act, it occurred after the November 6,
1978, date of enactment. Thus, under this decision the new definition applies to all preferences occurring before the effective date but within 90 days of bankruptcy.
114. Countryman, Scramble to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The Chief Justice,
the Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARv. J. LEG. 1, 40 (1985). A bill
has been introduced to correct some of the more glaring errors. S. 529, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985).
115. In 1981 Senator Dole's subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee held
hearings devoted primarily to a variety of amendments to the Reform Act proposed by the
consumer credit industry. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings Before Subcomm. on
Courts of the Senate JudiciaryComm. on The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (Apr. 3 and 6, 1981) [hereinafter cited as April 1981 Senate Hearings]; Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (FutureEarnings):Hearings Before Subcomm. on Courts of the
Senate JudiciaryComm. on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct.
29, 1981). At the hearings, creditors proposed an exception from § 547 treatment for payments on consumer debts-or at least an exception for payments not exceeding $750 within
the 90 day period-unless the creditor had reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent.
April 1981 Senate Hearings, supra, at 92, 92-94, 150, 158, 171-72, 181-82. Thereafter, the
Senate Judiciary Committee reported out a bill that would reintroduce the reasonable cause
to believe the debtor insolvent requirement for all voidable preferences. S. REP. No. 446 to
accompany S.2000, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 23-24 (1982). Tucked away under a subtitle for
"Consumer Credit Amendments," the same provision appeared in a bill that Senator Dole
introduced the following year. The Committee also reported out that bill, S. REP. No. 65 to
accompany S.445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1983), and then it was tacked on, 129 CONG.
REc. $535F7, S5363 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1983), as an amendment to another bill, S.1013, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), designed to deal with the problem of bankruptcy court jurisdiction
raised in Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1981). That bill
passed the Senate in 1983. 129 CONG. REc. S5364, S5370 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1983).
No similar provision passed the House in 1983. In 1984, however, the House passed a
bill, H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., that was .designed to deal with the court jurisdiction
problem and that contained a number of substantive provisions including an exemption
from the preference section for transfers of less than $600 by individual consumer debtors.
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For the final aspect of the definition of a preference now contained in section 547(b)-the requirement of a preferential effect-the Bankruptcy Commission proposed to retain from old section 60a the requirement that the preference enable the creditor to
obtain a greater percentage of his debt than other creditors of the
same class in order to preserve the rule of Palmer Clay Products
Co. v. Brown.116 But the Commission also would have added a requirement that there be "no unpaid creditor of a higher class" in
order to eliminate the possibility of the debtor's preferring a junior
class over a senior class. 117 The House staff rewrote this proposal to
cover both matters under a somewhat different formulation in section 547(b)(5). Preferential effect occurs when the transfer enables
the creditor to receive more than he would have if the transfer had
not been made and if he were to get the distribution provided for
130 CONG. REC. H1840 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1984). When that bill reached the Senate, Senator
Thurmond introduced extensive amendments, including the provision that earlier passed
the Senate, reinstating the reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent requirement for
all preferential transfers. 130 CONG. REC. S6082, S6122 (daily ed. May 21, 1984). This bill
languished in the Senate for a month as Congress repeatedly enacted short-term extensions
of the terms of sitting bankruptcy judges. The Reform Act originally scheduled their terms
to expire April 1, 1984, with the last extension expiring June 27, 1984. 98 Stat. 116, 163, 214,
268 (1984). Finally, on June 19, Senator Thurmond announced that, in order to get Senator
Metzenbaum's agreement to expedite debate, he was withdrawing a number of his proposed
amendments, including the one reinstating the reasonable cause to believe requirement for
all preferences. 130 CONG. REC. S7617 (daily ed. June 19, 1984). The bill passed the Senate
on June 19, id. at S7625; both Houses agreed to a Conference Report, H.R. REP. No. 582,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), on June 29, 130 CONG. REc. H7500, S8900 (daily ed. June 29,
1984); and the President signed the bill on July 10. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
The legislative accident occurred at conference. Senator Thurmond's preference amendment would have added a new paragraph (6) to § 547(b), requiring that all preferred creditors must have reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent for the preference
to be voidable. Accordingly, the amendment also would have deleted the reasonable cause
requirement from paragraph (4)(B), which deals with transfers to insider-creditors between
90 days and one year before bankruptcy. 130 CONG. REC. 86122 (daily ed. May 21, 1984).
The Conference Report deleted the proposed new paragraph (6) but did not remove the
deletion from paragraph (4)(B). H.R. REP. No. 882, supra, at 73. Although Senators Dole
and DeConcini attempted in October, 130 Cong. Rec. S13771 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984), to
create some retroactive legislative history to paper over two of the many other accidents in
the 1984 amendments, they either had not yet discovered this one or did not believe that
they could paper it over.
The 1984 amendment to § 547(b) was enacted July 10, 1984, but applies only in cases
filed 90 days thereafter. Preferences to insiders within 90 days of bankruptcy were voidable
under the Reform Act even if the preferee had no reasonable cause to believe the debtor
insolvent. Therefore, retroactive application of the accidental amendment to preferred insiders does not seem to present the constitutional problem that In re Caro Prods., Inc.
contained. See supra note 113.
116. 297 U.S. 227 (1936); see supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
117. See Commission Report, supra note 91, pt. II, at 166, 170-71.
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in a liquidation case under Chapter 7.
Although this formulation does expand the focus of inquiry
from the creditor-defendant's class to embrace the preference of a
junior class over a senior class,1" 8 it does not mean that classes of
claims are now unimportant. Under section 506(a), 1 9 secured
claims are secured only to the extent of the value of their collateral; any excess of claim over collateral is unsecured. Priorities
among several unsecured claims are prescribed by section 507.120
Unsecured, nonpriority claims are next in line, but secured or unsecured claims subordinated under section 510121 may constitute
even lower classes. These classes determine what the allegedly preferred creditor would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation case within
the meaning of section 547(b)(5).
Moreover, section 547(b)(5) requires that, in a Chapter 11 or a
Chapter 13 case, the effect of the alleged preference be tested by
what the defendant would have received in a purely hypothetical
Chapter 7 distribution. 12 2 In applying this test, it behooves counsel
and the court to recall certain differences found only in the Chapter 7 distribution:
(1) Under section 724(a),' 2 3 in Chapter 7 cases only, the trustee may avoid a lien securing a claim for a "fine, penalty, or forfeiture, or for multiple, exemplary, or punitive damages," to the extent that the claim is "not compensation for actual pecuniary loss."
(2) Under section 724(b)(2),224 in Chapter 7 cases only, a lien
securing tax claims is subordinated to the first five priorities specified in section 507(a).1 25
118. The Committee Reports noted:
Under this language, the Court must focus on the relative distribution between classes
as well as the amount that will be received by the members of the class of which the
preferee is a member. The language also requires the court to focus on the allowability
of the claim for which the preference was made. If the claim would have been entirely
disallowed, for example, then the test of paragraph (5) will be met, because the creditor
would have received nothing under the distribution provisions of the bankruptcy code.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 100, at 372; S. RzP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1978).
119. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982).
120. Id. § 507.
121. Id. § 510.
122. Similarly, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7) and 1325(a)(4) require the court in confirming
plans under Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 to test the plan by the amount certain creditors
would receive in a hypothetical Chapter 7 distribution.
123. 11 U.S.C. § 724(a (1982).
124. Id. § 724(b)(2).
125. A tax lien should be subordinated to the first six priorities specified in § 507(a),
and doubtless would have been by 1984 amendment if the 1984 draftsmen had not forgotten
that they amended § 507(a) to create a new fifth priority that relegated unsecured tax

1985]

VOIDABLE PREFERENCE

735

(3) Under section 725, in Chapter 7 cases only, creditors with
nonvoidable, nonsubordinated liens, if their collateral has not been
abandoned under section 554,126 if such creditors have not received
relief from the automatic stay of section 362(d) 12 7 to foreclose, and
if the trustee has not sold their collateral free of liens pursuant to
section 363(f), 28 should be given access to their collateral.12 9
(4) Under section 726(a) and (b),1 30 in Chapter 7 cases only,
priority claims are to be paid in the order specified in section
507.131 If, however, the trustee does not have enough funds to pay a
specified class in full, he must pay the claims within the class pro
rata.1 32 If the trustee has more than enough funds to pay all section 507 priority claims, section 726133 provides additional priorities in the order of distribution for Chapter 7 cases only.
Beyond these matters, most courts have had no difficulty in
claims from sixth to seventh priority.
126. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1982).
127. Id. § 362(d).
128. Id. § 363(0. If the trustee does sell their collateral, § 363(e) entitles secured creditors to adequate protection of their interest in the collateral that, "[m]ost often,. . . will be
to have [their] interest attach to the proceeds of sale." HR REP. No. 595, supra note 100, at
345; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 118, at 56.
129. 11 U.S.C. § 725 (1982). Section 725 is rather inscrutable. When the provision read
as it now does (except that the court was to "determine the appropriate disposition" after
notice and hearing, and the trustee was to "dispose of the property in accordance with such
determination"), the Committee Reports explained that § 725
requires the court to determine the appropriate disposition of property in which the
estate and an entity other than the estate have an interest. It would apply, for example,
to property subject to a lien or property co-owned by the estate and another entity.
The court must make the determination with respect to property that is not disposed
of under another section of the bankruptcy code, such as by abandonment under section 554, by sale or distribution under 363, or by allowing foreclosure by a secured
creditor by lifting the stay under section 362. The purpose of the section is to give the
court appropriate authority to ensure that collateral or its proceeds is returned to the
proper secured creditor, that consigned or balled goods are returned to the consignor or
bailor, and so on. Current law is curiously silent on this point, though case law has
grown to fill the void. The section is in lieu of a section that would direct a certain
distribution to secured creditors. It gives the court greater flexibility to meet the circumstances, and it is broader, permitting disposition of property subject to a co-ownership interest.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 100, at 382-83; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 118, at 96.
130. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) & (b) (1982).
131. Id. § 507.
132. For the different treatment of § 507 priority claims in Chapter 11 and Chapter
13, see id. §§ 1129(a)(9), 1322(a)(2). Both sections now fail to cover unsecured, nonpriority
tax claims because the 1984 draftsmen forgot that they had amended § 507(a) to create a
new fifth priority that relegated unsecured tax claims from sixth to seventh priority. See
supra note 125.
133. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1982).
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reading section 547(b)(5) as incorporating the rule of Palmer Clay
Products:" a preferential effect exists if the trustee can establish
that a defendant unsecured, nonpriority creditor, without the allegedly preferential payment or lien, would have received less than
a 100% payout in a Chapter 7 liquidation. 135 The result continues
to seem sensible for the same reason it did under Palmer Clay
Products-eitherbecause the preferential transfer covered 100%
of defendant's claim or, if the transfer covered less, because the
defendant would get on the unsecured balance the same dividend
that other creditors in his class would get on 100% of their claims.
In so reading section 547(b)(5), when the creditor receives a transfer as a partial payment or lien for his debt, most courts have seen
that the inquiry is not whether, without the transfer, the creditor
would have received a partial dividend equal to the amount of the
transfer in a Chapter 7 distribution; rather, the inquiry is whether
the creditor would have received a 100% dividend. 36
A few courts apparently have read section 547(b)(5) to mean
that the trustee establishes preferential effect by showing that the
transfer gave the d6fendant a larger percentage of his claim than
he would receive as a dividend in a Chapter 7 case. 13 7 This reading
might be proper if the defendant were the only unsecured, nonpri134. 297 U.S. 227 (1936); see supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
135. Because the test is whether the transfer enabled the creditor to receive more than
he would get in a Chapter 7 distribution, it is irrelevant that the creditor's claim is nondischargeable and thus "may be paid outside the estate after bankruptcy." In re Kayajanian,
27 Bankr. 711, 712 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983).
136. See In re Pippin, 46 Bankr. 281, 284 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1984); In re Advance
Glove Mfg. Co., 42 Bankr. 489, 491-92 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984); In re Independent Clearing
House Co., 41 Bankr. 985, 1012-13 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984); In re Harley, 41 Bankr. 276, 279
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984); In re Hillcrest Foods, Inc., 40 Bankr. 360, 362 (Bankr. D. Me. 1984);
In re Zachman Homes, Inc., 40 Bankr. 171, 174 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984); In re Thomas W.
Garland, Inc., 39 Bankr. 412, 415 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1984); In re General Office Furniture
Wholesalers, Inc., 37 Bankr. 180, 183 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984); In re Saco Local Dev. Corp.,
30 Bankr. 868, 869-70 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983); In re Saco Local Dev. Corp., 30 Bankr. 862,
865-66 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983); In re Tonyan Constr. Co., 28 Bankr. 714, 723 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1983); In re Fabric Buys of Jericho, Inc., 22 Bankr. 1010, 1012 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re
Utility Stationery Stores, Inc., 12 Bankr. 170, 179 (Bankr. N.D. IlM.1981); In re Thrifty
Supermarket, Inc., 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D (MB) 823 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980).
137. See In re Big Three Transp. Inc., 41 Bankr. 16, 20 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1983); In re
Sportfame of Ohio, Inc., 40 Bankr. 42, 55 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984); In re P.M.R.C. Corp., 39
Bankr. 912, 913 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Balducci Oil Co., 33 Bankr. 843, 845-46
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1983); In re Moran Air Cargo, Inc., 30 Bankr. 406, 408-09 (Bankr. D.R.I.
1983); In re Gastaldo, 13 Bankr. 808, 810 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); see also Mann, "Greater
Percentage" Problems in the Preference Section of the New Code, 86 CoM. L.J. 49, n.3
(1981) (author erroneously characterized § 547(b)(5) as a "greater percentage" test, erroneously stated that we had no such test before, and did not mention Palmer Clay Products).
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ority creditor in the case. But the trouble with this reading in the
more typical case is not merely that it ignores Palmer Clay Products. It also requires the trustee to prove with greater precision
what the dividend to unsecured, nonpriority creditors will be,
rather than merely to prove that it will not be 100%.1'a This is not
to say that the trustee need not prove anything. He must establish
at least that the dividend to unsecured, nonpriority creditors will
not be 100%.131 One court held that the trustee did not satisfy section 547(b)(5) in his action to recover a partial payment to the unsecured, nonpriority creditor because the trustee introduced no evidence on the amount of the other claims, on the value of the
estate, or on the amount of first priority administrative expenses
140
incurred.
138. Mann, supra note 137, also envisions other difficulties because more assets may
be discovered or recovered after the court decides the preference action. Id. at 50. Three
courts have answered that argument by noting that the defendant creditor then would share
pro rata with other creditors of his class in the additional dividend. See In re Advance
Glove Mfg. Co., 42 Bankr. 489, 490 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984); In re Brent Explorations, Inc.,
31 Bankr. 745, 752 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983); In re Gastaldo, 13 Bankr. 808, 810 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1981); see also In re Sportfame of Ohio, Inc., 40 Bankr. 42, 55 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1984).
139. Theoretically, the court also might require the trustee to show that the debtor
did not make a prebankruptcy transfer of an equal percentage to all such creditors. One
commentator said this possibility under PalmerClay Products meant "[a]s a practical matter" that the debtor had made "a general assignment for the benefit of creditors." McLaughlin, Sections 60, 67, and 70, Preferentialand Fraudulent Transfers, 11 J. REF. BANK.
61, 67 (1937), although that would not be the only way of doing it. Cf. In re Hayes, 5 Bankr.
676, 679 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980) (holding that when the insolvent debtor within 90 days of
bankruptcy paid her nonexempt wages to a state statutory trustee who thereafter distributed them pro rate to the "creditors who participated in the trusteeship," the trustee had
not met the requirements of § 547(b)(5) in his action to recover the distribution made to
one unsecured, nonpriority creditor). Presumably the trustee could satisfy § 547(b)(5) in
either instance by locating one unsecured, nonpriority creditor who did not participate in
the distribution under the assignment or the trusteeship.
140. In re K. Pritchard Co., 17 Bankr. 508, 510 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1981). This court
also worried about the defendant creditor's failure to file a claim in the bankruptcy case so
that if the dividend to unsecured, nonpriority creditors exceeded the percentage of the partial payment to defendant, § 547(b)(5) would not have been satisfied. The defendant creditor had received payment of about one-third of its debt and may have refrained from filing
to avoid surrendering payment under 11 U.S.C. § 502(d), perhaps because it did not anticipate that the dividend would be larger. As this case demonstrates, a preferred creditor does
not immunize himself from § 547 attack by failing to file his claim.
In any event, the language in § 547(b)(5) requiring a calculation of what the defendant
would have received in a Chapter 7 case should not require that the defendant file his claim
within the time allowed by Bankruptcy Rule 3002 for Chapter 7 or 13 cases (90 days after
first date set for meeting of creditors) or by Rule 3003 for Chapter 11 cases (time fixed by
court, which for cause shown may grant extensions). In Chapter 11 cases, all claims that the
debtor scheduled as undisputed, noncontingent, and liquidated are "deemed fied." 11
U.S.C. § 1111(a) (1982). Moreover, under Bankruptcy Rule 3002, a claim arising from the
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For other unsecured creditors, whether they are entitled to
priority under section 507(a)'4 1 and section 726(a) 142 or are subordinated under section 510, the test should be the same. If the dividend to the defendant-creditor's class in a Chapter 7 liquidation
would be less than 100%, the challenged transfer has preferential
effect. Only if there are no other creditors in the defendant's class
is it appropriate to test for preferential effect by comparing the
size of the challenged transfer with the size of the Chapter 7 dividend without the transfer. The court seemed to recognized this
principle in In re Tenna Corp.,4 3 which concerned prepetition
payment on priority tax claims of the Internal Revenue Service.144
Finding that other tax claimants shared the IRS's then sixth priority 1 45 and that sixth priority claims would receive no dividend even
if the payment to the IRS were recovered, the court concluded that
preferential effect existed. 146 Although the Court did not indicate
whether the payment to the IRS covered its entire claim or only a
part of it, the result in this case should have been the same even
without other tax claimants. Under section 547(b)(5) the test is no
longer whether preferential effect existed within a class, but
whether the payment gave the IRS more than it would have received in a Chapter 7 distribution if the payment had not been
made.
Tenna originated as a Chapter 11 case, but was converted to
Chapter 7 before the court decided the preference issue. 147 During
the Chapter 11 case, pursuant to section 364(d), 4 s the court authorized a postpetition credit extension of some four million dollars secured by a lien senior to existing liens. The Government contended that the court should construct a hypothetical Chapter 7
distribution, which would exclude the four million dollar lien and
the administrative expenses of the Chapter 11 proceeding, and that
recovery of a preference may be filed within 30 days after the judgment for recovery of the
preference becomes final.
141. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1982).
142. Id. § 726(a); see supra note 133 and accompanying text.
143. 43 Bankr. 140 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984).
144. Under 11 U.S.C. § 108(c), any provision of the Reform Act applicable to "creditors" is applicable to "governmental units" as defined in § 101(24); therefore, § 547 is applicable to the IRS whether or not it files a claim and waives sovereign immunity. See 124
CONG. REC. 32,394, 33,993 (1978).
145. In 1984, Congress amended 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) to relegate tax claims to a seventh
priority.
146. Tenna, 43 Bankr. at 142.
147. Id.
148. 11 U.S.C. § 364(d) (1982).
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the court should consider only the administrative expenses of the
Chapter 7 proceeding and prepetition claims worth approximately
$270,000, entitled to priority ahead of the tax claim. 149 The court
rejected this contention, however, because the case became an actual Chapter 7 case. Under section 348(d), 50 the court treated the
four million dollar lien claim in the converted Chapter 7 case as a
prepetition claim. Furthermore, under section 726(b),' 51 the Chapter 11 administration expenses still were entitled to payment, although section 726(b) subordinated them to the Chapter 7 administration expenses on the principle that the undertaker was to be
paid ahead of the doctor. 52 Hence, with an estate of only some
$780,000, the administrative expenses and the four million dollar
153
lien claim consumed the entire estate.
Secured creditors present different questions, however. In a
variety of contexts, the Supreme Court interpreted the preference
provisions of earlier Bankruptcy Acts to require that a voidable
preference must "impair"' 5 or "diminish"'15 5 the bankrupt estate.
From this interpretation, some courts concluded that payments
156
made to a fully secured creditor were not voidable preferences.
The conclusion seems correct: these payments either discharged
the secured debt and the lien on the debtor's property, or they
149.
150.

Tenna, 43 Bankr. at 141.
11 U.S.C. § 348(d) (1982).

151.

Id. § 726(b).

152.

Tenna, 43 Bankr. at 142.

153. Id. In re Thomas W. Garland, Inc., 39 Bankr. 412 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1984), was
another preference action against the IRS but did not directly concern the Service's tax
claim against the taxpayer. Within 90 days of the debtor's Chapter 11 petition, the IRS
made an administrative levy on the bankrupt debtor to reach the debtor's obligation to the
taxpayer. By two checks issued five and eight days later, the debtor paid what it owed the
taxpayer to the IRS. Id. at 413. Under 26 U.S.C. § 6332, service of the notice of levy on the
debtor imposed upon it a personal liability to the IRS; therefore, the court concluded that
the IRS was a "creditor" of the debtor and that the subsequent payments to the IRS were
on an "antecedent debt" within the meaning of § 547(b). Id. at 414. The court treated this
"debt" as an unsecured, nonpriority debt, not as a sixth priority tax debt. Because these
claims would not receive a 100% dividend in a Chapter 7 case, the Court found preferential
effect. Id. at 415.
154. See Stewart v. Platt, 101 U.S. 731, 743 (1879); Clark v. Iselin, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.)
360, 378 (1874).
155. See Continental Trust Co. v. Chicago Title Co., 229 U.S. 435, 443 (1913); National Bank v. National Herkimer County Bank, 225 U.S. 178, 184 (1912); New York County
Bank v. Massey, 192 U.S. 138, 147 (1904).
156. See, e.g., Shaw v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 385 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 1003 (1968); Rheem v. Allnut, 64 F.2d 548, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1933); see also
Bachner v. Robinson, 107 F.2d 513, 515 (2d Cir. 1939) (holding that lessor was in "a position
analogous to. . . a secured creditor" and, thus, debtor's payment of rent arrears was not a
preference).
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reduced the amount of the debt with a corresponding increase in
the value of the debtor's equity in the collateral. A more felicitous
interpretation of the statute, however, would base this conclusion
on the lack of preferential effect rather than on the lack of diminution of the estate. This interpretation is particularly apt under present section 547(b), in which the inquiry is whether the payment
enables the creditor to receive more than the trustee would have
distributed to him in a Chapter 7 case if the payment had not been
made. 157 Most of the cases applying this rule under present section
547(b) have relied on section 547(b)(5) rather than on the no-dimi15 8
nution-of-the-estate rationale.
Five of these cases1 59 also addressed questions that the earlier
cases did not reach: at what time, and by what measure, should the
court value the creditor's collateral to determine whether he is
1 60 and of section
fully secured? The logic of Palmer Clay Products
157. In Deel Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Levine, 721 F.2d 750 (11th Cir. 1983), a creditor acquired a judgment lien on the debtor's condominium. Within 90 days thereafter, the debtor
married, which qualified him under state law to claim the condominium as an exempt homestead, and filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition. The court held that the debtor, pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 522(h), could invoke § 547 to avoid the lien and claim his exemption. The
court reasoned that "the 'diminution of estate' doctrine was not applicable in the case of a
debtor bringing an action under section 522(h) to avoid a preference." Id. at 753. Because
the lien enabled the creditor to receive more than he would in a Chapter 7 case without it,
§ 547(b)(5) was satisfied. The debtor also sought to avoid the lien under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f),
which entitled him to avoid all judicial liens impairing exemptions. The bankruptcy court,
however, held § 522(f) inapplicable because the property was not exempt when the lien was
acquired. The debtor did not appeal that ruling. Id. at 752.
In a similar case under § 522(h), the creditor-defendant argued that "one of the conditions [of preference avoidance was] that other creditors [were] deprived." The court gave
him the short answer, "[t]hat is not the way the statute reads." In re Pierce, 6 Bankr. 18, 19
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980). Because the test is what the creditor-defendant would receive in a
Chapter 7 distribution, the debtor's payment to a fully secured creditor is preferential if the
security interest is in property of third parties rather than property of the debtor. See In re
Santoro Excavating, Inc., 32 Bankr. 947, 948 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also supra note
135.
158. See In re Lackow Bros., Inc., 752 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Auto-Train
Corp., 49 Bankr. 605, 609-10 (D. Colo. 1985); In re Property Leasing & Management, Inc.,
46 Bankr. 903 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985); In re George Rodman, Inc., 39 Bankr. 855 (Bankr.
W.D. Okla. 1984); In re Jameson's Foods, 35 Bankr. 433 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1983); In re PDQ
Copy Center, 26 Bankr. 77, 79 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Hale, 15 Bankr. 565, 568-69
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981); In re Conn, 9 Bankr. 431, 435 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981). But see In
re Zuni, 6 Bankr. 449, 451 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1980) (continuing to rely on the "no depletion of
the estate" rationale).
159. In re Lackow Bros., Inc., 752 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Auto-Train Corp.,
49 Bankr. 605 (D. Colo. 1985); In re George Rodman, Inc., 39 Bankr. 855 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1984); In re Jameson's Foods, 35 Bankr. 433 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1983); In re Zuni, 6 Bankr. 449
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1980).
160. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
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547(b)-both of which search for the effect of the transfer on what
otherwise would have been a Chapter 7 distribution-indicates
that the valuation of the collateral should be made at the time of
the Chapter 7 distribution. 6 1
Without attempting to be more precise than is the Reform
Act, 1 62 I would suggest that the measure of value should vary with
the circumstances of the case. The distribution test always focuses
on a Chapter 7 distribution, although sometimes a hypothetical
one. Therefore, the court may have to hypothesize whether the secured creditor or the trustee would liquidate the property prior to
the Chapter 7 distribution,' and the amount the liquidation then
would have produced. In other cases, the court should return the
collateral to the secured creditor prior to the Chapter 7 distribu161. Professor David Carlson posits the case of the oversecured creditor who gets paid
and releases his collateral sixty days before bankruptcy but whose former collateral is totally destroyed thirty days before bankruptcy. He then argues that, since the creditor released his security interest in exchange for payment, the payment was for new value and not
for antecedent debt. My colleague and collaborator, Professor Andrew Kaufman, also favors
this argument and it is presented in another context in V. COUNTRYMAN, A. KAUFMAN, & Z.
WISEMAN, COMMERCIAL LAW 308-09 (2d ed. 1982). But, although the language of § 547(a)(2)
and (b)(2) lends technical support to such an argument, it is contrary to the policy of
§ 547(b) to preserve the Chapter 7 distribution policy. If the payment had not been made,
the creditor would have received in a Chapter 7 distribution, not the 100% he is now holding, but what other unsecured creditors would receive in a Chapter 7 case. See also In re
Property Leasing & Management, Inc., 46 Bankr. 903, 912 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985) (although the amount of accounts receivable collateral "fluctuated dramatically" after payments made by debtor to creditor, "the only relevant question is what the secured status of
the claim would have been on the date of the petition since that alone would determine the
distribution to which [the creditor] would have been entitled in a Chapter 7 liquidation.");
In re Auto-Train Corp., 49 Bankr. 605, 610 (D. Colo. 1985) (creditor's security interest in
refundable unearned insurance premiums which were constantly diminishing valued for §
547(b)(5) purposes as of bankruptcy); In re George Rodman, Inc., 39 Bankr. 855, 857-59
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1984) (finding a voidable preference when the debtor paid a creditor the
full amount of his claim in exchange for release of a materialmen's lien on an oil well that
later turned out to be a "dry hole"); In re Jameson's Foods, 35 Bankr. 433, 437 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 1983) (assuming that the creditor had a security interest in identifiable proceeds in
the debtor's bank account at the time it was transferred to the creditor, but finding preferential effect because, on the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the creditor under U.C.C. § 9306(4)(b) and (c) lost its right to trace into the account and could not qualify for what
U.C.C. 9-306(4)(d) gave it in exchange).To all of this Professor Kaufman would reply that it
is, or should be, another bankruptcy policy that the estate not be consumed by the cost of
litigation.
162. Under 11 U.S.C. § 101(25), in determining solvency or insolvency, the court considers the debtor's assets "at a fair valuation." Under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), in fixing the
amount of a secured claim, the court determines the value of collateral "in light of the
purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property .. . ."
Under 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2), the value limits on exemptions mean "fair market value."
163. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
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tion to unsecured creditors1 4 for liquidation by him after the
Chapter 7 distribution.
The amount that the court believes a secured creditor can realize on the collateral may vary, depending on the nature both of
the collateral and of the secured creditor. For instance, the court
may conclude that a creditor who deals in property of the kind
constituting the collateral can realize more than a bank or a finance company without a recourse against a dealer. In any event,
two of the cases addressing the valuation problem seem wrong.
One court ignored the direction in section 547(b)(5)(B) to assume
the transfer was not made. The court upheld a finance company's
defense in a preference action that the value of the collateral after
the debtor made the challenged payments exceeded the balance of
the debt.16 5 The other court held that prepetition "going concern"
value of jewelry inventory and accounts, rather than postpetition
liquidation value after the debtor ceased operating the business
and the case had been converted from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7,
was the proper valuation for establishing the finance company's
defense.'
A payment to a secured creditor that comes from the creditor's own collateral does not effect a preference, whether he is fully
or only partially secured. That has been the rule before'6 7 and
since the Reform Act. Without this rule many prepetition foreclo164. See supra note 129.
165. In re Zuni, 6 Bankr. 449, 452 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1980). There are other cases similarly ignoring § 547(b)(5)(B). See also In re Roberson, 7 Bankr. 34, 36 (Bankr. D. Idaho
1980) (holding that because an execution sale to the creditor "extinguished" the earlier execution lien, the creditor would be an unsecured creditor who would receive less in a Chapter
7 distribution than the sale gave her). In re Williams, 5 Bankr. 706, 708 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1980), held that the creditor-defendant was not secured because it released its security interest when the debtor paid off the secured claim within 90 days of bankruptcy.
166. In re Lackow Bros., Inc., 752 F.2d at 1531-32. But see infra note 441.
167. See Kapela v. Newman, 649 F.2d 887, 891 (1st Cir. 1981); In re Holiday Airlines
Corp., 647 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1009 (1981); Biggins v. Southwest
Bank, 490 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1973); Calaway v. Admiral Credit Corp., 407 F.2d 518, 521
(4th Cir. 1969); Bogus v. American Nat'l Bank, 401 F.2d 458 (10th Cir. 1968); Walutes v.
Baltimore Rigging Co., 390 F.2d 350, 351 (4th Cir. 1968); Farmers Bank v. Julian, 383 F.2d
314, 322 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 1021 (1967); In re Riedl, 339 F.2d 338, 340 (7th
Cir. 1964); Azar v. Morgan, 301 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1962); Irving Trust Co. v. Bank of Am.
Nat'l Ass'n., 68 F.2d 887, 890 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 628 (1934); Coppard v. Martin,
15 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1926); cf. Bertram v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 283 F.2d 783 (6th Cir. 1960)
(holding that, when the debtor sold property covered by a valid execution lien for less than
the amount of the lien and paid the proceeds to the execution creditor who released the lien,
no diminution of the estate occurred and the payment was not preferential even though the
creditor then applied the payment to other debts secured by chattel mortgages).
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sures would constitute preferential transfers."6 8 Once again, the
former explanation for this rule was that no diminution of the estate occurred. A more felicitous explanation is that no preferential
effect exists because, if the payments had not been made before
bankruptcy, the creditor would be entitled to them in a Chapter 7
liquidation. Courts have given this explanation when they apply
the rule under the Reform act." 9
168. Whether the secured creditor or a third party purchases the property at a
prebankruptcy foreclosure sale may raise a question about the fairness of the sale price. A
similar question might arise when the creditor takes back the collateral and gives the debtor
credit for it. A line of cases originating with Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d
201 (5th Cir. 1980), under § 67d of the former Bankruptcy Act and carrying over to § 548 of
the Reform Act, holds that when the sale price was not the fair equivalent of the value of
the property and the debtor was insolvent at the time of sale, the trustee may avoid the sale
as a fraudulent conveyance. The Ninth Circuit, however, does not follow these cases. See In
re Madrid, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984).
Senator Thurmond proposed a 1984 amendment to the Reform Act to get rid of the
Durrett doctrine. First, he would have amended the definition of "transfer" in what is now
11 U.S.C. § 101(48) by adding at the end, "and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption." He also would have amended the definition of a fraudulent conveyance in 11 U.S.C.
§ 548 to include "voluntary or involuntary" transfers. Both of these amendments seem redundant because the definition of transfer in § 101(48) already expressly covered "voluntary
or involuntary" dispositions of an interest in property. Senator Thurmond, however, apparently designed the amendments to remove all doubt that § 548 applied to foreclosure of
sales. His third amendment would have added to § 548 a provision that, when a foreclosure
sale was "regularly conducted" and "noncollusive," the purchaser who bids in the full
amount of the mortgage debt "gives reasonably equivalent value." 130 CONG. REC. S6081-82,
S6107, S6118, S6122, S6127 (daily ed. May 21, 1984).
Thereafter, Senator Thurmond announced that he had dropped certain of his amendments, including those "relating to . . . the Durrett issue," in order to get Senator Metzenbaum's consent to expedited debate. 130 CONG. REc. S7617 (daily ed. June 19, 1984). But
another legislative accident occurred. The Conference Report dropped only the third Thurmond amendment and left the other two, making it very clear that § 548 applies to foreclosure sales. H.R. REP. No. 822, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38, 50 (1984). Nevertheless, three months
after enactment, Senators DeConcini and Dole tried, by a colloquy in the Senate, to create
some retroactive legislative history indicating that the first two amendments "were not intended to have any effect one way or the other on the so called Durrett issue." 130 CONG.
REc. S12771 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984).

Under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b), the trustee also can invoke state fraudulent conveyance law.
The new Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, however, includes a provision in section 3(b)
that a purchaser at a "regularly conducted, noncollusive" foreclosure sale gives "reasonably
equivalent value" without regard to the amount of his bid. U.F.T.A. § 3(b), 7A U.L.A. Supp.
80 (1985). Section 5(b) of that Act does make a transfer to an insider for antecedent debt by
an insolvent debtor a fraudulent conveyance if the insider had reasonable cause to believe
the debtor insolvent. But, perhaps because of the proprietary interest of the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws in the UCC, § 8(e) exempts from even this provision "the enforcement of a security interest in compliance with Article 9" of the UCC
169. See In re Nutting, 44 Bankr. 233, 238 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984); In re Cosmopolitan
Aviation Corp., 34 Bankr. 592, 594-96 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) (when execution lien on personalty by state law dated from delivery of writ to sheriff outside 90 day period, no preference occurred when sheriff levied on debtor's bank account and paid its proceeds to execu-
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In contrast, if a creditor who is only partially secured received
a payment from any of the debtor's property not covered by the
creditor's lien, the payment has preferential effect. That result
could be avoided. The creditor could apply the payment to the secured part of his claim 7 0° by releasing a corresponding amount of
collateral. But there is no recorded instance of a partially secured
creditor doing so. Instead, the creditor always takes the payment
and retains all of his collateral. On those facts, the courts find that,
to the extent the payment does not exceed the creditor's unsecured
claim, the payment gives him more than he would receive in a
Chapter 7 distribution without it.'
tion creditor within 90 day period); In re McQueen, 27 Bankr. 717 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983); In
re Jefferson Mortgage Co., 25 Bankr. 963, 966-67 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982); In re 550 Les
Mouches Fashions, Ltd., 24 Bankr. 509, 515 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Ridgway, 22
Bankr. 737, 740 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (even though creditor released security interest on
receipt of payment; cf. supra note 165); In re Markim, Inc., 15 Bankr. 56, 60 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1981); In re Castillo, 7 Bankr. 135, 137 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (allegations that deed
taken by mortgagee in lieu of foreclosure constituted a fraudulent conveyance under § 548
insufficient and complaint dismissed); see also In re O'Neill's Shannon Village, 750 F.2d 679
(8th Cir. 1984). In re Ramco Int'l, Inc., 754 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1985), like Cosmopolitan
Aviation Corp., supra, holds that, where by state law an execution lien dates from delivery
of the writ to the sheriff, the lien is not voidable under § 547 where the writ was delivered
outside the 90 day period although the levy was made within the 90-day period.
In In re Jacobs, 11 Bankr. 467 (Bankr. N.D. Mo. 1981), a creditor with "a valid and
perfected security interest" in debtor's tractor repossessed the tractor a few days before the
debtor filed a Chapter 13 petition. The court held that the Chapter 13 debtor could recover
the tractor because the repossession constituted a voidable preference. 11 Bankr. at 468.
This decision has several problems. The opinion did not indicate that the debtor claimed
the tractor as exempt, in which event 11 U.S.C. § 522(h) might have entitled him to invoke
§ 547, if the trustee did not. Otherwise, a Chapter 13 debtor, unlike a Chapter 13 trustee, is
not entitled to invoke § 547 even though he is operating a business. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1303,
1304 (1982); In re Colandrea, 12 Bankr. 568 (Bankr. D. Md. 1982). The Jacobs court did not
inquire whether the repossession deprived the debtor of all interest in the tractor. If not, the
result may have been proper, but the court should have based its decision on § 542, governing turnover of property of the estate, rather than on § 547.
170. Under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), a partially secured creditor has two claims: a secured
claim to the extent of the value of his collateral and an unsecured claim for the balance.
171. See Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 507-09 (7th Cir. 1981); In re Frigitemp Corp., 34 Bankr. 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), afl'd, 753 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1985); In re AutoTrain Corp., 49 Bankr. 605 (D. Colo. 1985); In re Property Leasing & Management, Inc., 46
Bankr. 903, 912 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985); In re Head, 26 Bankr. 375 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1983); In re Chancellor, 20 Bankr. 316, 318 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982); In re Satterla, 15
Bankr. 166, 167-68 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981); In re McCormick, 5 Bankr. 726, 729-30
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980); see also Small v. Williams, 313 F.2d 39, 46 (4th Cir. 1963); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Schlafly, 299 F. 202, 206-06 (8th Cir. 1924) (decided under the old Act).
The court in Barash, however, made the same mistake that the cases supra note 165 made
by ignoring § 547(b)(5)(B). The court in effect instructed the bankruptcy court on remand
that if creditors could establish that the value of their collateral exceeded the balance of
their claims after the challenged payments, no preferential effect would exist. 658 F.2d at
511-12.
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The old no-diminution-of-the-estate notion provided another
limitation on the trustee's power to avoid preferences. A contemporaneous exchange or substitution of collateral in which no additional value was subjected to the lien was not a voidable preference. The test of the validity of the substitution was two-fold.
First, the substitution of the new collateral must have been prior
to,17 21 simultaneous with,178 or at least substantially contemporaneous with 4 the release of the old collateral. Second, the value of
the substituted collateral could not exceed the value of the original;1 5 if it did, the excess was preferential if the secured creditor
needed the additional value because he was not fully secured by
the original collateral.1 6 Although a few cases under the Reform
Act have continued to find the substitution doctrine embodied either in the no-diminution-of-the-estate notion1 77 or in section
547(b) (5),17s the doctrine now may be codified elsewhere as will be
17 9
indicated later.

Whether a creditor seeks to meet the preference challenge by
asserting that he was fully secured at the time of the challenged
172. See First Nat'l Bank v. Julian, 383 F.2d 329, 334 (8th Cir. 1967); In re Pusey,
Maynes, Breish Co., 122 F.2d 606, 608 (3d Cir. 1941).
173. See Kapela v. Newman, 649 F.2d 887, 892 (1st Cir. 1981); In re Baumgartner, 55
F.2d 1041, 1047-48 (7th Cir. 1931); In re Lambert & Braceland Co., 29 F.2d 758, 759 (E.D.
Pa. 1928).
174. See In re Holiday Airlines Corp., 647 F.2d 977, 981-82 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 1009 (1981); Walker v. Clinton State Bank, 216 F.2d 165, 168 (8th Cir. 1954); Wolfe v.
Bank of Anderson, 238 F. 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1916).
175. See Stewart v. Platt, 101 U.S. 731, 743-44 (1879); Sawyer v. Turpin, 91 U.S. 114,
120-21 (1875); Clark v. Iselin, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 360, 377-78 (1874); Cook v. Tullis, 85 U.S.
(18 Wall.) 332, 339-40 (1873).
176. If the original collateral fully secured the creditor, then substitution of collateral
with a greater value would not cause diminution of the estate or increase over the creditor's
distribution in a Chapter 7 case. The original collateral should be valued, however, at the
time of that distribution. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., In re STN Enters., Inc., 45 Bankr. 959, 962-64 (D. Vt. 1985); In re
Cloyd, 23 Bankr. 51, 53-54 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
178. In re Bloom, 28 Bankr. 571 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983). This case joins others that
ignore § 547(b)(5)(B). See also Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981);
cases cited supra note 165. In Bloom, the debtor within 90 days of bankruptcy gave a creditor a security interest in a truck in exchange for release of an earlier execution lien on the
truck and an extension of maturity on the debt. The court held that the debtor seeking to
claim an exemption on the truck could not avoid the security interest. 28 Bankr. at 573. The
court did not allow the debtor to use 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), which permitted such a debtor to
avoid all judicial liens, because he was trying to avoid the security interest. Nor could the
debtor use § 522(h), which allowed such a debtor to invoke § 547 to avoid involuntary preferences, because the giving of the security interest to avoid execution sale of the truck was
voluntary. Id.
179. See infra note 293 and accompanying text.
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payment, that the payment came from his own collateral, or that
the challenged transfer was a valid substitution of collateral, the
creditor still may be vulnerable to a two-step attack i8 0 by the party
invoking section 547. If that party can avoid the defendant creditor's lien, 18 1 then the challenged transfer becomes one made to an
unsecured creditor and has a preferential effect unless this creditor
would receive 100% in a Chapter 7 distribution. Benedict v.
Ratner,"2 a case known better for its first step than for its second,
established the attack. In the first step, the trustee invoked old
section 70e, authorizing him to invalidate transfers constituting
fraudulent conveyances under state law. The trustee persuaded the
Court that under New York law an assignment of accounts receivable that allowed the debtor to collect the accounts and to use the
proceeds as he saw fit was invalid as a fraudulent conveyance. 183 As
his second step, the trustee invoked old section 60 to recover
prebankruptcy payments of some of the account proceeds to the
now unsecured creditor.18 4 Under section 9-205 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, such an assignment of accounts is no longer a
fraudulent conveyance. If, however, the party challenging a transfer to a secured creditor as a preference first can invalidate the
creditor's lien on any ground, including the ground that the lien
itself was a voidable preference under section 547, the challenging
party then can treat the subsequent transfer under section 547 as
one made to an unsecured creditor. 185
180. Some of my students have irreverently labeled this attack "the Countryman twostep."
181. The party must avoid the creditor's originallien when substitution of collateral is
involved.
182. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
183. Id. at 360.
184. Id. at 365.
185. See, e.g., In re Roco Corp., 701 F.2d 978, 985 (1st Cir. 1983) (security interest
avoidable under 11 U.S.C. § 548 as a fraudulent conveyance); In re Air Florida, Inc., 48
Bankr. 437, 440 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (security interest avoidable under 11 U.S.C. §
544(a)(1) because not perfected); In re Chief Freight Lines Co., 37 Bankr. 436 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1984) (same); In re Wilmington Nursery Co., 36 Bankr. 813, 815 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.
1984) (judgment lien avoidable under § 547); In re Brent Explorations, Inc., 31 Bankr. 745
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (security interest avoidable under § 544(a)(1) because not perfected);
In re Dunlap, 27 Bankr. 728, 732 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1983) (no lien acquired under state law
by defective service of execution on garnishee two years before bankruptcy); In re Brame, 26
Bankr. 309, 312 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (statutory materialmen's lien expired before bankruptcy by terms of creating state statute because materialman failed to file notice); In re B.
& L. Coal Co., 20 Bankr. 864 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982) (security interest became unperfected
and avoidable under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) when debtor changed place of business); In re
Mazzetti, 22 Bankr. 538, 539-40 (Bankr. E.D.Mich. 1982) (equitable mortgage avoidable
under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3)); In re Brown, 18 Bankr. 956 (Bankr. S.D. MI1.1982) (security
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Thus, we have finally come, in part by accident, to a voidable
preference concept that abandons the English requirement of the
debtor's culpability and our own former requirement of the creditor-defendant's culpability. Lord Mansfield's concern about transfers "in contemplation of bankruptcy" has long been replaced with
a definite time period preceding bankruptcy, and no one has voiced
criticism of this change. Probably all would prefer the certainty
afforded by this change, although others might pick, as England
has picked,"'6 a different period than ninety days. All that the trustee need show 8 7 to avoid transfers within the ninety day period is
interest not perfected and avoidable under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1)); In re Express Fruit &
Produce, Inc., 16 Bankr. 366 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982) (same); In re Purbeck & Assoc., Ltd.,
12 Bankr. 406 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (same); In re Hawkins Mfg., Inc., 11 Bankr. 512
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1981) (no judgment lien acquired by recording of judgment more than 90
days before bankruptcy because by state law judgment lien reached only realty and debtor
owned no realty in county of recording); In re Peninsula Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc., 9
Bankr. 257, 262 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981) (common law possessory attorney's lien avoidable
under § 547); In re Kelley, 3 Bankr. 651, 654 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980) (security interest
avoidable under § 547 because of delay in perfection); cf. In re Cloyd, 23 Bankr. 51 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1982), which held that a security interest in livestock did not exist at the time
other collateral was substituted because "[t]he cattle had either been sold, traded, or had
died." Id. at 55. If the security interest was perfected in the cattle sold or traded (a point on
which the record was silent), and the secured party did not authorize the disposition within
the meaning of U.C.C. § 9-306(2), the security interest would continue in the cattle. The
security interest then would be a lien on property of others and would not be recognized in
the debtor's Chapter 7 distribution. See In re Santoro Excavating, Inc., 32 Bankr. 947, 948
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
186. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. We also at different times have picked
different periods. See supra notes 39, 44, 67 & 83 and accompanying text.
187. 11 U.S.C. § 547(g), which was added in 1984 and provides that the trustee has the
burden of establishing all elements of a voidable preference under § 547(b), merely codifies
case law under former § 60a and b. See Pyle v. Texas Transp. Co., 238 U.S. 90, 98 (1915);
Constructora Maza, Inc. v. Banco de Ponce, 616 F.2d 573, 576 (1st Cir. 1980); Wilkie v.
Brooks, 515 F.2d 741, 744 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 996 (1975); Farmers Bank v.
Julian, 383 F.2d 314, 322 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 1021 (1967); American Nat'l Bank
v. Bone, 333 F.2d 984, 987 (8th Cir. 1964); Moran Bros. v. Yinger, 323 F.2d 699, 701 (10th
Cir. 1963); Mizell v. Phillips, 240 F.2d 738, 740 (5th Cir. 1957); Barry v. Crancer, 192 F.2d
939 (8th Cir. 1951); City Nat'l Bank v. Slocum, 272 F. 11 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 257 U.S.
637 (1921).
Section 547(g) also codifies case law under the Reform Act prior to the 1984 amendment. See Brown v. First Nat'l Bank, 748 F.2d 490, 491 (8th Cir. 1984); In re American
Ambulance Serv., Inc., 46 Bankr. 658, 659 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985); In re Trejo, 44 Bankr.
539, 540 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1984); In re Fred's Dollar Store, 44 Bankr. 491, 495 (Bankr. N.D.
Miss. 1984); In re Tinnell Traffic Servs., 43 Bankr. 277, 279 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984); In re
Big Three Transp. Co., 41 Bankr. 16, 18 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1983); In re Jameson's Foods, 35
Bankr. 433, 436 (Bankr. S.D.S.C. 1983); In re American Gypsum Co., 36 Bankr. 360, 361-62
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1984); In re Hogg, 35 Bankr. 292, 294 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1983); In re Damon,
34 Bankr. 626, 629 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983); In re Kennesaw Mint, Inc., 32 Bankr. 799, 803
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983); In re Deltar Constr., Inc., 30 Bankr. 90, 91 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983)
(trustee lost because failed to prove that value of property transferred exceeded prior liens);
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that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer, with the
presumption of section 547(f) usually carrying the day for the trustee on this issue; that the transfer was to or for the benefit of a
creditor, for or on account of antecedent debt; and that the transfer had a preferential effect as heretofore explained.
This result seems consistent with the purpose of the preference concept, although the purpose never has been explained very
accurately. Even though statements in the legislative history discuss deterring creditors from scrambling for advantage,18 8 it seems
ridiculous to expect deterrence for two reasons. First, a preferred
creditor can retain his preference if the ninety day period elapses
before the bankruptcy petition is filed. Second, if the petition is
filed within the ninety day period, the preferred creditor can escape all consequences of having been preferred by simply surrendering his preference, unless the creditor has a defense he is willing
to litigate. 8" Given these alternatives, few creditors will be deterred from seeking or accepting a preference.
Statements in the legislative history also mention preserving
the bankruptcy policy of "equality" of distribution. 190 But, with
creditors classified for distribution purposes on the basis of liens
and priorities,' 9' no bankruptcy policy of "equality"' exists. A policy of preserving classes and of preserving equality within classes
does exist, however, and the preference concept is designed to preserve this policy. The function of the preference concept is to avoid
prebankruptcy transfers that distort the bankruptcy policy of distribution. Transfers that do distort this policy do so without regard
to the state of mind of either the debtor or the preferred creditor.
The trustee must prove the same elements when pursuing
preferences to insiders in the period one year to ninety days before
bankruptcy, except that he is not aided by a presumption of insolvency during that time; rather, the trustee must prove that the
In re Murray, 27 Bankr. 445, 447 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983); In re Sbraga, 27 Bankr. 199,
200-01 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1982) (trustee lost because failed to introduce evidence on preferential effect); In re Jefferson Mortgage Co., 25 Bankr. 963, 966 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982); In re
Saco Local Dev. Corp., 25 Bankr. 876, 878 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982); In re Eggleston, 19 Bankr.
280, 282 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982); In re K. Pritchard Co., 17 Bankr. 508, 509 (Bankr. S.D.
Ala. 1981); In re Lucasa Int'l, Ltd., 13 Bankr. 596, 598 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Utility
Stationery Stores, Inc., 12 Bankr. 170, 175 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1981); In re Camp Rockhill,
Inc., 12 Bankr. 829, 831 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Meritt, 7 Bankr. 876, 879 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1980); In re Kelley, 3 Bankr. 651, 653 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980).
188. See supra notes 91 & 100 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 101 & 102 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 91, 98 & 100 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
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debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer. Removal of the
requirement that the insider-creditor have reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent was doubtless an accident. 192 Congress
very probably will make an effort to restore the requirement as
soon as it again can divert its attention to the subject of bankruptcy. That the requirement should be restored is not clear, however. A transfer to an insider-creditor by an insolvent debtor, like
the debtor's transfer to any other creditor, is not any more or less a
distortion of the bankruptcy distribution policy depending on the
transferee's state of mind. The additional burden of proof imposed
on the trustee as to the transferee's state of mind, which Congress
decided not to impose on him for creditors who are not insiders,
also may enable many insiders to frustrate the bankruptcy distribution policy.
Before reinstating this burden of proof in the case of insidercreditors, two other questions need answers. First, is the definition
of an "insider" in section 101(28) 193 too broad for preference purposes? "Insider" "includes," but is not limited to, 94 persons ranging from a corporate debtor's treasurer to an individual debtor's
mother who knows nothing about his business. Those who would
not be disturbed by a ruling that the treasurer must disgorge a
preference received from his insolvent corporation eleven months
before bankruptcy without regard to his state of mind might not
favor treating the mother the same way.
Second, is the extension of the preference period from ninety
days to one year for insiders too long? Although the legislative history contains no clue indicating how Congress selected this period,
the length corresponds to the one year period during which prepetition fraudulent conveyances are vulnerable to the trustee's attack
195
under section 548, as they were under section 67d of the old Act.
It may have been a purpose of the insider provision in section 547,
as it is one of its effects, to compensate for a change in coverage of
section 548. Under old section 67d, as under section 3 of the
UFCA, the "fair consideration" that would save a transfer not
192.
193.

See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
11 U.S.C. § 101(28) (1982).

194. Under 11 U.S.C. § 102(3), "'includes' and 'including' are not limiting." Hence, In
re Motanino, 13 Bankr. 307, 309-10 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981), concluded that the parents of the
woman with whom the debtor had lived for the past five years, although he was married to
another, were insiders for § 547 purposes.
195. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1984). Alternatively, under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b), as under § 70e of
the old Act, the trustee may invoke state fraudulent conveyance law, including the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act, for which the statute of limitations may be longer.
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made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors '
had to be given in "good faith." Trustees invoked the "good faith"
requirement for security transfers or debt payments to corporate
officers and stockholders that occurred more than four months
before bankruptcy, so that the transfers were not vulnerable under
old section 60. And occasionally trustees were able to persuade
courts that the transfers were vulnerable under old section 67d or
under the UFCA because they were not taken in good faith, even
though the antecedent debt secured was not disproportionately
small or the antecendent debt paid was a fair equivalent. 197 Although section 548(a)(2)(A) eliminates the "good faith" requirement, the trustee under section 544(b) still may be able to invoke
that requirement under UFCA section 3.198
B.

The Perfection Requirement

Under the old Act, the best thing that could happen to a creditor who received an otherwise avoidable preference was for four
months to expire without the debtor's going into bankrutpcy.
Therefore, the preferred creditor had an incentive to conceal the
preference. 199 Since 1898, Congress has sought to counteract this
incentive by imposing bankruptcy consequences on transferees
who delay complying with nonbankruptcy notoriety requirements
rather than by imposing an independent bankruptcy notoriety requirement. Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court later said, prior to
1938 the courts consistently "found its efforts faulty. ' 200 Finally, in
the Chandler Act,2 01 Congress amended old section 60a to provide
196. See supra note 10.
197. See, e.g., Burroughs v. Fields, 546 F.2d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 1976); Bullard v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 468 F.2d 11, 13 (7th Cir. 1972); In re Inland Sec. Co., 382 F. Supp. 338, 347
(W.D. Mo. 1974); Duberstein v. Werner, 256 F. Supp. 515, 520 (E.D.N.Y. 1966); see also
Gilmer v. Woodson, 332 F.2d 541, 547 (4th Cir. 1964); Cohen v. Sutherland, 257 F.2d 737,
742 (2d Cir. 1958); Studley v. Lefrak, 66 A.D.2d 208, 213, 412 N.Y.S.2d 901, 905 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1979); Southern Indus. v. Jeremias, 66 A.D.2d 178, 183, 411 N.Y.S.2d 945, 949 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1978).
198. See In re Checkmate Stereo & Elecs., Ltd., 9 Bankr. 585, 617-18 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1981), afl'd, 21 Bankr. 402 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). In the new Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act, "good faith" is also dropped from § 3. Under § 5(b), however, an insolvent
debtor's transfer to an insider for an antecedent debt is a fraudulent conveyance as to existing creditors if the insider had reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent. U.F.T.A.
§ 5(b), 7A U.L.A. 80 (Supp. 1985). But see supra note 168.
199. During the 80 years under the 1898 Act, when a preference was also an act of
bankruptcy that would support an involuntary petition filed within four months after the
transfer, the debtor had a similar incentive.
200. Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434, 438 (1943).
201. 52 Stat. 869 (1938). For more detail, see Countryman, The Secured Transactions
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that, for the purposes of section 60a and 60b:
[A] transfer shall be deemed to have been made at the time when it became
so far perfected that no bona-fide purchaser from the debtor and no creditor
could thereafter have acquired any rights . . superior to the rights of the
transferee therein, and, if such transfer is not so perfected prior to the filing
of the petition.
. . it shall be deemed to have been made immediately before
20 2
bankruptcy.

The meaning of this "perfection clause" came before the Supreme Court in Corn Exchange National Bank v. Klauder,203 in
which the trustee was attacking assignments of accounts receivable
as preferential transfers under section 60. Because the debtor
made all of the challenged assignments within four months of
bankruptcy, the trustee did not need the perfection clause to toll
the statutory period. But all the assignments were in fact made to
secure present advances to the debtor, and the trustee asserted
that, because the creditor failed to perfect the assignments, they
were converted, for section 60 purposes, into assignments made immediately before bankruptcy and that the earlier advances consti2 04
tuted antecedent debt.
The failure to perfect was not a failure to perfect against creditors of the debtor. At the time of Klauder, most states did not
require perfection of assignments of accounts against creditors.2 0 5
Pennsylvania, however, where the case arose, followed the so-called
"English rule," under which a second assignee of the same accounts who first notified the account obligors of his assignment
would prevail over an earlier assignee. 0 6 The only assignee in
Klauder had not notified the account obligors.
The Supreme Court agreed with the trustee that, because the
creditor-defendant failed to notify the obligors on the assigned accounts, it had not perfected against a hypothetical subsequent assignee who would be a bona fide purchaser under the perfection
clause. 0° The Court agreed also that, in this situation, the perfection clause converted the assignments into assignments for antecedent debt. 0 8 In effect, although there is no express recognition of
Article of the Uniform Commercial Code and Section 60 ofthe Bankruptcy Act, 16 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 76, 77-79 (1951).
202. 52 Stat. 869, § 60a (1938).
203. 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
204. See id. at 435, 437.
205. See 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 902-903 (1951); 3 S. WILLISTON, CorRACTs
§§ 433-34 (3d ed. 1960).
206. See Klauder, 318 U.S. at 436.
207. Id. at 437.
208. Id.
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that fact in the Klauder opinion, the Court allowed the trustee to
hypothesize not merely a bona fide purchaser, but a purchaser who
also had been first to notify the account obligors of his
assignments.
The four month period of section 60 ran from the time of
transfer; the debtor's insolvency was tested as of the time of the
transfer; and the creditor's reasonable cause to believe the debtor
insolvent focused on the time of the transfer. Klauder seemed to
suggest that all these elements also would be tested at a time immediately before bankruptcy if no perfection occurred before
bankruptcy and at the time of perfection if delayed perfection occurred before bankruptcy. Furthermore, under Palmer Clay Products, 20 9 preferential effect was tested as of the time of distribution,
apart from any perfection requirement. Hence, in the event of a
delay in perfection, or a complete failure to perfect as in Klauder,
no element of a voidable preference was tested as of the time the
transfer actually occurred.
At least Klauder did not require the impossible of the creditor-defendant. He could have perfected by giving prompt notice of
his assignment to the account obligors.2 1 ° Some states, however,
followed the "Massachusetts," or "four horsemen," rule embodied
in the Restatement of Contracts. 1 ' That rule allowed a second assignee to prevail over an earlier assignee if the subsequent assignee
was first to obtain judgment on or payment of the account, or a
novation with or a negotiable instrument from the account obligor.
To subject an assignee of accounts to this rule would require the
impossible of him whenever the assignee was not situated to move
first because his assignment was only a security interest and the
debtor was not in default. Nonetheless, one court read Klauder to
allow the trustee to invoke this rule.2" 2 Another court refused to
apply the rule because "the favored position acquired by the subsequent assignee . . . comes not from his status as bona fide purchaser, but from his activities following his belated assignment." 21 3
That rationale applies equally, however, to the hypothetical subsequent assignee in Klauder. The only assignees of accounts who
seemed completely free from the 1938 perfection clause were those
governed by the "New York rule," which had no perfection re209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

297 U.S. 227, 229 (1936); see also supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
See Klauder, 318 U.S. at 437.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 342(b) (1981).
See In re Vardaman Shoe Co., 52 F. Supp. 562, 563 (E.D. Mo. 1943).
In re Rosen, 157 F.2d 997, 1001 (3d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 835 (1947).
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quirements against either creditors or subsequent assignees.21 4
The consequence was a 1950 amendment21 5 adding a new
perfection requirement as section 60a(2) and six other new
paragraphs to section 60a.21 6 The Reform Act consigned most of
the 1950 amendments to history, but section 60a(2) is still relevant. Section 60a(2) preserved much of the language of the 1938
perfection provision, including language that a transfer was
"deemed made" at perfection or immediately before bankrutpcy if
not perfected before the filing of the petition. The new section bifurcated the perfection test, however. Transfers of real property
had to be perfected against bona fide purchasers, and transfers of
"property other than real property" had to be perfected against a
"subsequent lien upon such property obtainable by legal or equita2 17
ble proceedings on a simple contract.1
Confining the bona fide purchaser test to real property alleviated worries not only about accounts receivable but also about a
variety of inventory financing devices under which a dealer-debtor
could defeat even a perfected security interest by a sale to his customer. 21 8 But U.C.C. sections 9-102(1) and 9-302(1) now require
the filing of a financing statement to perfect a sale or a security
interest in accounts or a security interest in general intangibles.
Also, under section 9-301(1)(b) and (d), a judicial lien creditor or a
bona fide purchaser can defeat an unperfected interest in such
collateral.
Section 60a(4) further defined the judicial lien obtainable by a
creditor "on a simple contract," against which transfers of property
other than realty had to be perfected. The lien must arise on the
entry or docketing of a judgment, 21 9 or upon attachment, garnishment, execution, or similar process. It did not include liens that
"under applicable law are given a special priority over other
liens. 22 0 The discovery of a single state statute apparently in214. Countryman, supra note 201, at 79.
215. 64 Stat. 24 (1950).
216. For more detail, see Countryman, supra note 201, at 86-90.
217. 64 Stat. 24, § 60a(2) (1950).
218. By U.C.C. §§ 1-201(9) and 9-307(1), the customer, now described as a "buyer in
ordinary course of business," can defeat a perfected interest in inventory if the collateral is
not farm products.

219. Kentucky, Michigan, and the New England states, with two exceptions, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-44 (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. § 12-2901 (Supp. 1982), have no judgment
lien. In most of the other states, a judgment lien reaches only real property, but in a few
states it also reaches personalty. See ALA. CODE § 6-9-211 (1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-80
(1982); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-19 (1972).
220. 64 Stat. 24, § 60a(4) (1950).
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spired section 60a(4).2 21 The statute authorized anyone with a
damage claim arising from tortious operation of a motor vehicle to
attach the vehicle and obtain a lien on it with priority over all
other liens except tax liens.2 2
Most remarkably, the 1950 amendments to section 60 did not
affect the "literal interpretation" of Klauder. The test for perfection changed for some types of collateral, but if the test was not
met the result seemed the same as under Klauder. The creditor
who took a security interest on a present advance six months
before bankruptcy and waited three months to perfect would have
his security interest converted into one for antecedent debt. The
four month period of section 60a would be calculated from the
date of perfection; the debtor's insolvency and the creditor's reasonable cause to know of the insolvency would be tested as of the
date of perfection. If the creditor never had perfected before bankruptcy, he again would end with a security interest for antecedent
debt, and the four month period, the debtor's insolvency, and the
creditor's reasonable cause to know of the insolvency would be
tested as of a time immediately before bankruptcy. 23 With preferential effect still tested at the time of distribution, no element of
the trustee's case would be tested at the time of actual transfer in
either instance.
Section 547(e)(1) of the Reform Act continues the bifurcated
perfection test with a few modifications. 24 The test for transfers of
"real property other than fixtures, but including the interest of a
seller or a purchaser under a contract for the sale of real property,"
is perfection against a bona fide purchaser "against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected." The test for transfers of "a fixture or property other than real property" is perfection against a judicial lien obtained by "a creditor on a simple
contract." The Committee Reports 22 5 explain that the "simple contract" language "is derived from" old section 60a(4). 2 6 The reference to a purchaser "against whom applicable law permits such
221. S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-15-20 (1977).
222. Id. Proponents of the 1950 amendment also had complained that all security
transfers could not be completed "on the courthouse steps." As a result, some delay would
occur between the transfer and perfection, and the "literal interpretation" of Klauder would
convert the transfers into transfers for antecedent debt. In response to that plea, § 60a(7)
gave creditors 21 days to perfect, unless state perfection law specified a shorter period.
223. See 2 W. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 60-39[3], [4], [5] (J. Moore 14th ed. 1977).
224. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1) (1982).
225. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 100, at 374; S.REP.No. 989, supra note 118, at 89.
226. See supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.

1985]

VOIDABLE PREFERENCE

transfer to be perfected" also appears in sections 544(a)(3),
548(d)(1), 549(c). 227 The "simple contract" language appears also
in section 544(a)(1). In both Houses, the floor managers of the Reform Act explained with reference to section 544(a)(3) that the
language was included "so as not to require a creditor [sic] to perform the impossible in order to perfect his interest. ' 228 They further explained that "[b]oth the [simple contract] lien creditor test
in § 544(a)(1) and the bona fide purchaser test in § 544(a)(3)
should not require a transferee to perfect a transfer against any
entity with respect to which the applicable law does not permit
'229
perfection.
Section 547(e)(2) also provides that "a transfer is made" for
the purposes of section 547 at the time it "takes effect between the
transferor and the transferee" if perfected within ten days of that
time, even though the perfection occurs after bankruptcy. If
perfection occurs after expiration of the ten day grace period, 230
the transfer "is made" at the time of perfection, except that, if the
transfer is not perfected when the debtor files the petition and the
grace period has expired, the transfer "is made" immediately
before the date of bankruptcy.23 1 All of the provisions of section
547(e)(2) apply "except as provided in" section 547(e)(3), however,
and the latter section provides that "for the purposes of" section
547, "a transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in
the property transferred."
But, insofar as section 547(e)(2) appeared to authorize postpetition perfection within the ten day grace period, a legislative acci227. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(a)(3), 548(d)(1), 549(c) (1979). In the Reform Act, the words in §
548(d)(1) were "against whom such transfer could have been perfected," but the 1984
amendments conformed the language to that in §§ 544(a)(3), 547(e)(1), and 549(c).,
228. 124 CONG. REc. 32,400, 33,999 (1978).
229. Id. The floor managers also explained that Congress "intended that the simple
contract test used in § 547(e)(1) [would] be applied as under section 544(a)(1) not to require
perfection against a creditor on a simple contract in the event applicable law [made] such
perfection impossible." Id. at 33,999, 34,000.
230. This 10 day period replaces the 21 day grace period of the old Act. See supra
note 222.
231. This last provision seems nearly redundant. The trustee can defeat, under
§ 544(a)(1), most transfers not perfected at bankruptcy against judicial lien creditors and,
under § 544(a)(3), most transfers of realty not perfected against bona fide purchasers without proving the elements of a voidable preference. But see infra note 236 and accompanying
text. The same near redundancy was in the 1938 and 1950 perfection provisions of old § 60
for transfers not perfected at bankruptcy against judicial lien creditors, because old § 70c
authorized the trustee to avoid the transfers for that reason alone. Until the enactment of
§ 544(a)(3), however, the trustee had no similar power to defeat transfers of realty not perfected at bankruptcy against bona fide purchasers.

756

VANDERBIL T LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:713

dent may have occurred in 1978. Section 546(b)2 32 subjects the
trustee's avoiding powers under sections 544, 545, and 549383 to any
"generally applicable law" that grants a grace period for perfection
with retroactive effect against intervening interests; moreover, section 546(b) specifically contemplates that the grace period may extend beyond the filing of a bankruptcy petition. The Committee
Reports explain that "'generally applicable law' relates to those
provisions of applicable law that apply both in bankruptcy cases
and outside of bankruptcy cases. ' 23 4 The Reports cite as an example U.C.C. section 9-301(2), which gives the holder of a purchase
money security interest ten days from the time the debtor gets
possession of the collateral to perfect the interest, with retroactive
effect against intervening levying creditors and bulk transferees. "
Also, because the filing of the petition under section 362(a)(4)2 36
operates as an automatic stay of "any act to. . .perfect. . . any
lien against property of the estate" an exception from that stay
was written into section 362(b)(3) to the extent that the trustee's
powers are subject to grace periods for perfection under section
546(b).
None of these provisions, including the exception in section
362(b)(3), however, applied to a creditor seeking to take advantage
of his grace period for perfecting a transfer under section 547(e)(2).
The grace period does not come by way of section 546(b) and its
incorporation of "generally applicable law"; rather, it is conferred
by section 547(e)(2), which is not a law applicable "both in bankruptcy cases and outside of bankruptcy cases." Under the Reform
Act, the creditor apparently had to seek relief from the automatic
stay before attempting a postpetition perfection within the ten day
grace period of section 547(e)(2). As a result, the 1984 amendments
expanded the exception from the automatic stay in section
362(b)(3) to include a perfection that is accomplished "within the
period provided under" section 547(e)(2).
Nevertheless, the 1984 amendment does not solve the entire
problem. Section 546(b) subjects the trustee's avoiding powers
under section 544(a) only to grace periods for perfection given by
"generally applicable law," not to those given by section
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

11 U.S.C. § 546(b) (1982).
Id. §§ 544, 545, 549.
H-R.REP. No. 595, supra note 100, at 371; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 118, at 86.
Id. They also might have cited many mechanics' and materialmen's lien statutes.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (1982).
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547(e)(2). 3 Although a creditor no longer needs relief from the
automatic stay to take advantage of the grace period given by section 547(e)(2) for purposes of section 547, most transfers not perfected at bankruptcy against judicial lien creditors and most transfers of realty not perfected at bankruptcy against bona fide
purchasers still will be voidable under section 544(a)(1) or (3).38
Therefore, section 546(b) also should be amended to subject the
trustee's avoiding powers to grace periods conferred by "generally
applicable law" or by section 547(e)(2).
In addition, the reading Klauder gave to the old perfection
provisions seems equally applicable to new section 547(e). A failure
to perfect within the ten day grace period of section 547(e)(2) will
toll the ninety day or one year provision of section 547(b);23 9 will
237. See In re Murray, 27 Bankr. 445, 448 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983); In re Ken Gardner Ford Sales, Inc., 10 Bankr. 632, 643 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981).
238. There may be some overlap. A purchase money secured party who takes advantage of § 546(b) and U.C.C. § 9-301(2) to make a postpetition perfection within 10 days of
the time the debtor gets possession of the collateral, if the perfection occurs within 10 days
of the time the "transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee," may have
complied with the 10-day grace period of § 547(e)(2). But the holder of a UCC security
interest that is not for purchase money has no UCC grace period to perfect. He will be in
the same position as the holder of a statutory attorney's lien with no grace period in In re
Storage Technology Corp., 45 Bankr. 83 (D.C.D. Colo. 1985). The attorney, who filed a notice to perfect his lien after the bankruptcy petition was filed, got no protection from 11
U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) or § 546(b). His filing violated the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5)
and his lien was voidable under § 545(2) as a statutory lien not perfected against a bona fide
purchaser at bankruptcy. The holder of a UCC interest that is not for purchase money, who
filed after bankruptcy, would be in the same position except that his security interest would
be avoidable under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1).
239. See In re Strom, 46 Bankr. 144, 148 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985); In re Gottschalk, 46
Bankr. 49, 51 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985); In re La Mancha Aire, Inc., 41 Bankr. 647, 648
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984); In re Harter, 41 Bankr. 276, 278-79 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984); In re
A.E.F.S., Inc., 39 Bankr. 66 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984); In re Airport-81 Nursing Care, Inc., 29
Bankr. 501, 509 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983); In re Hogg, 35 Bankr. 292, 297 (Bankr. D.S.D.
1983); In re Murrey, 27 Bankr. 445, 448 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983); In re Fregosi, 23 Bankr.
641, 643 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982); In re Holl, 13 Bankr. 918, 923 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 1981); In
re Elkind, 11 Bankr. 473, 475 (Bank. D. Colo. 1981); In re Eichorn, 11 Bankr. 81, 83
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1981); In re Amato, 10 Bankr. 120, 121 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); In re
Meritt, 7 Bankr. 876, 878 (Bank. W.D. Mo. 1980).
Former Bankruptcy Rule 906(a) incorporated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a),
which provides that in computing
any period of time prescribed ... by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event,
or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the
next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday ....
New Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a), effective August 1, 1983, copies FED. R. CIv. P. 6(a). See
Harbor Nat'l Bank v. Sid Kumins, Inc., 696 F.2d 9, 10 (1st Cir. 1982); In re Schneider, 44
Bankr. 961, 962 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984); In re Wilmington Nursery Co., 36 Bankr. 813, 816
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convert a security interest for a present advance into one for antecedent debt; 240 and will provide a later testing period for the
debtor's insolvency.2 41 Prior to the 1984 amendments, section
547(e) also provided a later testing period for the insider-creditor's
reason to know of the debtor's insolvency. 242 It still provides a later
for determining whether the creditor-defendant was
testing period
2 43
an insider.
C.

The Exceptions from Preference

Even though the trustee, with or without the aid of section
547(e), proves his entire case under section 547(b), he may recover
nothing. Section 547(c) contains seven exceptions from section
547(b), and the creditor-defendant may prevent avoidance of his
transfer "to the extent that" he can bring it within24 4 one or
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984); In re Cosmopolitan Aviation Corp., 34 Bankr. 592, 594 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1983) (citing cases); In re Enterprise Fabricators, Inc., 36 Bankr. 220, 222 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1983).
240. See, e.g., In re Strom, 46 Bankr. at 148; In re La Mancha Aire, Inc., 41 Bankr.
647 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984); In re Harley, 41 Bankr. 276, 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984); In re
Airport-81 Nursing Care, Inc., 29 Bankr. 501, 509 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983); In re Davis, 22
Bankr. 644, 646 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982); In re Martella, 22 Bankr. 694, 651 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1982); In re Hall, 14 Bankr. 186, 187 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1981); In re Christian, 8 Bankr. 816,
818 (M.D. Fla. 1981); In re Meritt, 7 Bankr. 876, 879 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980); In re Kelley,
3 Bankr. 651, 654 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980); see also Hogan, Bankruptcy Reform and
Delayed Filing Under the U.C.C., 35 ARK. L. REv. 35, 45 (1981).
241. See, e.g., In re La Mancha Aire, Inc., 41 Bankr. 647, 648 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984);
In re Eichorn, 11 Bankr. 81, 83 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981).
242. See In re Camp Rockhill, Inc., 12 Bankr. 829, 834 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); In re
Crouthamel Potato Chip, Co., 6 Bankr. 501, 507 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980).
243. In In re Camp Rockhill, Inc., a minority stockholder's stock was redeemed by the
corporate debtor's judgment note more than a year before bankruptcy. The stockholder recorded the note and thereby acquired a lien on the debtor's real estate more than 90 days
before bankruptcy. The court held that, even though the stockholder might have been an
insider before his stock was redeemed, he was not an insider at the time he acquired his
judgment lien. 12 Bankr. at 834; see also In re Crouthamel Potato Chip Co., 6 Bankr. at 507
(holding that a transfer more than 90 days before the transferor's bankruptcy and three
days before the transferee became a member of the debtor's board of directors was not a
transfer to an insider); cf. In re Louisiana Indus. Coatings, Inc., 31 Bankr. 688 (Bankr. E.D.
La. 1983) (redemption of stock of majority stockholder 11 months before corporation filed
for bankruptcy was voidable preference to insider).
For a more detailed analysis of § 547(e), see Breitowitz, Article 9's Security Interests as
Voidable Preferences, 3 CARDozo L. REv. 357 (1982).
244. To the extent that § 547(g), added in 1984, puts the burden on the creditordefendant to prove nonavoidability of a preference under § 547(c), it codifies prior case law.
See In re Ken Gardner Ford Sales, Inc., 10 Bankr. 632, 646 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981), afl'd,
23 Bankr. 743 (E.D. Tenn. 1982); In re Air Vermont, Inc., 47 Bankr. 537, 539 (Bankr. D. Vt.
1985); In re American Ambulance Serv., Inc., 46 Bankr. 658, 660 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985); In
re Fasano/Harriss Pie Co., 43 Bankr. 871, 877 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984); Tinnell Traffic
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more 24 5 of these exceptions. 246 No picture of the current American
concept of a voidable preference would be complete without an examination of these exceptions.
1.

The Contemporaneous Exchange Exception

In National City Bank v. Hotchkiss, 24 7 a bank made an unsecured day loan to a stockbroker at 10:00 a.m., the stock market
broke before noon, and the New York Stock Exchange suspended
the broker at noon. When the bank learned of these facts, it demanded a pledge of securities from the broker, and got it between
2:00 and 3:00 p.m. the same day, although the broker advised the
bank that a bankruptcy petition would be filed against it (as it was
at 4:00 p.m.) and that the pledge would be a preference. In one of
Justice Holmes' cryptic opinions, the Court held that the pledge
2 48
was a voidable preference.
Four years after Hotchkiss, the Court decided Dean v. DaServ., Inc., 43 Bankr. 277, 290 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984); In re Blanton Smith Corp., 37
Bankr. 303, 306 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984); In re General Office Furniture Wholesalers, 37
Bankr. 180, 183 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984); In re Lario, 36 Bankr. 582, 583-84 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1983); In re Damon, 34 Bankr. 626, 629 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983); In re Saco Local Dev.
Corp., 30 Bankr. 867, 876 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983). In re Fetterer Eng. Assoc., Inc., 27 Bankr.
878, 882 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983), holds that the debtor in possession has the burden of
proof under § 547(c)(5) by confusing that section with § 547(b)(5). Fairchild v. Lebanon
Prod. Credit Ass'n, 31 Bankr. 789, 794 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983), reaches the same conclusion
by misreading a prior decision holding that "[o]nce there is proof that a transfer is within §
547(b), the creditor has the burden of proving that he is protected by one of the exceptions." In re Ken Gardner Ford Sales, Inc., 10 Bankr. at 646.
245. "If a creditor can qualify under any one of the exceptions, then he is protected to
that extent. If he can qualify under several, he is protected by each to the extent that he can
qualify under each." H.R. RE,. No. 595, supra note 100, at 373; S. REP. No. 989, supra note
118, at 88.
246. Old § 60a and present § 547(b)(4) apply only to transfers made "before" the filing
of the petition. Hence, neither applies to postpetition transfers-a point occasionally overlooked, e.g., Bank of Main v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966), but sometimes recognized,
see, e.g., In re Isis Foods, Inc., 37 Bankr. 334, 337 (W.D. Mo.), appeal dismissed, 738 F.2d
445 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Bridges Enters., Inc., 44 Bankr. 979, 982 (Bankr. S. D. Ohio 1984);
In re American Gypsum Co., 36 Bankr. 360, 363 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1984). In re Chancellor, 20
Bankr. 316, 318 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982). Postpetition transfers of property of the estate
generally are avoidable under 11 U.S.C. § 549 unless the Reform Act or the court authorizes
the transfers. Transfers occurring in an involuntary case after the filing of the petition, but
before the order for relief, are valid under § 544(b) to the extent of "any value, including
services, but not including satisfaction or securing of [prepetition] debt," despite the transferee's notice or knowledge of the case. The exceptions contained in § 547(c), however, are
not applicable to § 549(b). See In re Bridges Enters., Inc., 44 Bankr. at 983; In re Isis Foods,
Inc., 37 Bankr. at 337; In re American Gypsum Co., 36 Bankr. at 363.
247. 231 U.S. 50 (1913).
248. Id. at 58.
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vis,1 a case much better known for holding that a mortgage was a
fraudulent conveyance when knowingly given to secure a loan that
enabled a debtor to give another creditor a preferential payment.250 But the Court also held that, since the parties intended a
secured loan at the outset, the fact that the mortgage was not executed until seven days, or recorded until eight days, after the loan
did not convert the mortgage into a voidable preference, because it
"was given to secure . . . a substantially contemporary
251
advance.
The Commission that drafted the first version of the Reform
Act proposed to define antecedent debt for preference purposes as
a debt incurred more than five days before a transfer paying or
securing the debt. This proposal was made for the express purpose
of overruling Hotchkiss. 52 This author pointed out to Congress
that this provision would overrule both Hotchkiss and Dean v. Davis and suggested that the two cases demonstrated that "this matter is much better left to the courts. '2 53 The House and Senate
staff dropped the proposed definition of antecedent debt and substituted the language now in section 547(c)(1): the trustee may not
avoid a transfer under section 547 to the extent that the transfer
was "(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor. . . to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor; and (B)
in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange. ' 254 Apparently,
the more demanding requirement of (A) came from Hotchkiss and
the less demanding requirement of (B) from Dean v. Davis.
But this provision developed a troublesome legislative history.
Both Committee Reports erroneously state:
Normally, a check is a credit transaction. However, for the purposes of this
paragraph, a transfer involving a check is considered to be "intended to be
contemporaneous," and if the check is presented for payment in the normal
course of affairs, which the Uniform Commercial Code specifies as 30 days,
U.C.C. § 3-503(2)(a), that25will amount to a transfer that is "in fact substantially contemporaneous. 5

A check is "a draft drawn on a bank and payable on demand. 2' 5 5 A
249. 242 U.S. 438 (1917).
250. See supra note 95.
251. 242 U.S. at 443.
252. Commission Report, supra note 91, pt. I, at 205; pt. II, at 168.
253. The Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Improvements in
JudiciaryMachinery of Senate JudiciaryComm. on S. 235 and S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
1041 (Nov. 12, 1975).
254. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
255. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 100, at 373; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 118, at 88.
256. U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(a)(1978).
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check is not a credit instrument unless it is "postdated by even one
day.

'257

A postdated check technically is not a check but a time

draft because it is not payable until the stated date. 58 Therefore,
on a check not postdated, the drawer has not obtained a legal right
to delay payment. In other words, no credit has been extended.
And U.C.C. section 3-503(2)(a), to which the Committee Reports
referred, provides for a thirty day period for presenting a check to
the drawee bank to charge the drawer with his obligation under
U.C.C. section 3-413 to pay the amount if the drawee dishonors the
check.259 This thirty day period has nothing to do with whether the
underlying transaction is a credit transaction.26 °
When the floor managers of the bill later attempted to clear
up the confusion created by the Committee Reports, they only
compounded it and extended it also to section 547(c)(2): "Contrary
to language contained in the House Report, payment of a debt by
means of a check is equivalent to a cash payment, unless the check
is dishonored.261 Payment is considered to be made when the check
is delivered for purposes of sections 547(c)(1) and (2). ' '262 As we

will see, this bit of history has caused confusion. The courts, for
inconsistent reasons, have held that the debtor transfers no property, within the meaning of section 547(b), when he issues his own
check. As under old section 60,263 the transfer occurs when and if

the drawee bank honors the check.2 6 ' Most courts base this conclu257. Id. § 2-511 comment 6.
258. See id. § 3-114(2).
259. Id. § 3-503(2)(a).
260. See Engstrom v. Benzel, 191 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1951); Engstrom v. Wiley, 191
F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1951).
261. Under U.C.C. § 2-511, subject to § 3-802, payment for goods by check "is conditional and is defeated as between the parties by dishonor of the check on due presentment."
U.C.C. § 2-511(3)(1978). Under § 3-802, which is not confined to sale of goods, unless otherwise agreed, an obligation is discharged if a check is taken on which a bank is drawer or
acceptor and for which no recourse lies against the underlying obligor. Id. § 3-802(1)(a). In
any other case, the underlying obligation is suspended only until presentment. Id. § 3802(1)(b). If the check is dishonored, action may be maintained either on the check or on
the underlying obligation. Id.
262. 124 CONG. REc. 32,400 (statement of Rep. Edwards), 34000 (statement of Sen.
DeConcini) (1978).
263. See Nicholson v. First Inv. Co., 705 F.2d 410, 413 (11th Cir. 1983); Fitzpatrick v.
Philco Fin. Co., 491 F.2d 1288, 1293 (7th Cir. 1974). But see Shamrock Golf Co. v. Richcraft,
Inc., 680 F.2d 645, 646 (9th Cir. 1982) (the court was persuaded by the statement of the
floor managers that a transfer occurs for purposes of old § 60 when the debtor delivers his
check to the creditor).
264. See In re Insulation Materials, Inc., 47 Bankr. 832, 835 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985);
In re Isis Foods, Inc., 37 Bankr. 334, 336 (W.D. Mo.), appeal dismissed, 738 F.2d 445 (8th
Cir. 1984); In re Bridges Enters., Inc., 44 Bankr. 979, 982 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984); In re
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sion on U.C.C. section 3-409(1), which inartfully provides that "[a]
check or other draft does not of itself operate as an assignment of
any funds in the hands of the drawee available for its payment,
the drawee is not liable on the instrument until he accepts
and
it. 12 65 By issuing its check to a creditor, the debtor does not transfer any part of the debtor's claim against its bank; rather, the
debtor only gives the creditor a contingent promise under U.C.C.
section 3-413(2) to pay the creditor if the drawee bank does not. If
the drawee bank wrongfully fails to pay, its liability under U.C.C.
section 4-402 runs only to the drawer, not to the creditor as holder
of the check. 26" But some courts also have treated this situation as
FasanolHarriss Pie Co., 43 Bankr. 871, 873 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984); In re Georgia Steel,
Inc., 38 Bankr. 829, 834 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984); In re Bob Grissett Golf Shoppes, Inc., 34
Bankr. 320, 322 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983); In re Video East, Inc., 33 Bankr. 61, 63 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1983); In re Brent Explorations, Inc., 31 Bankr. 745, 751 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983); In
re Ellison, 31 Bankr. 545, 547 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983); In re Moran Air Cargo, Inc., 30
Bankr. 406, 408 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983); In re Mailbag Int'l, Inc., 28 Bankr. 905, 907 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1983); In re Skinner Lumber Co., 27 Bankr. 669, 670-71 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982); In re
Super Market Distribs. Corp., 25 Bankr. 63, 64 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982); In re Fabric Buys of
Jericho, Inc., 22 Bankr. 1010, 1011 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Ardmore Sales Co., 22
Bankr. 911, 913 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); In re Sportsco, Inc., 12 Bankr. 34, 36 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 1981); In re Duffy, 3 Bankr. 263, 265 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980). Contra In re Sider Ventures & Servs. Corp., 47 Bankr. 406, 407-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (court was misled by statement
of floor managers); In re Walker Indus. Auctioneers, Inc., 45 Bankr. 452, 455 (Bankr. D. Or.
1984) (following Shamrock Golf Co. v. Richcraft, Inc., 680 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1982) note 263
supra.). In Isis Foods and Bridges, the courts' application of this rule meant that the transfers occurred postpetition and were governed by § 549 rather than § 547. 37 Bankr. at 336;
44 Bankr. at 983. Ardmore applied this rule to find that payment of the debtor's check
constituted a transfer more than 90 days before bankruptcy. The payment constituted an
accounting to the creditor, who had terminated the debtor's insurance premiums, for
unearned premiums resulting from the debtor's cancellation of policies. The insurer's earlier
payment to the debtor was provisional, subject to a formal audit that was completed within
90 days of bankruptcy. "[T]he final auditing affected only the rights and laibilities of [the
insurer] and the debtor against each other" and had no "direct effect on the payment by the
debtor to" the creditor. 22 Bankr. at 913.
265. U.C.C. § 3-409(1) (1978). "Certification of a check is acceptance." Id. § 3-411(1).
266. Third party checks held by the debtor as payee or indorsee are different. The
debtor can transfer these checks to a creditor by voluntary delivery with any necessary indorsement. The delivery is a negotiation, and the creditor becomes a holder under U.C.C.
§ 3-202. In the alternative, the debtor may make a transfer that falls short of a negotiation
under § 3-201. In either event, the debtor by the transfer gives the creditor rights against
the third party drawer of the check. See McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365, 371
(1944) (debtor indorsed and mailed a government check to a creditor, and the Court held
that the transfer occurred when the check was mailed). Cashier's checks, drawn by a bank
on itself, are also different. Under U.C.C. § 3-118(a), a cashier's check is "effective as a
note," and the bank's unconditional engagement as maker under § 3-413 is to pay the instrument according to its tenor. By transferring a cashier's check to a creditor, the debtor
transfers rights against the bank. See In re Kimball, 16 Bankr. 201, 203 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1981) (holding that a transfer occurs for purposes of § 547(b) when the debtor delivers a
cashier's check to a creditor); cf. In re Archie Cambell, Inc., 45 Bankr. 416 (Bankr. D.N.D.
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a perfection problem under section 547(e). U.C.C. section 4-303
provides that legal process served on a bank after the bank has
paid or certified a check is too late to affect the bank's duty to pay
the check. Hence, these courts conclude that it is the payment or
certification that "perfects" the transfer, even though there is no
earlier "time the transfer takes effect between the transferor and
the transferee" from which section 547(e)(2) measures the ten day
period for perfection. 6 7
In re Wadsworth Building Components, Inc.2 61 8 typifies one
pattern of cases emerging under section 547(c)(1). The seller delivered goods on credit in October and received in December the
buyer's check for the price. When he tried to collect the check,
however, it was dishonored. He then advised the buyer that no
more orders would be filled until the check was made good. Upon
the buyer's assurances that the check would be paid, the seller delivered more goods on credit in January. When the check was redeposited, it was paid in February, but the buyer never paid the
seller for the January shipment. The buyer's bankruptcy trustee
recovered the February payment as a preference. The court held
that section 547(c)(1) was unavailable to the seller because the
seller did not give new value in exchange for the payment, which
was made to pay a past debt in order to receive further credit. 69
1984). Certified checks are also different. By certifying (accepting) the debtor's check, a
bank makes the same unconditional engagement as does the maker of a note under U.C.C. §
3-413(1); by transferring a certified check to a creditor, the debtor again transfers rights

against the bank. See In re Fabmet Corp., 31 Bankr. 414, 417 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983)
(holding that a transfer occurs when the debtor delivers his certified check to a creditor).
267. See, e.g., In re Bridges Enters., Inc., 44 Bankr. 979, 982 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984);
In re Georgia Steel, Inc., 38 Bankr. 829, 834 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984); In re Bob Grissett Golf

Shoppes, Inc., 34 Bankr. 320, 322 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983); In re Fabmet Corp., 31 Bankr.
414, 417 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Mailbag Int'l, 28 Bankr. 905, 908 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1983); In re Super Market Distribs. Corp., 25 Bankr. 63, 65 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982); In re
Mindy's, Inc., 17 Bankr. 177, 179 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); In re Sportsco, Inc., 12 Bankr.
34, 36 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1981); see also In re Sider Ventures & Servs. Corp., 47 Bankr. 406,

409 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
268. 711 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1983); see also In re Fasano/Harriss Pie Co., 43 Bankr. 871
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984); In re Naudain, Inc., 32 Bankr. 871 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983); In re

Saco Local Dev. Corp., 30 Bankr. 859 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983).
269. 711 F.2d at 124. The dissent considered the payment to be for both the past debt
and the continued credit extension, although nothing indicated that the seller contractually
had committed itself to extend more credit. The dissent would have held that the seller
qualified under § 547(c)(1) to the extent of the goods delivered in January. Id. at 125
(Boochever, J., dissenting).
"New value," which must be exchanged for the debtor's transfer to qualify under §
547(c)(1), includes under § 547(a)(3), "new credit," but "new credit" is difficult to find with

no commitment to extend credit. Moreover, with the entire amount of the check credited to
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In re Standard Food Service, Inc.,27 ° was similar, except that
it concerned a cash sale rather than a credit sale. The seller took
the buyer's check for the price of the goods at the time of delivery,
but the check was dishonored. Again, the seller advised that no
more orders would be filled until the check was made good and
then accepted a cashier's check2 71 for the amount of the earlier
check eleven days after the goods were delivered and six days after
the original check was dishonored. Apparently, this seller delivered
no more goods to the buyer. The seller tried to invoke section
547(c)(1) when the trustee attempted to recover the amount of the
72
The court, after considering the
cashier's check as a preferenceY.

legislative history of section 547(c)(1), said that the seller's argument that the giving of the original check constituted a transfer for
new value (the goods delivered) "would be dispositive had the
check cleared.

21 7

The court, however, invoked the language of the

floor managers indicating that a check was not the equivalent of
cash if it was dishonored.274 Hence, the court concluded that
"when the check bounced, the transaction became a credit transaction"; consequently, the seller's receipt of the cashier's check discharged antecedent debt and was not a contemporaneous exchange
for new value. 5
A more troublesome use of the legislative history of section
547(c)(1) was made in two other circuit decisions. 27 6 The courts

held that section 547(c)(1) was not applicable to purchase money
security interests not perfected until fourteen days, in one case,
2 77
and twenty-six days in the other case, after they were acquired
because (1) the legislative history revealed that Congress intended
the section for "check or other cash equivalent transactions" and
not for purchase money security transactions, and (2) Congress
specifically provided for purchase money security transactions in
past debt, finding that the debtor gave any part of his payment in exchange for "new credit"
is difficult as well.
270.
271.
272.

723 F.2d 820 (11th Cir. 1984).
See supra note 266.
723 F.2d at 821. Belatedly, the seller also tried to invoke § 547(c)(2) on appeal,

but the court refused to consider the assertion because it was not raised below. Id. at 822.
273.
274.
275.
276.
1983).
277.

Id. at 821.
See supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
723 F.2d at 821.
In re Davis, 734 F.2d 604 (11th Cir. 1984); In re Vance, 721 F.2d 259 (9th Cir.
Section 547(c)(3) was not available to the creditor in either case because it had

not perfected its purchase money security interest within the 10 day period allowed by
§ 547(c)(3)(B). 734 F.2d at 607; 721 F.2d at 262.
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section 547(c)(3)278 and the two provisions were mutually exclusive.27 9 The Sixth Circuit, in In re Arnett,280 reached a similar conclusion about a nonpurchase money security interest not perfected
until thirty-three days after it was acquired, reasoning that to employ section 547(c)(1) would be inconsistent with the ten day
perfection period allowed by section 547(e)(2).281 But the Arnett
court also read the legislative history of section 547(c)(1) to indicate that Congress merely intended to codify cases that dealt with
"the exchange of goods or other 'value' for a check" and not to
apply to a security interest.282 These three decisions give too much
significance to a legislative history that is too muddled to support
invocation of the old rule of statutory interpretation that, if the
legislative history is clear enough, the court need not read the language of the statute. After all, section 547(c)(1) does not speak of
"checks" but of "transfers," which section 101(48) defines clearly
to include the taking or retaining of a security interest. Furthermore, both Hotchkiss and Dean v. Davis, which appear to have
inspired the statutory language, dealt with security interests.2 83
At the same time, the three cases reached a correct result in
not employing section 547(c)(1) to expand the ten day period for
perfection allowed by section 547(e)(2). Section 547(e)(2) provides
that if a transfer is not perfected within ten days after it takes
effect between debtor and transferee-creditor, the transfer will
"[flor the purposes of this section" (including section 547(c)(1))
"occur" at a later time. Nothing in the statutory language or the
legislative history indicates that Congress intended section
547(c)(1) to authorize departures from the precise ten day perfection period of section 547(e)(2). Therefore, courts should confine
the language "in fact . . . substantially contemporaneous" in section 547(c)(1)(B) to cases in which a delay "in fact" occurs in the
time when the transfer "takes effect" between debtor and transferee-creditor, which was the situation in Dean v. Davis. 28 4
278. As indicated infra at text accompanying notes 333-34, the availability of
547(c)(3) to all purchase money security interests is not clear.

§

279. Davis, 734 F.2d at 607; Vance, 721 F.2d at 261; see also In re Gottschalk, 46
Bankr. 49, 51 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985) and cases cited therein.
280. 731 F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1984).
281. Id. at 364; see supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
282. 731 F.2d at 361.
283. See supra notes 247-51 and accompanying text.
284. See In re Lyon, 35 Bankr. 759, 763 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982) (holding that, when the

creditor made a loan to the debtor that the parties intended to secure by a real property
mortgage executed 21 days later and recorded 5 days after execution, § 547(c)(1), which
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Section 547(c)(1) also may perform another function. The
debtor and the transferee-creditor must intend the "new value" as
a contemporaneous exchange for the debtor's transfer, and a substantially contemporaneous exchange must occur in fact. Included
in the definition in section 547(a)(2) of the "new value" is a "release by a transferee of property previously transferred to such
transferee in a transaction that is neither void nor voidable by the
debtor or the trustee under any applicable law. '285 If one bears in
mind that section 547(c)(1) is a defense for a transferee-creditor
only "to the extent that" the section covers him, the definition of
"new value" appears to be an attempt to codify the substitution of
collateral doctrine. Courts originally developed the doctrine under
the preferential effect requirement of old section 60,286 limited by
the Benedict v. Ratner two-step approach, which permitted the
trustee to avoid the substitution as a preference if he could avoid
the original lien on any ground. 8
The history of section 547(c) contains some support for the
above hypothesis. From 1967 to 1970 a committee of the National
Bankruptcy Conference, chaired by the late Professor Grant Gilmore, studied the treatment of security interests in bankruptcy
and drafted proposals for a variety of amendments to old section
60.288 One proposal, which the committee described as "merely a
codifies Dean v. Davis, applied; and § 547(e)(2) was also satisfied). But see In re Strom, 46
Bankr. 144, 148 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985)(holding that when a deed of trust was "in fact"
executed by the debtor when new value was given, but recorded eight months thereafter and
within 90 days of bankruptcy, § 547(e)(2) converted the deed of trust into a transfer for
antecedent debt). This is not to say that § 547(c)(1) should not apply to payments as well as
to the taking of security interest. But cf. In re George Rodman, Inc., 39 Bankr. 855, 857
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1984) (creditor took payment of its claim in exchange for "immediate
release" of a statutory materialmen's lien on an oil well that later turned out to be a "dry
hole," and court held that it made a contemporaneous exchange for the payment within the
meaning of § 547(c)(1), but that the "valid but valueless" materialmen's lien that it released
did not constitute "new value." And in In re Air Vermont, Inc., 45 Bankr. 817, 820 (D.C. D.
Vt. 1984), the security interest attached on January 6 when the secured party gave value by
a binding commitment to extend credit on that date. The secured party made its advance
on January 12 and the security interest was perfected on January 17. The court recognized
that the transfer did not occur under § 547(e)(2) until January 17, but used § 547(c)(1) to
extend the 10 day period of § 547(e)(2).
For a different view of § 547(c)(1), see Duncan, Section 547(c)(1) and Delayed Perfection of Security Interests in the Ninth Circuit, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J. 269 (1984); Duncan,
Delayed Perfection of Security Interests in PersonalProperty and the Substantially Contemporaneous Exchange Exception to Preference Attack, 62 NEB. L. REv. 202 (1983).
285. The 1984 amendment to § 547(a)(2) adds "including proceeds of such property."
286. See supra notes 172-79 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
288. The 1970 report of the Gilmore Committee is printed in an appendix to H.R. REP.
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statutory restatement of the 'substitution of collateral' idea,

'28 9

would have provided:
If a transferee has released or returned to the debtor property previously
transferred to him in a transaction which was not voidable.. ., then a transfer in substitution for the property released or returned is not voidable except to the extent that the value of the substituted property exceeds the
value of the property released or returned. The release or return and the substitution need not take place simultaneously provided that the release or return is made in contemplation of the substitution and the substitution is
29 0
made within a reasonable time after the release or return.

Although the Bankruptcy Commission adopted many of the Gilmore committee's proposals, the Commission did not adopt this
proposal, 9 1 nor did the House and Senate draftsmen. 92 But the
draftsmen did include, in the definition of "new value" in section
547(a)(2), the Gilmore committee's language about release of prior
transfers. In addition, the language with which they drafted section 547(c)(1) bears a strong resemblance to the language of the
Gilmore committee.
Even though some cases under the Reform Act recognize the
doctrine of substitution of collateral, courts have continued to base
the doctrine on the preferential effect requirement of section
547(b)(5).293 In one respect, the basis of that doctrine makes a difference. Under section 547(g), if the proper basis is section
547(b)(5), the trustee has the burden of proof; but if the proper
basis is section 547(c)(1), the transferee-creditor has the burden.
2. The "Current Expenses" Exception-And How It Grew
Formerly, establishing the debtor's intent to prefer was essential before a preferential transfer would be considered an act of

bankruptcy.294 During that time, a number of cases held that credi-

tors who filed involuntary petitions did not establish the debtor's
intent to prefer in payments usually, but not invariably, for current expenses made within four months of bankruptcy. Usually,
the payments were described as "necessary" to the continuance of
the business or made in the "ordinary course of business. "295 And,
No. 595, supra note 100, at 204-19. I was a member of the committee.
289. Id. at 215.
290. Id. at 212.
291. Commission Report, supra note 91, pt. II, at 166-68.
292. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978); S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
293. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
295. See Goodlander-Robinson Lumber Co. v. Atwood, 152 F. 978, 979 (4th Cir. 1907)
(supplier of inventory); Martin v. Hulen & Co., 149 F. 982, 983 (8th Cir. 1906) (same); Rich-
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with no help from, or regard for, the language of the statute, a
smattering of cases held that such payments were also exempt
from avoidance under old section 60.219 Based on these cases, the
leading bankruptcy treatise advised that "payments on account of
current expenses. . are generally not within the category of pref'297
erential transfers.
In an apparent attempt both to confine the earlier rulings
under section 60 and to provide them with some statutory base,
the Bankruptcy Commission proposed to exclude from its definition of antecedent debt "(A) a debt for personal services, (B) a
debt for utilities incurred within three months of the petition,
[and] (D) a debt for inventory paid for within three months of the
delivery of the goods in the ordinary course of the debtor's business."2 98 The National Bankruptcy Conference, treating these as
exclusions of "utilities and trade debt," proposed to limit the excluded debt for personal services to "non-executive type employees," to limit the excluded debt for inventory to that paid for
within thirty days of delivery, and to limit the exclusions for inventory and utilities to that supplied and paid for in the ordinary
course of business of both parties. 9 9
The House and Senate draftsmen instead supplied section
547(c)(2) as enacted in 1978: the trustee could not avoid a transfer
under section 547 to the extent that it was in payment of a debt
incurred in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of
the debtor and the creditor; if the payment was also made in the
ordinary course of business or financial affairs of both and was acmond Standard Steel Spike & Iron Co. v. Allen, 148 F. 657, 662 (4th Cir. 1906) (president's
salary); In re Union Feather & Wool Mfg. Co., 112 F. 774, 777 (7th Cir. 1902) (current
payroll); In re E.T. Russell Co., 291 F. 809, 813-14 (D. Mass 1923) (insurance premiums,
teamster's services, stationery and painting expenses, finance company installment loan, and
president's salary); In re Columbia Real Estate Co., 205 F. 980, 982 (D.N.J. 1913) (unspecified debts); In re Hallin, 199 F. 806, 808 (W.D. Mich. 1912) (unspecified debts); In re
Perlhefter, 177 F. 299, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1910) (advertising expense); In re Tirre, 95 F. 425, 426
(S.D.N.Y. 1899) (back rent and taxes).
296. See Marshall v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 112 F.2d 380, 382 (5th Cir. 1940) (warehouse
charges); Talty v. Ross, 14 F.2d 240, 241 (D. Mass. 1926) (current payroll); Brush v.
Seymore, 30 F. Supp. 202, 204 (D.N.H. 1939) (current payroll); In re Mersick, Inc., 1 Bankr.
599, 601-02 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1979) (current rent); Dunn v. E.L. Gayvert & Co., 263 A.D.
785, 31 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1941), afl'd, 288 N.Y. 669, 43 N.E.2d 72 (1942) (utilities).
297. 3 W. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 60.23 (14th ed. 1977); see also Kaye, Preferences
Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197, 201-02 (1980).
298. Commission Report, supra note 91, pt. II, at 168.
299. Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House JudiciaryComm. on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
1849 (Mar. 19, 1976).
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cording to ordinary business terms; and if the payment was made
not later than forty-five days after the debt was incurred.30 0 The
Committee Reports explained that for "a consumer, the paragraph
uses the phrase 'financial affairs' to include such nonbusiness activities as payments of monthly utility bills," and that the "purpose of this exception is to leave undisturbed normal financial relations, because it does not detract from the general policy of the
preference section to discourage unusual action by either the
debtor or his creditors during the debtor's slide into bankruptcy."3'0 1 Clearly, Congress intended to limit the exception to the
payment of current expenses. If there was an intent to limit the
exception also to "trade debt," the draftsmen must have despaired
of attempting to define that frequently used but intensely undefined term, 0 2 and invoked the forty-five day limitation in recognition that most of the trade debt at which they were aiming was
short term. Nevertheless, the draftsmen must have realized that
their formulation also would apply to short-term credit of any
kind.
300. H.R.8200 and S. 2266, supra note 254.
301. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 100, at 373; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 118, at 88.
One of the draftsmen later elaborated on this modest explanation:
The second exception to the preference section insulates ordinary trade credit transactions that are kept current. . . .Forty-five days was selected as a normal trade credit
cycle. For example, a normal trade credit transaction might be as follows: supplier
ships goods during month 1 and sends his bill to the debtor at the end of the month or
the very early of the part of the following month. Normally, that bill would become
due, or will be payable in the debtor's ordinary course of business, by the 10th of
month 2. If it is paid by the 15th, there will be no question that the entire transaction-incurring of the credit and the payment-took place within 45 days.
Congress has not defined when a debt is incurred. In the preceding example, of
course, there is no question. However, if the supplier's bill was paid toward the end of
month 2, the supplier/creditor might argue that the debt was not incurred until the
invoice was sent, thus bringing the payment within the 45-day period. Congress's intent
seems to be contrary. For the purposes of this exception, the debt is incurred when it
becomes a legally binding obligation on the debtor. Thus, when goods are shipped, the
debtor becomes liable for the payment, and the debt is incurred. This is supported by
Congress's selection of the 45-day period: Congress treated as non-preferential an ordinary-course payment of trade credit in the first 15 days of the month following the
month in which the goods were shipped or services performed. Payments later than the
15th are often late payments and an indication of financial trouble.
Levin, An Introduction to the Trustee's Avoiding Powers, 53 AM. BANK. L.J. 173, 186-87
(1979). The generalization that the debtor is liable to pay when the goods are shipped may
cover most sales of goods, but not all. Any lawyer worth his or her salt can draw a contract
under which the buyer is not only liable to pay, but the payment is due, before the seller
ships the goods. But cf. In re Gold Coast Seed Co., 781 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1985).
302. With apologies to Mr. Justice Erle, who remarked more than a century ago that
"the words 'equitable lien' are intensely undefined." Brunsdon v. Allard, 121 Eng. Rep. 8, 11
(Q.B. 1859).
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Most of the litigation under section 547(c)(2) has been concerned with when a debt is incurred and when a payment is made
because of the forty-five day limit between the two dates. The
cases concerning the date the debt is incurred may be relevant to
whether a transfer is for an antecedent debt under section
547(b)(2).303 If the payment is by check, the cases concerning the
payment date may be relevant to when a transfer is made under
section 547(b), (c)(1), or (c)(4). These cases, however, are no longer
relevant under section 547(c)(2) and will not be considered here
because a 1984 amendment to that section eliminated the fortyfive day limit.3 0"
The 1984 amendment has long roots. One of the first groups to
seek any amendment to section 547 were issuers of commercial paper backed by an irrevocable letter of credit from a bank, a bank's
irrevocable commitment to lend the issuer money to meet maturities, or an indemnity bond from an insurance company. Their concern was with the market for this paper in the light of the horrible
possibility that the issuer might pay at maturity but then go into
bankruptcy within ninety days. Unless the holder of the paper
could find an applicable exception in section 547(c), the trustee
frequently would be able to recover the payment, even though the
holder had no reason to believe the issuer insolvent at the time of
303. Section 547(a)(4) provides that a debt for taxes is incurred on the last day when
the tax is payable without penalty, including any extension. The floor managers explained
this provision to Congress solely in terms of its effect on the determination of when a tax
debt is incurred for purposes of § 547(c)(2). 124 CONG. REc. 32,417, 34,017 (1978). Since the
1984 amendment to § 547(c)(2), the provision no longer has any office to perform under
§ 547(c)(2). If a tax debt is paid on the last day payable without penalty, however, the
payment should not be for antecedent debt within the meaning of § 547(b)(2). See HR. REP.
No. 595, supra note 100, at 373. This provision also seems applicable to estimated tax payments, which the House Report explains will not be preferential "because no tax is due
when the payments are made. Therefore, the tax on account of which the payment is made
is not an antecedent debt." Id. This explanation overlooks the regrettable reality that a time
does come (the time when most of us pay them) when estimated tax payments are due.
304. Nevertheless, the attorney confronting the statement of the bill's floor managers
that payment is considered made when a check is delivered "for purposes of sections
547(c)(1) and (2)," see supra note 262 and accompanying text, should not miss In re Advance Glove Mfg. Co., 25 Bankr. 521, 527 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982) (concluding that the
reference to § 547(c)(2) "appears to be clearly inadvertant, gratuitous, and unintentional"
and holding that when payment is by check no transfer occurs under § 547(c)(2) until the
check is paid), indorsed by In re Staveco Elec. Constr. Co., 48 B.R. 247, 250 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1985), and In re Naudain, 32 Bankr. 871, 874 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983); see also In re Advance
Glove Mfg. Co., Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 70,505 (6th Cir. 1985); O'Neill v. Nestle Libbys
P.R., Inc., 729 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1984); In re Emerald Oil Co., 695 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1983);
In re Property Leasing & Management, Inc., 46 Bankr. 903, 912-14 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1985); In re Quality Holstein Leasing, Inc., 46 Bankr. 70 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985).
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payment. The only possibly available exception was section
547(c)(2), but frequently the exception would not apply because
the commercial paper involved had more than a forty-five day maturity. And the holder then would have no recourse against the
bank or insurance company that backed the paper because their
undertaking would have terminated when the issuer paid.
Senator DeConcini in 1980 proposed, as a solution to their
problem, adding another exception for this specially backed paper
with a maturity date not exceeding nine months. 5 During hearings on this proposal, 0 and in subsequent hearings during which
the proposal was revived,3 0 7 its proponents never indicated, and
were never asked, whether they had considered seeking from the
banks, insurance companies, or others an undertaking to pay if the
bankruptcy trustee recovered the issuer's payment from the
holder. During the subsequent hearings, other groups objecting to
the forty-five day limit in section 547(c)(2) joined the specially
backed commercial paper group.3 0 8 These groups also suggested
that the forty-five day period, or some shorter period, should run
from the due date rather than the day the debt was incurred.3 09
The fruit of these proposals was a bill introduced by Senator
Dole that would have provided an exception, as a new section
547(c)(7), for payments made on specially backed commercial paper regardless of its maturity date and would have deleted the
forty-five day limit from section 547(c)(2).310 Somewhere between
the introduction of this bill and its adoption by the Senate, however, an untoward thing happened to new section 547(c)(7). After
its revision, it did not except from section 547 a payment to the
holder of specially backed commercial paper by the issuer of the
305. S. 3023, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
306. Preference Section of the Bankruptcy Code: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Judicial Machinery of the Senate JudiciaryComm. on S. 3023, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 18,

1980).
307. April 1981 Senate Hearings, supra note 115, at 229-74.
308. One group was suppliers of sporting goods who sold to dealers at the beginning of
the season on credit that extended to the end of the sporting season. Id. at 251-55. A
spokesman for the National Association of Credit Management also testified that in many
industries "in the real world" the "normal trade credit cycle" was more than 45 days. Id. at
255-61.
309. Id. at 249, 255, 261.
310. S.445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 211(b), 359(b) (1983). The first provision was contained in a subtitle of the bill for "Technical Amendments" and the second in a subtitle for
"Consumer Credit Amendments" with the one sentence explanation that the 45-day limitation in § 547(c)(2) "places undue burdens upon creditors who receive payments under business contracts providing for billing cycles greater than 45 days." S. RaP. No. 55, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 60 (1983).
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paper; instead, it excepted a payment by the bank that had issued
the letter of credit or loan commitment or by the insurance company that had issued the indemnity bond!3 11 More than a year
later, Senator Thurmond tacked to the 1984 amendatory act both
of these provisions as they had earlier passed the Senate.-1 ' The
exceptions for specially backed commercial paper now appeared as
section 547(c)(8). Later, however, in order to obtain Senator Metzenbaum's consent to expedited consideration of the 1984 amendments, Thurmond withdrew his proposed section 547(c)(8).313
In explaining the Conference Report before its adoption in the
Senate, Senator Dole blanketed the amendment of section
547(c)(2) in with "a host of technical matters. ' 1 4 Senators Dole
and DeConcini explained only that the elimination of the forty-five
day period would "relieve buyers of commercial paper with maturities in excess of 45 days of the concern that repayments of such
paper at maturity might be considered as preferential transfers." ' 5
But the elimination does much more than that. Elimination of the
forty-five day period creates a gaping hole in the preference policy
by protecting every creditor who receives a payment otherwise
avoidable under section 547(b) who can persuade the court that
the debt was incurred and the payment was made "in the ordinary
course of business or financial affairs" of debtor and creditor and
that the payment was made "according to ordinary business
terms."
The quoted statutory words of limitation do not come into the
bankruptcy law with a heavy gloss from use in other areas. The
"ordinary course of financial affairs" and "ordinary business
terms," both undefined, are new to our jurisprudence. "[O]rdinary
course of business" also is undefined. The concept of a "buyer in
ordinary course of business" is defined in U.C.C. section 1-201(9)
and used in U.C.C. sections 9-307(1) and 2-403(3) for the buyer of
goods from a seller in the business of selling such goods. The UCC
definition is not helpful, however, in determining when a debtor
obtains credit and later pays, or when the creditor extends credit
3 16
and later receives payment in the ordinary course of business.
311.
312.
(daily ed.
313.
314.
315.
316.

129 CONG. REC. S5378 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1983).
130 CONG. REC. S6081-82, S6107, S6122, S6127 (daily ed. May 27, 1984), S7265
June 19, 1984).
Id. at S7617 (daily ed. June 19, 1984).
Id. at S8890 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
Id. at S8897.
The bulk purchaser who buys "not in ordinary course" of the seller's business
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Although the above concepts have now been in the Reform
Act since 1978, case law reveals little about what they may come to
mean. Most of the litigation under section 547(c)(2) has been concerned with the times when the debt was incurred and when the
payment was made under the part of section 547(c)(2) that Congress eliminated in 1984. Nevertheless, among the few cases dealing with other matters under section 547(c)(2), courts have held
that certain payments were not made in the ordinary course of
business of either debtor or creditor. 17 Other courts have held that
under U.C.C. § 6-102(1) is even less translatable.
317. Debtor and creditor both engaged in buying and selling seed, and they agreed
that creditor would take a shipment of seed from debtor in payment of an overdue debt. In
re Gold Coast Seed Co., 24 Bankr. 595, 597 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982). But cf. In re American
Gypsum Co., 36 Bankr. 360, 363 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1984) (assuming that a transfer of some of
the debtor's wallboard inventory to pay a trucking company's bill is covered by § 547(c)(2)).
After debtor's check to supplier was dishonored, the parties agreed that debtor would deposit cash or debtor's customers' checks with a third party. Supplier delivered inventory to
debtor only to the extent of deposits, and seller was paid by the depository. In re D.A.C.
Meats, Inc., 8 Bankr. 230, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Debtor made regular monthly payments of
$28 on an installment debt for 20 months, two payments totalling more than $350 in the
next two months, none for the next three months, and then within a few days of bankruptcy
full payment of the $340 balance ahead of time. In re Williams, 5 Bankr. 706, 707 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1980). As indicated supra note 165, the court erroneously ignored that the creditor was at least partially secured. In another case, after debtor's customer paid in advance
for silver that debtor was unable to deliver, debtor repaid customer in cash and by the
negotiation of other customers' checks. Customer contended that the cash and checks constituted "silver's worth" delivered in fulfillment of its order. In re Kennesaw Mint, Inc., 32
Bankr. 799, 805 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983). Creditor advised debtor that creditor had been
approached by another creditor about joining in an involuntary petition and asked debtor
for financial statements and anything else debtor could do to show its good faith. Debtor
switched from payments by its corporate checks to payments by cashier's checks. In re
Craig Oil Co., 31 Bankr. 402, 406 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983). After debtor closed its business
operations, it returned goods purchased on credit to an unpaid supplier. In re Martin
County Custom Pools, Inc., 37 Bankr. 52, 53 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984); cf. In re Amex Trading
Co., 32 Bankr. 793, 799 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1984) (reaching different result because of evidence of trade custom). After debtor had closed its business and was attempting to liquidate
it, but before bankruptcy, debtor turned over a customer's check to its attorney. The attorney was authorized to, and did, use the money collected from the check to pay for past due
and current legal fees. In re Peninsula Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc., 9 Bankr. 257, 261
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981). After insolvent debtor redeemed its majority shareholder's stock
in exchange for property, cash, and an unsecured promissory note, debtor made payments
on the note. The court said that ordinary course of business was confined to "the ordinary
and necessary running expenses of the debtor's business, of types and amounts that the
debtor had theretofor made a practice of paying." In re Louisiana Indus. Coatings, Inc., 31
Bankr. 688, 695 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1983). The court derived its definition from three of the
old cases which held that lack of intent to prefer meant that preferential payments could
not be treated as acts of bankruptcy. See In re Union Feather & Wool Mfg. Co., 112, F. 774
(7th Cir. 1902); In re Columbia Real Estate Co., 205 F. 980 (D.N.J. 1913); In re Perlhefter,
177 F. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1910). After debtor for years had made monthly payments to a supplier that were only one or two days late by checks that always cleared, one payment was
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neither the incurring of the debt nor the payment of it were in the
ordinary course of business.3 18 Two courts have determined that
payments by the debtor were not according to ordinary business
terms. 19 Finally, only two courts have held that debts incurred or
payments made were in the ordinary course of business of the
debtor and the creditor, according to ordinary business terms.2 0
nine days late because debtor's check was dishonored; other payments were two to twelve
days late; some payments "split" the monthly bill into two payments; and some payments
were made after supplier had put future deliveries on a C.O.D. basis. In re Ewald Bros.,
Inc., 37 Bank. 52, 56-60 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984). Finally, one court held, without explanation, that an individual debtor's purchase of a used car from an automobile dealer was not
in the ordinary course of debtor's business or financial affairs. In re Martella, 22 Bankr. 649,
652 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982).
318. A farmer delivered grain to the warehouse of debtor milling company with an
option in debtor to purchase or return it within a specified time. Debtor thereafter exercised
the option and made payment. Farmer failed to prove "that he, or other farmers, had entered into like option contracts with the debtor in the past. In re Economy Milling Co., 37
Bankr. 914, 922 (D.S.C. 1983). After corporate debtor engaged in construction business got
into financial difficulties, its sole stockholder made "sporadic advances" to meet daily payroll overdrafts. Debtor repaid stockholder when it received payments on its construction
projects. In re Fulghum Const. Co., 45 Bankr. 112, 115-16 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984). Debtor
obtained payment from 10 to 15 customers by submitting false invoices. Six days later,
debtor had a change of heart toward one customer, admitted that the invoices were false,
and repaid him. In re Tinnell Traffic Servs. Inc., 41 Bankr. 1018, 1020 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1984). A corporate debtor borrowed money from its president's wife to pay its taxes and
avoid an IRS levy on its assets and later repaid her. In re Arctic Air Conditioning, Inc., 35
Bankr. 107, 108 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983). Five months after the debtor's business had been
closed by fire damage, it retained a law firm on a contingent fee basis to pursue its claim
against the lessor of the business premises and one month later the firm effected a settlement and collected its fee. The relationship between a law firm and the debtor was held not
to be a "normal credit transaction such as the sale of goods for a business supplier on account" and, moreover, the firm was not retained until the debtor's business had closed.
Kallen v. Litas, 47 Bankr. 977, 984 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985).
319. Debtor between March and May bought goods on open account and then in September, three weeks before bankruptcy, paid his account in full. The payment was not according to ordinary business terms. In re Gulf States Marine, Inc., 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d
(MB) 650, 653 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1980). Payments made by debtor operating a modern
"Ponzi" scheme, under which funds obtained from later investors were used to pay "interest" to earlier investors, were not made in ordinary course of debtor's business or according
to ordinary business terms. Instead, the court held that the payments were "unusual, extraordinary, and unrelated to any business enterprise whose protection was intended by the
drafters of § 547(c)(2)." In re Independent Clearing House Co., 41 Bankr. 985, 1014-15
(Bankr. D. Utah 1984).
320. The IRS levied on debtor's obligation to a delinquent taxpayer. The court held
that debtor's obligation to the IRS and its payment of the obligation were in the ordinary
course of business of both the IRS and debtor and that the payment was according to ordinary business terms. In re Thomas W. Garland, Inc., 39 Bankr. 412, 415-17 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 1984). If the court extended its ruling to a debtor who paid in response to service of a
writ of garnishment on behalf of a private creditor of one to whom the debtor was obligated,
the court would be approaching Lord Mansifled's concept of ordinary course of business.
See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text. The court, however, may have been influ-
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Even if other patterns that are not "ordinary" for incurring
and paying debt develop in case law, and even if these patterns
include prepayment of debt and payment of debt long overdue,
section 547(c)(2) in its present form (which I am unable to characterize as another "legislative accident") seems doubly indefensible.
The exception creates a huge gap in the policy underlying section
547. First, that a debt was "ordinarily" incurred and paid has no
more relevance to whether the debt repayment distorts the bankruptcy distribution scheme than does the purpose of the debtor in
making the payment, and of the creditor in receiving it. Second,
the present section 547(c)(2) immunizes the ordinary "payment,"
whether in cash or property, but does not immunize ordinary
transfers by way of security.3 21 No rational explanation for this distinction is conceivable, except that the drive to amend section
547(c)(2) presented those hostile to the preference policy with an
opportunity to exempt payments from preference treatment but
with no similar opportunity to exempt security transfers.
The only apparent justification for section 547(c)(2) as enacted
in 1978 (I have not yet heard, but would like to hear, a plausible
justification for it in its present form) is the following: If a debtor
selectively can meet debts currently coming due in order to continue functioning outside of bankruptcy, creditors should be encouraged to accept these payments, even though preferential. Consequently, creditors may continue doing business with the debtor
because they will not be penalized if the debtor's attempt to function outside of bankruptcy fails. This justification is not compelling because it is contrary to the entire concept of preference.' If
this justification provides the basis for an exception, then the exception should not be confined to "trade debts," however that term
might be defined. A banker's demand or thirty day note may pose
as great an obstacle to keeping the debtor's business or financial
enced because the levy was for taxes--"the life-blood of government." 39 Bankr. at 416.
Debtor, engaged in the distribution of cedar products, incurred debt to suppliers on
open account in ordinary course of business of debtor and supplier. Supplier then assigned
the account to a bank to secure an extension of credit. The court held that § 547(c)(2)
protected payments made to the bank by debtor because the bank as assignee stood "in the
shoes of" supplier assignor. In re Bagwell, 29 Bankr. 457, 461 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983); In re
Bagwell, 29 Bankr. 461, 465 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983). The court did not inquire whether the
assignments were perfected.
321. At least one court, however, has tested transfers by way of security for compliance with § 547(c)(2), but found that the provision was unsatisfied in other respects. In re
Martella, 22 Bankr. 649, 652 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982). Another court found that a transfer by
way of security satisfied § 547(c)(2). In re Hart Ski Mfg. Co., 7 Bankr. 465, 469 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1980).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:713

affairs in operation as the claim of an inventory supplier or a utility. The real rub, however, is that a banker's longer term note, or
other long-term installment obligations, or a retailer's long overdue
accounts may present the same obstacle. The 1984 amendments
now permit payment of these long-term obligations, even though
22
the 1978 version of section 5 4 7(c)(2) did not protect them.
In view of the feeble inspiration for this exception,323 and because the exception is completely at war with the concept of a
preference and has no rational confining limits, the best future for
present section 547(c)(2) is repeal.
3.

The Enabling Loan Exception

U.C.C. section 9-107 defines two types of purchase money security interests. A purchase money security interest arises (a) when
the seller of the collateral takes or retains a security interest to
secure all of the sale price; or (b) when one who, by making advances or incurring an obligation, gives value to enable the debtor
to acquire rights in or the use of the collateral and the value is in
fact so used. 2 4
The Gilmore committee of the National Bankruptcy Conference3 25 urged an exception to the preference concept, not for a security interest retained by the seller under section 9-107(a), but for
322. See In re Barash, 658 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981) (monthly installment obligation);
In re McCormick, 5 Bankr. 726, 730-32 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980)(same); In re Burner, 3
Bankr. 617 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980)(same). Because courts considered that the debtor incurred installment obligations when the credit was extended rather than when monthly installments became due, any payment beyond the first installment was unprotected under
the 45 day limit. See also In re Pippin, 46 Bankr. 281, 283-84 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1984) and
cases cited therein. But see In re Iowa Premium Serv. Co., 695 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1982); In
re Graves, 45 Bankr. 858 (E.D. Cal. 1985). Payments on a charge account also were unprotected by § 547(c)(2) when the debtor made the latest charges more than 45 days before
payment, see In re Gulf States Marine, Inc., 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D. (MB) 650, 652
(Bankr. W.D. La. 1980); or when the debtor made charges within 45 days, but a state statute
required payment to be applied first to the oldest charges, see In re Williams, 5 Bankr. 706,
708 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980). Under the 1978 version of § 547(c)(2), in the absence of a
similar state statute, courts applied the usual rule that the debtor may direct how the payments shall be applied; if the debtor does not direct payment, the creditor may decide. See
In re American Gypsum Co., 36 Bankr. 360 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1984); In re Balducci Oil Co., 33
Bankr. 843, 847 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983); In re Gander Mountain, Inc., 29 Bankr. 260 (Bankr.
E.D. Miss. 1983). Courts experienced more difficulty with utility bills when service was provided continuously, but the meters were read monthly. See In re Georgia Steel, Inc., 38
Bankr. 829 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984); In re Keydata Corp., 37 Bankr. 324 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1983); In re Thomas W. Garland, Inc., 19 Bankr. 920 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1982).
323. See supra notes 295-97 and accompanying text.
324. U.C.C. § 9-107 (1978).
325. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
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a security interest taken by the "enabling lender" under section 9107(b). The committee explained that its proposal would protect
from preference attack "what are usually called 'enabling loans'
where the acquisition of the property by the debtor is, chronologically, later in time than the advance of the enabling loan, so that
the transfer of the security interest in the property acquired is,
technically, for antecedent debt.I 2 The seller who retains a security interest in property sold to the debtor does not face this problem. He must be concerned about preference law only if he delays
perfection of his interest beyond the time allowed under that law.
The Bankruptcy Commission quoted the above explanation
from the Gilmore committee report and proposed an exception labeled "Enabling Loans." If a security interest is perfected within
ten days after the debtor first "acquires rights in the property,"
the exception applies to the extent "that [the collateral] secures
new value previously given to enable the debtor to acquire the
property.3' 2 7 The National Bankruptcy Conference, not surprisingly, supported this proposal. The Conference spokesman explained that the proposal was
designed to coordinate with, and in a sense is made necessary by, section 9203 of the [U.C.C.], which provides that a security interest is not created and
does not attach until the debtor has rights in the collateral; 28 therefore,
where the creditor lends money to a debtor to acquire the collateral, the security interest may be deemed to be given for antecedent debt.32 9

The House and Senate staff accepted the proposal but rewrote
the exception in section 547(c)(3) as enacted in 1978.330 The exception applied to a transfer under section 547(c)(3)(A) when a security interest "in property acquired by the debtor" secured new
value "(i) given after the signing of a security agreement that contains a description" of the collateral, "(ii) given by or on behalf of
the secured party, . . . (iii) given to enable the debtor to acquire
such property, and (iv) in fact so used by the debtor." Under section 547(c)(3)(B), the exception applied if the security interest was
perfected within ten days after "such security interest attaches."
The Committee Reports explain in a single sentence that this ex326. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 100, at 214.
327. Commission Report, supra note 91, pt. I, at 208; pt. II, at 167.
328. Section 547(e)(3) is in accord with U.C.C. § 9-203. See text following supra note
231.
329. Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings before Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of House JudiciaryComm. on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 2nd Seass. 1482
(Mar. 19, 1976).
330. H.R. 8200 and S. 2266, supra note 254.
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ception is "for enabling loans in connection with which the debtor
acquires the property that the loan enabled him to purchase after
the loan is actually made."331 This formulation exceeds earlier proposals by requiring, as does U.C.C. section 9-107(b), that the
debtor in fact use the loan to acquire the collateral.3 32 In addition,

the proposal exceeds section 9-107(b) by requiring that the security interest contain a description of the collateral-a requirement
that may cause difficulties for secured parties who take security
interests in collateral in which the debtor does not have rights and
which may not be in existence.
Nevertheless, a loan must be given at or after the signing of
the security agreement to enable the debtor to acquire collateral,
and the debtor in fact must use the loan to acquire collateral.
Under section 547(e)(3), the excepted transfer is not made until
the debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred. This
provision and the scattered but fairly clear legislative history indicate that Congress did not intend section 547(c)(3) to apply to a
seller who retains a purchase money interest in the goods sold;
rather, Congress intended the exception to apply to the purchase
money secured party whose transaction in fact involves antecedent
debt: the enabling lender. 333 Nevertheless, some courts have con-

cluded, without express discussion of the matter, that section
547(c)(3) may be available to a seller who has retained a security
interest.3 3 4 Those cases, however, caused no damage because the
331. HR. REP. No. 595, supra note 100, at 373; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 118, at 88.
332. U.C.C. § 9-107 applies only to personal property collateral. Section 547(c)(3), cast
in terms of "property," is not confined to personalty although the reported cases that have
arisen under it so far are.
333. One could design an enabling loan to take effect after the debtor acquired the
collateral, so that no antecedent debt in fact would exist. One also could design a seller's
security interest not to attach until some time after the goods were sold to the debtor, so
that an antecedent debt problem in fact would exist. These designs, however, would not be
typical transactions, and neither of them seemed to inspire § 547(c)(3). In In re Damon, 34
Bankr. 627, (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983),-the lender made an unsecured enabling loan and took a
security interest after the debtor acquired the collateral. The court held that § 547(c)(3) was
inapplicable because the loan preceded the security agreement. Id. at 630.
334. See, e.g., In re Davis, 734 F.2d 604 (11th Cir. 1984); In re Murray, 27 Bankr. 445,
448 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983); In re Martella, 22 Bankr. 649, 651 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982); In
re Enlow, 20 Bankr. 480, 483 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1982); In re Lucas, 28 Bankr. 366 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1982). In Davis, Murray, Martella, and Enlow, the seller had assigned the security interest to a finance company that was the defendant in the preference action. In Davis
and Murray, the dealer was a Ford dealer and the finance company was Ford's captive Ford
Motor Credit Corporation (FMCC). Although the definition of "new value" in § 547(a)(2)
includes "new credit," the case did not indicate whether FMCC made a contractual commitment after the security agreement was executed and before the debtor acquired the collateral that would qualify as "new value" under § 547(c)(3). FMCC claimed solely as assignee
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security interest was not perfected within ten days and failed to
qualify under section 547(c)(3)(B) as a result.
The separate ten day perfection provision in section
547(c)(3)(B) is both perplexing and a possible trap for the unwary.
First, as enacted in 1978, the ten day period of section 547(c)(3)(B)
ran from the time the "security interest attaches." Presumably this
ten day period referred to the same time period as section
547(e)(2), which, "[flor the purposes of this section," prescribed a
ten day perfection period from the time the "transfer takes effect
between the transferor and the transferee," unless there is some
difference between the quoted terms. This interpretation would
not render section 547(c)(3)(B) redundant because the failure to
perfect within ten days would disqualify the secured party for section 547(c)(3), but only would postpone when the transfer occurs
under section 547(e)(2). There is some support for this interpretation. Under U.C.C. section 9-203(1), a security interest is not enforceable against the debtor and does not attach until the debtor
signs a written security agreement (or the secured party has possession of the collateral under an oral agreement), the secured
party has given value, and the debtor has rights in the collateral.
The Gilmore committee's enabling loan provision required only
that "within a reasonable time" after the loan "the debtor acquire[d] the property and [made] a perfected transfer of it." 3 5 The
Gilmore committee's equivalent of section 547(e)(2) also measured
the time for perfection from the time when the transfer "became
effective between the parties."33 6 The committee explained that it
had not used the U.C.C. term "attached" because confusion might
have resulted for transfers other than Article 9 security interests.
But the committee added that "becomes effective between the parof the dealer's retained purchase money interest. Davis, 734 F.2d at 604; Murray, 27 Bankr.
at 448.
In Martella, the debtor was a General Motors dealer, and the finance company was
General Motors captive General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC). Although the
court concluded GMAC could not invoke § 547(c)(3) because its interest was not perfected
withn the 10 day period of § 547(c)(3)(B), it disagreed with those courts holding that
§ 547(c)(1) and § 547(c)(3) were mutually exclusive. See supra notes 276-78 and accompanying text. In concluding that GMAC qualified for § 547(c)(1), although the time of the
assignment of the dealer's retained interest to GMAC did not appear, the court decided that
the transfer to GMAC and the giving of new value were substantially contemporaneous because the dealer "was acting as GMAC's agent." 22 Bankr. at 652. In Enlow, the seller assigned its retained security interest to an apparently unrelated finance company 12 days
after the sale. 20 Bankr. at 483.
335. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 100, at 210.
336. Id.
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ties" had the same meaning as "attached" in the Article 9
context.

33

Second, any purchase money secured party governed by the
U.C.C. has, under section 9-301(2), a ten day grace period to perfect. He may invoke that period, if it has not expired, even after
bankruptcy against a trustee who seeks to use his avoiding power
under section 544(a).3 3 But the ten day period of section 9-301(2)

runs from the time "the debtor receives possession of the collateral." Hence, suppose an enabling lender in New York advances
money to a New York debtor pursuant to a signed security agreement to enable the debtor to acquire collateral from a California
supplier, and the debtor so uses the loan. If the lender, in reliance
on section 9-301(2), waits until the debtor receives the collateral in
New York and perfects within ten days thereafter, he may find
that the debtor acquired rights in the collateral when it was
shipped in California,38 9 or even earlier.3 40 Therefore, the security
interest attached and became enforceable against the debtor more
than ten days before perfection under U.C.C. section 9-203 and
within the meaning of both section 547(c)(3)(B) and (e)(2).3 4

Several courts have held that an enabling lender failed to
qualify for section 547(c)(3) because he did not perfect within the
ten day period.3 42 In none of these cases, however, does reliance on
U.C.C. section 9-301(2) appear to have misled the secured party.
Nonetheless, section 547(c)(3)(B) was amended in 1984 to make its
ten day perfection period run from the time the debtor acquires
possession of the collateral. No change was made in section
547(e)(2), under which the ten day period runs from the time the
transfer "takes effect" between the debtor and the secured party.
Courts probably will hold that, even though section 547(e)(2) liter337. Id. at 213.
338. See supra notes 232-38 and accompanying text.
339. "Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time and place
at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the
goods. . . ." U.C.C. § 2-401(2) (1978).
340. "The buyer obtains a special property and insurable interest in goods by identification of existing goods to which the contract relates. . . ." Id. § 2-501(1).
341. Under Tennessee's version of § 9-301(2), the purchase money secured party is
given 20 days from the time the debtor acquires possession of the collateral to perfect.
TENN. CODE ANN.47-9-301 (1980). In re Murray, 27 Bankr. 445 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983),
recognized that § 546(b) did not apply to § 547, so that Tennessee's § 9-301(2) could not
extend the grace periods of either § 547(c)(3)(B) or § 547(e)(2). 27 Bankr. at 451.
342. See In re Vance, 721 F.2d 259, 260 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Ken Gardner Ford Sales,
Inc., 23 Bankr. 743, 747 (E.D. Tenn. 1982); In re Brinhall, 13 Bankr. 942, 948 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 1981); In re Christian, 8 Bankr. 816, 819 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).
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ally applies throughout section 547, the 1984 amendment carves an
exception to section 547(e)(2) and prescribes a special rule for section 547(c)(3). Also, the enabling lender who runs afoul of section
547(b) because of this failure to perfect within ten days of the time
the transfer "takes effect" between the debtor and the secured
party still may qualify for the section 547(c)(3) exemption if he
perfects within ten days of the time the debtor acquires possession
of the collateral as section 547(c)(3)(B) now requires.
4.

The Subsequent Advance Exception

Old section 60c provided, from its enactment in 1898, s"1 that if
a creditor had been preferred "and afterward in good faith gives
the debtor further credit without security of any kind for property
which becomes a part of the debtor's estate, the amount of such
new credit remaining unpaid" at bankruptcy "may be set off
against the amount" of the preference that the trustee recovers.
The Gilmore committee recommended a provision that would
carry the concept of old section 60c into the Reform Act. If a
transferee who did not give new value when the transfer occurred
"thereafter delivers goods to the debtor or makes further advances
to him, or otherwise gives new value, then, to the extent of the new
value so given, the transfer is not voidable."34 4 The provision directed that the trustee deduct any security given for the new
value.34 5 The committee reasoned that the "net result" of these
transactions was "no depletion" of the estate. 4 6 The Bankruptcy
Commission simplified the Gilmore committee's recommendation
to read: "[A] transfer is not voidable to the extent of new value
given at the time of the transfer or at any time thereafter." The
Commission retained the direction that the trustee deduct the
value of any security taken from the new value. The Commission
343. 30 Stat. 562 (1898).
344. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 100, at 210.
345. Id.
346. The Committee explained that:
[t]he core meaning of the entire preference concept is that the transfers which should
be avoided are those which, if allowed to stand, would leave the estate available for
distribution among creditors permanently depleted. If, in a series of transactions between the (bankrupt) transferor and a transferee, the "net result" is zero (i.e. no depletion), it seems unfair to penalize a transferee by holding each separate "transfer" preferential without crediting him for the subsequent unsecured new value contribution he
has made to the estate.
Id. at 214. For a somewhat different proposal, see Taylor, Section 60c of the Bankruptcy
Act: InadequateProtectionfor the Running Account Creditor,24 VAND. L. REv. 919 (1971).
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explained that it was eliminating the old section 60c requirements
that the creditor act in good faith in connection with the subsequent credit extension, that the subsequent credit extension remain unpaid at bankruptcy, and that no security be taken for the
347
subsequent credit extension.
The House and Senate staff cast the subsequent advance proposal in section 547(c)(4) in its present form. The transfer is exempted from section 547 if, "after such transfer, such creditor gave
new value to or for the benefit of the debtor. . .(a) not secured by
an otherwise unavoidable security interest; and (b) on account of
which value the debtor did not make an otherwise unavoidable
transfer to or for the benefit of such creditor."3 48 The requirements
of old section 60c that the new credit be given in good faith and
the express requirement that the new credit remain unpaid at
bankruptcy were deleted. Furthermore, in place of the requirement
of old section 60c that the credit be given "without security of any
kind,"' 49 section 547(c)(4) requires only that an otherwise nonvoidable transfer not secure or be made on account of the credit extension. The House and Senate reports do not explain clearly any of
these changes; rather, they state only:
The fourth exception codifies the net result rule in § 60c of current law.
If the creditor and debtor have more than one exchange during the 90-day
period, the exchanges are netted out according to the formula in paragraph
(4). Any new value that the creditor advances must be unsecured in order for
it to qualify under this exception.350

The Gilmore committee report also explains that its proposal
is based on old section 60c and on "the case law, mostly of fairly
discusses what is usually referred to as the
ancient vintage, which
'net result' rule." 351 The Commission report, however, which
quotes the above language from the Gilmore committee report in a
note to its proposed preference section,35 2 also says in a passage
that appears earlier in the report but was later written:
The Commission's recommendation does not, however, go as far as the
"net result rule" established by some early cases. A true "net result" rule
would total all payments and all advances and offset the one against the
347. Commission Report, supra note 91, pt. I, at 210; pt. II, at 167, 171-72. The Commission's only elaboration was to quote from the Gilmore Committee's report.
348. H.R. 8200 and S. 2266, supra note 254.
349. The § 60c requirement could have disqualified even a credit extension secured by
a transfer that the trustee later avoided. This argument apparently never was made.
350. H.R. REP.No. 595, supra note 100, at 374; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 118, at 88.
351. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 100, at 214.
352. Commission Report, supra note 91, pt. II, at 171.
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other. This is not allowed under the Commission's recommendation, since the
advances to be offset must be subsequent to the preference [as they must be
also under section 547(c)(4)]. 53

In fact, no "net result" rule has existed since 1903, and the
rule never was applicable to old section 60c. The rule developed
when old section 57g required creditors to surrender "technical"
preferences, which were not voidable because the creditor had no
reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent, before their
claims would be allowed. 3 " To mitigate the rigors of section 57g,
lower courts developed, and the Supreme Court approved, a "net
result" rule under which all "technical," nonvoidable preferences
received by a creditor and all unsecured credit extended by that
creditor during the then four month preference period were viewed
as a single transaction. 55 Only to the extent that the "net result"
showed a gain by the creditor would the creditor be required to
surrender it before his claim would be allowed. Courts, however,
applied that rule only under section 57g and only to creditors who
had received nonvoidable preferences; the rule did not apply to
creditors who received preferences that the trustee could avoid
under old section 60. Those creditors might have been able to set
off subsequent unsecured credit extensions under section 60c, but
they could not invoke the "net result" rule. When Congress
amended section 57g in 1903 to confine its operation to voidable
preferences, there was no longer any occasion to apply the "net
result" rule. Every court that has considered the effect of the
amendment of section 57g on the "net result" rule has reached this
conclusion. 5 6
Fortunately, the misleading legislative history of section
353. Id., pt. I, at 210-11.
354. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
355. See Joseph Wild & Co. v. Provident Trust Co., 214 U.S. 292 (1909); Yaple v.
Dahl-Millikan Grocery Co., 193 U.S. 526 (1904); Jaquith v. Alden, 189 U.S. 78 (1903).
356. See In re Frigitemp Corp., 753 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1985); Cooper Petroleum Co. v.
Hart, 379 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1967); Campanella v. Liebowitz, 103 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1939); In
re Ira Haupt & Co., 304 F. Supp. 917, 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Some cases under the old Act
did not consider the effect of the amendment of § 57(g). These courts, however, assumed
that the rule continued to apply, and they held that the rule was unavailable to a creditor
with reason to know the debtor insolvent. See, e.g., Talty v. Ross, 14 F.2d 240 (D. Mass.
1926); In re Farmers' Store & Supply Co., 214 F. 505 (N.D.W. Va. 1914); Chisholm v. First
Nat'l Bank, 269 11. 110, 109 N.E. 657 (1915). Courts also applied the rule in favor of a
creditor who did not need it because he had no reason to believe the debtor insolvent. See,
e.g., In re Fred Stem Co., 54 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1931); Dunlap v. Seattle Nat'l Bank, 93
Wash. 568, 161 P. 364 (1916). Finally, some courts misapplied the rule on behalf of a creditor who had reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent. See, e.g., Farmers Bank v.
Julian, 383 F.2d 314 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1021 (1967).

784

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:713

547(c)(4) has caused less damage than the similarly misleading history of section 547(c)(1) and (2). Most courts have agreed with the
57
Sixth Circuit's decision in In re Fulghum Construction Corp.
that, in light of the clear requirement that the new value be given
"after" the voidable preference, section 547(c)(4) "has transformed
the judicially58 created net result rule into . . . a subsequent ad3
vance rule.
In determining the time of transfer under section 547(c)(4),
courts have received no assistance from legislative history, except
when they take the history of section 547(c)(1) and (2) to mean
that payment by check is a transfer at different times under different provisions in section 547. Nevertheless, the courts consistently
have held that, for the purposes of section 547(c)(4), a transfer occurs when the debtor's check is delivered to the creditor, at least
when the drawee later honors the check. Thus, the creditor who is
encouraged by receipt of the check to extend new unsecured credit
without waiting for the check to clear may invoke section 547(c)(4)
to apply the credit against the trustee's recovery of an earlier
preference. 5 9
The creditor, however, must give the new value after the preferential transfer. For example, in In re Wadsworth Building Components, Inc.,3 e0 the debtor gave his check in December for goods
sold on credit and delivered in October. The check was dishonored
357. 706 F.2d 171 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 342, 343 (1983).
358. Id. at 174; see, e.g., In re Wadsworth Bldg. Components, Inc., 711 F.2d 122, 12324 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Gold Coast Seed Co., 30 Bankr. 551, 553 (9th Cir. 1983); Leathers v.
Prime Leather Finishes Co., 40 Bankr. 248, 250-51 (D. Me. 1984); In re Isis Foods, Inc., 39
Bankr. 645, 649-50 (W.D. Mo. 1984); In re Columbia Packing Co., 44 Bankr. 613, 615
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1984); In re Keydata Corp., 37 Bankr. 324, 328 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983); In
re Saco Local Dev. Corp., 30 Bankr. 859, 862 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983); In re Rustia, 20 Bankr.
131, 135-36 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Thomas W. Garland, Inc., 19 Bankr. 920, 922-26
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1982); In re Bishop, 17 Bankr. 180, 183-84 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982); see
also In re Fabric Buys, Inc., 22 Bankr. 1013, 1017 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
359. See In re Gold Coast Seed Co., 30 Bankr. 551, 553 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Sider
Ventures & Servs. Corp., 33 Bankr. 708 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd on other grounds, 47
Bankr. 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Fasano/Harriss Pie Co., 43 Bankr. 871, 874-76 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1984); In re Georgia Steel, Inc., 38 Bankr. 829, 837 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984); In
re Blanton Smith Corp., 37 Bankr. 303, 307-09 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) (to satisfy perfection requirements of § 547(e)(2), the check must be honored within 10 days after delivery);
In re Chemical Separations Corp., 36 Bankr. 141, 143 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984); In re Philadelphia Light Supply Co., 33 Bankr. 734 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (even though check was
dishonored over a month after receipt by creditor because of an error by drawee bank,
which paid creditor by wire transfer four days later); In re Saco Local Dev. Corp., 30 Bankr.
868, 878 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983); In re Thomas W. Garland, Inc., 19 Bankr. 920, 928 (Bankr.
E.D. Mo. 1982).
360. 711 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1983).
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but was redeposited and paid in February, after the seller had delivered more goods on credit in January. The court treated the
transaction as a perfection problem under section 547(e)(2);3 61 the
transfer, therefore, did not occur until February, and the January
shipment came too early to invoke section 547(c)(4). ss2 The dissent
argued that the seller had qualified under section 547(c)(1) to the
extent of the value of the goods delivered in January.3 63 The dissenting opinion, in addition to raising difficulties under section
547(c)(1),36 4 seems inconsistent with the timing requirements of
section 547(c)(4).
Although old section 60c was limited to subsequent "credit
for property that becomes part of the debtor's estate,"' s any
consideration fitting the definition of "new value" in section
547(a)(2), ss6 given after the preferential transfer, will qualify under
section 547(c)(4). But here the old notion of "diminution of the
estate" has emerged, perhaps with some justification, with an assist from one of the draftsmen who wrote that section 547(c)(4)
"insulates from preference attack a transfer to a creditor to the
extent that the creditor thereafter replenishes the estate. 36 s7 Thus,
the exception may include more than goods sold on unsecured
credit 6 s or money lent. For instance, it also may include the value
361. See supra note 267 and accompanying text; In re Blanton Smith Corp., 37 Bankr.
303, 309-10 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984).
362. Wadsworth, 711 F.2d at 123-24.
363. Id. at 124-25.
364. See supra note 269.
365. In Kaufman v. Tredway, 195 U.S. 271 (1904), the Court held that § 60c did not
require that the money or property remain in the "debtor's estate" at bankruptcy in order
to become part of the bankrupt estate. Id. at 274-75. The Court also held that the language
of § 60c requiring that the subsequent credit be extended in "good faith" (omitted in
§ 547(c)(4)) required only that the creditor "let the debtor have the money or property for
some honest purpose" and that the creditor not "intentionally defeat the Bankruptcy Act"
by aiding the debtor to conceal the transfer from the bankruptcy trustee. Id. In re Ira
Haupt & Co., 424 F.2d 722, 724(2d Cir. 1970), held that "property" under § 60c included
lawyers' and accountants' services. Bernstein v. Home Life Ins. Co., 25 Bankr. 321, 324
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), held that "property" covered health insurance for the debtors' employees
by reading Haupt to mean that "property" under § 60c "may include services which do not
result in a traceable balance that increases the assets of the debtor."
366. Section 547(a)(2) defines "new value" as:
Money or money's worth in goods, services, or new credit, or release by a transferee of property previously transferred to such transferee in a transaction that is
neither void nor voidable by the debtor or the trustee under any applicable law, including the proceeds of such property, but does not include an obligation substituted for an
existing obligation.
11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2)(1982).
367. Levin, supra note 301, at 187.
368. See In re Isis Foods, Inc., 39 Bankr. 645 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984); Butz v. Chain-
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of insurance coverage provided after the payment of delinquent
premiums,3 69 the value of leased equipment when the lessor permitted the debtor-lessee to continue using the equipment to produce inventory after default in rental payments, 370 and may include the value of electricity supplied by a utility to the debtor
after preferential payments. 7 '
paign Landmark, Inc., 33 Bankr. 926, 929 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983); In re D.A.C. Meats, Inc.,
8 Bankr. 230, 233 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (even though a third party guaranteed the subsequent unsecured credit extension).
369. In re Dick Henley, Inc., 45 Bankr. 693, 699 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1985).
370. See In re Quality Plastics, Inc., 41 Bankr. 241, 243 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984).
The court concluded that the debtor was not legally bound to pay the total rent specified in
the lease from the time the lease was signed; rather, he had to pay only when the equipment
was used. Therefore, the obligation to pay for postdefault use was not merely substituted for
an existing obligation within the meaning of § 547(a)(2). See supra note 366; see also In re
Iowa Premium Serv. Co., 695 F.2d 1109, 1111 (8th Cir. 1982); In re Clothes, Inc., 35 Bankr.
489 (D.N.D. 1983), on remand, 45 Bankr. 419 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984); In re Mindy's, Inc., 17
Bankr. 177, 179 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982). The Quality Plastics court also distinguished In re
Duffey, 3 Bankr. 263 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980). The Duffey court, without revealing to what
use the debtor put a rented automobile, held that the lessor gave no new value by forbearing
to repossess the auto after the debtor defaulted on rental, because the forbearance did "not
enhance the value of the debtor's estate. The debtor's continued right to drive the rented
vehicle is not an asset of benefit to his creditors that could reasonably offset the dimunition
of his estate upon payment" of the preference. Id. at 266. In re Lario, 36 Bankr. 582 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1983), held that a lessor of real estate did not give new value under § 547(c)(4) by
forbearing to terminate the lease for defaults beginning in June or by consenting to an assignment of the lease for a price, which produced enough to pay the lessor and other creditors in November before bankruptcy. By forbearing to terminate, the lessor was "merely
exercising a pre-existing right, not giving 'new value.'" Id. at 584. In exchange, the debtor's
obligation to pay rent was replaced by an obligation to pay an antecedent debt that was
merely an obligation substituted for an existing obligation, excluded from "new value" by §
547(a)(2), supra note 366. Id.
371. See In re Keydata Corp., 37 Bankr. 324, 328-29 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983); In re
Thomas W. Garland, Inc., 19 Bankr. 920, 928-29 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1982). Prior preferential
payments occurred becuase the debtors delivered their checks to the utilities (treated'as the
time of transfer) approximately a month after the meter was read at monthly intervals
(treated as the time the debt was inccured). An analogous case was In re Georgia Steel, Inc.,
38 Bankr. 829 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984), which regarded the supplying of gas to the debtor
after the payment of earlier bills as the giving of new value. Because the debtor's payments
were made between meter readings, however, the court held that the utility had not met its
burden of showing how much gas had been supplied after the payment. Id. at 837-41. This
same problem seems to be present in Keydata and Garland, but the courts in both cases
placed a value on postpayment service supplied.
Although postpayment services also may be considered new value, one court refused to
find any value in the services of a technical expert on leather finishing who was compensated by the debtor's supplier of leather where there was no evidence on the value of the
services. Leathers v. Prime Leather Finishes Co., 40 Bankr. 248 (D. Me. 1984). Furthermore,
the debtor had not contracted for the services; rather, he only contracted to pay the price of
the goods supplied. Therefore, the court held that the services were nothing more "than an
incentive gratuity offered to facilitate the sale of [the supplier's] products." Id. at 252; see
also In re Saco Local Dev. Corp., 30 Bankr. 859, 862 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983).
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Section 547(c)(4) does not expressly require, unlike old section
60c, that the new unsecured credit3 72 remain unpaid at bankruptcy. Most courts nonetheless agree with In re Bishop373 that
when the debtor has paid for the new credit, the requirement is
preserved by section 547(c)(4)(B), which directs that the debtor
make no other unavoidable transfer on account of the new value.3 74
This reading apparently also would mean that if a preferential
payment was followed by new unsecured credit for which the
debtor later paid, and if that payment itself was a voidable preference (or was otherwise avoidable), then the amount of the new
credit should be a defense to the recovery of the earlier preference.
But not all courts agree with this reading. One court held that unsecured credit that had been repaid before bankruptcy could be
invoked, because the "only two exceptions" are those specified in
section 547(c)(4)(A) and (B), without considering whether (B) fit
the case.37 5 Another held that unsecured credit that had been paid
Although new value is given for actual charges made on the debtor's credit card following preferential payments, no additional new value is given merely because the preferential
payments restore an unused portion of the debtor's credit limit on the card. "New credit is
extended only when the debtor actually uses the credit line by making purchases or receiving cash advances, since the value of the item purchased or the cash obtained augments the
estate for the purposes of distribution to creditors." In re Rustia, 20 Bankr. 131, 136 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982). In another case, new value was given by shipment on unsecured credit of
belt buckles custom made for the debtor, which the debtor returned after the bankruptcy
petition was filed. In re Gander Mountain, Inc., 24 Bankr. 827 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1982). The
creditor had to melt down the buckles and recast them in order to resell them. The parties
had stipulated the value of the buckles for which the creditor was entitled to credit under §
547(c)(4). Nevertheless, the court held that the amount could not be increased by the cost to
the creditor of reprocessing the buckles, because § 547(c)(4) required that, after receiving a
preference, the creditor "replace[s] part of that diminution [of the estate]" resulting from
the preference. Id. at 829.
372. In re H & S Transp. Co., 45 Bankr. 233, 237 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984), treated as
new value supplied on unsecured credit goods and services that were supplied on credit
secured by a statutory maritime lien on a ship. At some undisclosed time, the ship had been
sold, and the entire proceeds of sale went to satisfy a senior ship mortgage.
373. 17 Bankr. 180, 183 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982).
374. See In re H & S Transp. Co., 45 Bankr. 233, 237 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984); In re
Fulghum Constr. Corp., 45 Bankr. 112, 119 (M.D. Tenn. 1984); In re Columbia Packing Co.,
44 Bankr. 613 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984); In re Quality Plastics, Inc., 41 Bankr. 241, 242
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984); In re Keydata Corp., 37 Bankr. 324, 328 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983);
Butz v. Champaign Landmark, Inc., 37 Bankr. 926, 929 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983); In re Saco
Local Dev. Corp., 30 Bankr. 859, 861 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983). In re Strom, 46 Bankr. 144, 149
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985), held that the creditor could invoke a new advance made after the
recording of a mortgage that covered future advances because the mortgage was voidable as
a preference. The result seems correct, but for a different reason: to the extent of the new
advance, the mortgage was not for antecedent debt.
375. In re Isis Foods, Inc., 39 Bankr. 645, 653 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984); see also In re
H & S Transp. Co., 45 Bankr. at 237-39 (allowing the creditor to invoke credit secured by a
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might be invoked because, apparently, it regarded a contrary rule
to be based on the discontinued "net result" rule.3 76 This reading
apparently would not preclude recovery under section 547 of later
credit that the credipayments made by the debtor on unsecured
37 7
tor extended after an earlier preference.
The prevailing interpretation seems to be the correct one. If
the debtor has made payments for goods or services that the creditor supplied on unsecured credit after an earlier preference, and if
these subsequent payments are themselves voidable as preferences
(or on any other ground), then under section 547(c)(4)(B) the creditor should be able to invoke those unsecured credit extensions as a
defense to the recovery of the earlier voidable preference.378 On the
other hand, the debtor's subsequent payments might not be voidable on any other ground and not voidable under section 547, because the goods and services were given C.O.D. rather than on
credit, 7 9 or because the creditor has a defense under section
547(c)(1), (2), or (3). In this situation, the creditor may keep his
payments but has no section 547(c)(4) defense to the trustee's action to recover the earlier preference. In either event, the creditor
gets credit only once for goods and -services later supplied.3 8 0
But courts that refuse to allow section 547(c)(4) to be invoked
for subsequent unsecured credit later paid by the debtor, those
that do allow it, and those that have not ruled on the point lose
sight of the question when confronted with the following pattern: a
preferential payment, followed by an extension of unsecured
credit, which in turn is followed by the debtor's additional payments to the creditor. These courts have not inquired whether the
later payments were applied to the intervening credit extension, or
whether any unpaid balance remained after the earlier preference
statutory maritime lien because § 547(c)(4)(A) is confined to a "security interest." The court

did not consider whether the statutory lien involved a "transfer" within the meaning of
§ 547(c)(4)(B)).
376.

In re Amex Trading Co., 37 Bankr. 793, 796 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1984).

377. Id. at 798.
378. Similarly, if his later credit extensions had been secured but his security interest
was voidable, the creditor could invoke those later credit extentions under § 547(c)(4)(A).
See In re Strom, 46 Bankr. 144 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985).
379. If the creditor gave the goods and services C.O.D., the debtor's payments would
not be for antecedent debt under § 547(b)(2).
380. When the creditor is able to invoke the later credit extensions as a defense only
under § 547(c)(4), he will get full credit for the extensions only if they do not exceed the
amount of the earlier preferences for which they are a defense. Nevertheless, as indicated
infra text accompanying notes 384-89, any excess of his claim for unsecured credit over the
earlier preferences should remain as an unsecured claim in the bankruptcy case.
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to which the later payments could have been applied. Instead, they
have allowed the intervening credit extensions to be invoked under
section 547(c)(4)181
My Boston neighbor, bankruptcy Judge Lavien, recently ruled
on a question of first impression under section 547(c)(4) in In re
Columbia Packing Co. 3 82 Suppose a creditor receives an $8000 payment on a $10,000 antecedent debt that would be a voidable preference, except for section 547(c)(4). Without section 547(c)(4), the
creditor would be required by section 502(d)"8 3 to surrender the
$8000 before any part of his claim would be allowed. But if he did
surrender the $8000, or if the trustee obtained a judgment compelling him to do so, the creditor would have an allowable claim for
$10,000 under section 502(h)3 84 and Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c)(3).
However, after the receipt of the preference, the creditor extended
an additional $5000 in unsecured credit for which he was not paid.
Under section 547(c)(4), he then had to surrender only $3000
before his claim would be allowed. But in what amount should the
claim be allowed? Counsel for the debtor-in-possession apparently
argued that, because the creditor was allowed by section 547(c)(4)
to retain $5000 of the $8000 preference, he should have only a
$5000 claim on surrender of the $3000 balance of the preference. If
that was the argument of counsel for the debtor-in-possession, it
ignored the fact that the $5000 subsequent advance was also the
basis for a claim. Therefore, the creditor's total claim would be
$15,000 unless the $5000 subsequent advance were disallowed because the creditor used it to retain $5000 of his $8000 preference.
That is apparently the way Judge Lavien understood debtor's
counsel's argument, since he rejected it because "the creditor
would be penalized an additional $5000 on his proof of claim, all
for shipping an additional $5000 in goods."3 85 Judge Lavien first
pointed out that section 547(c)(4), unlike old section 60c, did not
expressly use the words "set off;" instead, under section 547(c)(4),
"there is simply no preference to the extent of" $5000. 386 Second,
381. See, e.g., In re Quality Plastics, Inc., 41 Bankr. 241, 242-43 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1984); In re Isis Foods, Inc., 39 Bankr. 645, 652-53 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984); In re Amex
Trading Corp., 37 Bankr. 793, 807 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1984); In re Saco Local Dev. Corp.,
30 Bankr. 871, 872 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983); In re Hersman, 20 Bankr. 569, 575 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1982); In re Thomas W. Garland, Inc., 19 Bankr. 920, 929 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1982).
382. 44 Bankr. 613 (D. Mass. 1984).
383. 11 U.S.C. § 502(d)(1982); see supra note 101 and accompanying text.
384. 11 U.S.C. § 502(h) (1982); see supra note 102 and accompanying text.
385. Columbia Packing, 44 Bankr. at 615.
386. Id. at 614 (emphasis in original). This point hardly seems dispositive.
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he concluded that the creditor on surrender of the $3000 preference had an allowable claim of $10,000-the total credit extended
of $15,000 minus the $5000 payment retained under section
547(c)(4).37 Finally, he concluded that the "claims of creditors are
not to be diminished by more than any payment [the creditors] are
allowed to retain and for which they have not already given
credit."38 8 That conclusion must be correct.38 9 The creditor's total
claim, including that part on which he received a voidable preference, must be reduced by the amount of the preference that section 547(c)(4) allowed him to retain. Otherwise, he could assert a
claim for credit that had been paid.
5. The No-Improvement-in-Position Exception
The Gilmore committee's chief concern was reconciling the after-acquired property clause, legitimated and made effective by
section 9-204 of the U.C.C., and the preference concept of bankruptcy law. Suppose a creditor makes an advance to the debtor,
takes and perfects a security interest in the debtor's presently
owned and after-acquired inventory or receivables more than
ninety days (or four months under the old Bankruptcy Act) before
bankruptcy, and makes no further advances to the debtor. Section
9-203 of the U.C.C. (section 9-204 in the 1962 version) also provides that a security interest cannot attach until, among other requirements, the debtor acquires rights in the collateral.390 The
1962 version of the U.C.C.-in a provision omitted in the 1972 version-also provided in section 9-204 that the debtor had no rights
in an account until the account came into existence.3 91 And section
9-303 in both the 1962 and the 1972 versions of the U.C.C. provides that a security interest is perfected when it has attached and
387. At least, I believe that is what he concluded; his opinion is a bit confusing. After
discussing the creditor who received an $8000 preference on a $10,000 antecedent debt and
then extended $5000 in new credit, Judge Lavien said that when "$3,000 is returned, the
original $10,000 is still unpaid and represents the creditor's claim." Id. at 615. But then he
hypothesized another case in which the subsequent credit was $12,000, bringing the total
credit extension to $22,000. Because the entire $8000 preference then might be retained
under § 547(c)(4), Judge Lavien said that "the creditor's claim would be the original $10,000
and the $4,000 of the new shipment or $14,000." Id.
388. Id.
389. Anticipating the problem discussed supra note 378, Judge Lavien added that if,
subsequent to the last new credit extension, the debtor paid the creditor an additional
$4000, the creditor would have to relinquish the payment as a preference because no new
credit extension followed it. Id. at 615.
390. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
391. U.C.C. § 9-204 (1962) (amended 1972).
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the required perfection steps have been taken; moreover, if the
perfection steps are taken before the interest attaches, the security
interest is perfected when it attaches. If the debtor enters bankruptcy and the secured party claims a security interest in inventory that the debtor acquired, or in accounts that arose, within
ninety days of bankruptcy, then isn't the secured party claiming
under a transfer that occurred within ninety days of bankruptcy to
secure antecedent debt?
The substitution of collateral doctrine3 92 offers little comfort.
Inventory generally declines over a period of time as the debtor
makes sales and then increases abruptly as the debtor replenishes
inventory. To conclude that most of the increase would be substahtially contemporaneous with the decrease is difficult. Conversely,
accounts receivable generally increase as the debtor makes sales
during a billing period and then decrease abruptly shortly after the
end of the billing period. Again, to conclude that the increase was
substantially contemporaneous with the decrease is difficult.
The U.C.C. draftsmen anticipated the timing problem and
sought to deal with it in section 9-108. Section 9-108 concerns, as
did my hypothetical, a secured party who at the outset makes an
advance that is to be secured in whole or in part by after-acquired
property. In that situation, section 9-108 provides that the secured
party's security interest in the after-acquired collateral "shall be
deemed" taken for new value and not as security for antecedent
debt if the debtor acquires rights in the after-acquired collateral
"either in the ordinary course of his business or under a contract of
purchase made pursuant to the security agreement within a reasonable time after the new value is given." '9 3 In a comment to section 9-108, the draftsmen discuss this remarkable provision but
never mention the supremacy clause of the Constitution; instead,
the draftsmen carefully and misleadingly explain that "when a
transfer is for antecedent debt is largely left by the Bankruptcy
Act to state law."3'9 A more accurate statement would be that, although state law usually determines when a debt is incurred and
when a transfer is made, once state law fixes the time of their occurrence, bankruptcy law determines whether the debt is antece392. See supra notes 172-79 & 285-93 and accompanying text.
393. U.C.C. § 9-108 (1972). The last clause was apparently an attempt to take care of
the enabling lender, who is now better taken care of by § 547(c)(3). See supra notes 325-42
and accompanying text.

394. U.C.C. § 9-108 comment 1 (1972).
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dent to the transfer. 95 State law, the U.C.C., quite clearly would
provide in my hypothetical case that the security interest would
not attach until the debtor acquired rights in inventory or in the
receivables. The only contribution of section 9-108 would be the
argument that inventory or receivables acquired within the ordinary course of the debtor's business should "be deemed" taken for
new value, rather than "deemed" given for antecedent debt-the
purpose that the secured party intended.
While the Gilmore committee was grappling with the after-acquired collateral problem, two circuit courts of appeals ruled on
cases concerning accounts receivable. In DuBay v. Williams,396 the
Ninth Circuit concluded under the 1962 version of the U.C.C. that
the bankruptcy trustee could not recover after-acquired accounts
receivable arising within the then four month preference period because the transfer occurred more than four months before bankruptcy and, thus, by the same token was not for antecedent debt.
Although the U.C.C. clearly provided that the security interest
could not attach to the accounts until they came into existence
within four months of bankruptcy, the U.C.C. did not determine
the time of transfer. "Congress itself defined" the time of transfer,
"leaving only some details to be brushed in by state law. '3 97 The

court reached this conclusion with express disavowal of any reliance on U.C.C. section 9-108."" 8 Instead, the court, by turning upside down the perfection provision of old section 60,31" which was
aimed only at cases in which perfection was delayed, applied the
provision to a case in which there was no delay in perfection and
the perfection provision had no office to perform. The court read
section 60 to say that the transfer was "deemed" made when it was
perfected against levying creditors. Because by state law no levying
creditor could have defeated the secured party's security interest
from the time a financing statement was filed more than four
months before bankruptcy, the transfer was made when the statement was filed.4 °° If the Ninth Circuit had peered more deeply into
state law, it would have found that levying creditors could not
reach accounts receivable by garnishing account obligors until the
395. See Countryman, Code Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 75 CoM. L.J. 269, 275
(1970), reprinted in 4 U.C.C. L.J. 35, 49 (1971).
396. 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969).
397. Id. at 1287.
398. Id. at 1289 n.15.
399. Id. at 1287-88; see supra text accompanying notes 213-23.
400. Id. at 1288-89.
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accounts came into existence within the four month period. This
result would occur not because a financing statement was filed, but
for the same reason that the security interest would not attach: the
accounts had not come into existence, and no account obligors
were available.
The DuBay court said its holding was perfectly consistent
with two identified policies of old section 60. One policy was to
discourage secret liens that "concealed from general creditors the
precarious financial condition of the debtor."'4 1' In DuBay the secured party's "floating lien on accounts receivable was easily ascertainable by any creditor who cared to look at the financing statement."'40 2 The other policy was "to prevent an insistent creditor
from harvesting more than his fair share of the insolvent's assets. ' 403 "[N]o last minute favoritism characterizing true preferences" 40 4 occurred, however, because the secured party had contracted for favoritism in advance.
In the other case concerning accounts receivable, Grain
Merchants v. Union Bank,0 5 the Seventh Circuit also decided the
case under the 1962 version of the U.C.C., also expressly disclaimed any reliance on U.C.C. section 9-108,406 and reached the
same conclusion as DuBay. The Seventh Circuit embraced what I
have called the DuBay court's "Abracadabra, or The Transfer Oc407
curred Before It Occurred" theory.
In addition, Grain Merchants advanced two alternative theories. One theory was the "Entity" or "Mississippi River" theory.
An ancient metaphysician, Heraclitus, once said, "You can't step
twice in the same river," and I believe we can understand what he
meant. But a more recent metaphysician, Professor Raymond Henson, argued, "You can step twice into the Mississippi River, and
that is good enough. ' 40 8 In other words, don't think small; think
401. Id. at 1288.
402. Id. at 1289. Under U.C.C. § 9-402(3), however, the financing statement need not
disclose that after-acquired property is claimed as collateral. Other creditors, or potential
creditors, who pursue the inquiry authorized by U.C.C. § 9-208 will not necessarily discover
that after-acquired collateral is covered.
403. Id. at 1288.
404. Id. at 1289.
405. 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 827 (1969). In this case, the secured
party made additional advances within the four month period, but the trustee sought to
reach only accounts that came into existence after the last advance.
406. Id. at 218.
407. See Countryman, supra note 395, at 277.
408. Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 COLUM. L. Rv.
232, 233 (1965).
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big. Don't think about individual accounts or about individual
items of inventory; think about only an "entity" called "accounts"
or "inventory" without regard to its composition at any given time.
If a person can expand his thoughts to that extent, he can persuade himself that the only transfer occurs when the original security agreement was made and perfected. The Seventh Circuit
was able to expand its thoughts to that extent. The second alternative theory in Grain Merchants was a "Relaxed Substitution" theory. For some reason, which the court did not explain, the fact that
U.C.C. section 9-205 had amended state fraudulent conveyance law
so that a security interest was no longer fraudulent merely because
it permitted the debtor to sell inventory or collect accounts without accounting to the secured party for the proceeds, 09 meant that
it was "no longer appropriate to apply strict timing or value
rules

410

of the doctrine of substitution of collatera' 1-a

doctrine

based entirely on the preference section of the Bankruptcy Act.
DuBay and Grain Merchants established that, subject to any
prior valid liens on the accounts concerned, the secured party defendants in those cases could take all the accounts they could find
at bankruptcy to the extent needed to pay their claims. Some commentators argued that the secured party should be confined to the
lowest value of accounts during the preference period because at
that low point the substitution of new accounts failed to match the
depletion of old accounts.
The Gilmore committee recommended an exception from section 60 that was a compromise between these two positions. The
committee proposed that, for accounts and inventory, which typically fluctuate in value, the secured party should not be penalized
for nor be allowed to improve his position as a consequence of
these fluctuations. If the inventory or accounts "arose in the ordinary course of the debtor's business" and became collateral covered by a security agreement, a perfected transfer of the collateral
within four months of bankruptcy would not have been avoidable
"except to the extent" that the transferee had "improved his position"" because a "deficiency" between the amount of the debt
and the value of the collateral four months before bankruptcy was
reduced or eliminated at the time of the petition. 4 The test was
409.

See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.

410.

Grain Merchants, 408 F.2d at 209.

411.
412.
413.

See supra notes 172-79 and accompanying text.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 100, at 211.
This circumlocution was in recognition that the secured party's position might be
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strictly a two-point comparison between the secured creditor's unsecured deficiency four months before bankruptcy and his position
at the time of bankruptcy, with no inquiry into variations within
the four month period.' 1 ' This proposed rule would have applied
whether or not the debtor was insolvent "at any date prior to the
. .filing [of] the petition" and whether or not the creditor "had
reasonable cause to believe ... the debtor was insolvent" at the
time of any transfer. 1 5
Professor Homer Kripke, 4' e who was not a member of the Gilmore committee but who was invited to sit in on its deliberations,
still was not satisfied with the exception. He was concerned about
four situations in which the collateral improved in value within the
four month period: (1) farm crops 41 7 whose value enhanced upon
harvest; (2) work in process 18 transformed into more valuable finished goods; (3) off-season merchandise that reached its seasonal
peak in value; and (4) inventory converted into more valuable cash
and receivables. 1 9 Professor Kripke thought that the secured party
should "keep the benefit of the improvements in the cases mentioned so long as it was not at the expense of other parties interested in the estate.' ' 42 0 He recommended amendments to the Gilmore committee proposal to require that, in these four instances, a
deficiency should not be "deemed" reduced or eliminated if the secured party paid to the estate the amount by which "portions of
the estate not subject to the security interest" were depleted in
connection with the improvements in value, and if the secured
party paid the amounts of any allowed claims against the estate
that arose in conection with the improvements. 421
*

affected either by further extensions of credit or by an increase in the value of collateral.
The proposal was designed to allow the secured party the benefit of the former but not of
the latter.
414. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 100, at 211.
415. Id.
416. Professor Kripke, with the late Professor Robert Braucher, codrafted what became the 1972 revision of Article 9 of the U.C.C. and they both were invited to participate
in the deliberations of the Gilmore committee.
417. The Gilmore committee defined "inventory" to include farm products such as
crops or livestock. See HR. REP. No. 595, supra note 100, at 211.
418. Work in process also was included in the committee's definition of "inventory."
See id.
419. Memorandum of Professor Kripke to all members of the Gilmore committee,
September 17, 1970, at 2-4 [hereinafter cited as Kripke Memorandum]. A part of this memorandum is reproduced in Commission Report, supra note 91, pt. I, at 210. I have a complete copy.
420. Kripke Memorandum, supra note 419, at 2-4.
421. Id.
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The National Bankruptcy Conference did not endorse the
Kripke amendments. As I recall, many of us did not regard the
entire exception as very important because we felt that, in the typical case, the secured party's unsecured deficiency increased rather
than decreased during the preference period; moreover, Professor
Kripke had been unable to find a single case involving any of his
four situations.4 22 I recall also that some of us did not believe that
any "transfer" within the meaning of section 60 occurred when an
inventory of Christmas tree ornaments increased in value from
four months before bankruptcy to the filing of the petition in early
December.4 23
Nevertheless, the Bankruptcy Commission did attempt "partially to meet Professor Kripke's criticism." The Commission proposed that if receivables or inventory "arose and became collateral
covered by a security agreement within 90 days of bankruptcy,"
the perfected security interest in the collateral was not voidable
"except to the extent that the transferee had improved his position
at the expense of the estate" between the earlier of either ninety
days before bankruptcy, or the time when new value was first given
under the security agreement, and the time of bankruptcy. The
trustee had the burden to prove "no improvement in position by
an increase in value of security at the expense of estate and the
extent thereof. '424 Gone were the Gilmore committee's perhaps not
very significant requirement that the inventory and receivables be
acquired in the ordinary course of the debtor's business and the
committee's distinction between an increase in the value of collateral and an increase in unsecured deficiency. Since the Commission
had also recommended creation of a presumption of insolvency for
the period ninety days before bankruptcy and elimination of reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent for all but insiders in
the period one year to ninety days before bankruptcy, the Commission's proposed exception contained no special provisions concerning insolvency or reasonable cause to believe. The proposed exception, however, would not reach insider-creditors in the period one
422. Professor Kripke argued by analogy, id. at 2, from Meinhard Greeff & Co. v.
Edens, 189 F.2d 792 (4th Cir. 1951). In this old Chapter X case, the trustee after bankruptcy processed yarn into finished goods and sold the goods. The court held that a creditor
with a perfected security interest in the yarn was entitled to the proceeds of sale less the
cost to the trustee of finishing the goods. Id. at 797.
423. The Minutes of the October 29-31, 1970, annual meeting of the National Bankruptcy Conference, at 7-8, indicate only that the Kripke proposal was not adopted. They do
not report or summarize the debates.
424. Commission Report, supra note 91, pt. I, at 208; pt. II, at 167, 172.
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year to ninety days before bankruptcy.
The House and Senate committee staffs made some slight
changes in the Commission's proposal and cast it in the form in
which section 547(c)(5) was enacted. 42 51 They had in section 547(f)
created a presumption of insolvency for the period of ninety days
before bankruptcy and had eliminated reasonable cause to believe
the debtor insolvent for all but insiders within the period ninety
days to one year before bankruptcy. The section 547(c)(5) exception applies to a perfected security interest 42 6 in inventory or receivables or the proceeds of either arising within ninety days-or
one year for insiders 4 7-of bankruptcy, except to the extent that
the security interest causes a reduction in unsecured deficiency "to
the prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims ' 42 8 between the later of either ninety days-or one year in the case of an
insider-before bankruptcy, or the date on which new value was
first given under the security agreement, and the date of bankruptcy. Section 547(a) provides definitions in the form in which
they were enacted under which "inventory" is not confined to the
U.C.C. notion of "goods" but covers all personal property and includes "farm products such as crops or livestock, held for sale or
lease." And "receivables" means "[a] right to payment, whether or
not . . . earned by performance," which would cover "accounts,"
"chattel paper," "instruments," and most "general intangibles"
under U.C.C. sections 9-105 and 9-106.429
The Committee Reports explain that section 547(c)(5) "codifies the improvement of position test, and thereby overrules such
cases as DuBay v. Williams 43 0 and Grain Merchants of Indiana v.
Union Bank (citations omitted)43 1 . . .,"although the reports also
add that section 547(e)(3) ,432 "more than any other in [section
425. H.R. 8200 and S. 2266, supra note 254.
426. The 1984 amendments make no change in § 547(c)(5) except that, instead of excepting from § 547 "a transfer of a perfected security interest," the amendments except "a
transfer that creates a perfected security interest." 98 Stat. 378 to be codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(e)(5).
427. Under the 1984 amendment to § 547(b)(4)(B), insiders no longer need to have
reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent. See supra note 115.
428. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5)(1982). Apparently, the secured party has a defense when
the only prejudice is to junior secured claims whose collateral is overencumbered so that
unsecured creditors would have received nothing from the collateral in any event.
429. "Receivables" under § 547(a)(3) also includes a "contract right" under the 1962
version of U.C.C. § 9-106.
430. See supra notes 396-404 and accompanying text.
431. See supra notes 405-11 and accompanying text.
432. See supra text following note 231.
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547], overrules" those cases. 43 The reports further note that the
test of section 547(c)(5)
is a two point test, and requires determination of the secured creditor's position 90 days before the petition and on the date of the petition. If new value
was first given after 90 days before the34 case, the date on which it was first
given substitutes for the 90-day point.

So far, section 547(c)(5) has proved to be of as little importance as many supposed it would be.43 As the Gilmore committee
pointed out, "[u]nless there is a deficiency . . . on the first date,
there can be no preference" under section 547(c)(5) 43 from the acquisition of more collateral through an after-acquired property
clause. But if the secured party receives payments from the debtor
during the ninety day period, the secured party also may have to
establish that he was fully secured at bankruptcy in order to protect the payments from preference attack.3 7 A creditor whose after-acquired property clause picks up inventory or receivables obtained within the ninety day period cannot invoke this exception if
his interest in the after-acquired collateral is not perfected because
he failed to perfect the basic security interest.438 Because the exception is confined to "a perfected security interest," section
547(c)(5) is not available to a creditor who garnishes the debtor's
wages 43 9 (which are "receivables" under section 547(a)(3)) within
433. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 100, at 374; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 118, at 8889.
434. Id.
435. See supra note 422 and accompanying text; see also Ross, The Impact of Section
547 of the Bankruptcy Code Upon Secured and Unsecured Creditors,69 MINN. L. REv. 39
(1984). Section 547(c)(1) receives at least as much attention as it deserves in Breitowitz,
Article 9 Security interest as Voidable Preferences: Part II, 4 CARDozo L. REV. 1 (1982).
436. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 100, at 216.
437. This rule was misapplied in In re Lackow Bros., Inc., 19 Bankr. 601, 604-05
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982), aff'd, 752 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1985). Because the payments came
from the creditor's own collateral, it should have made no difference that the creditor was
not fully secured at bankruptcy. If, however, the payments had come from other property of
the debtor, they would have been preferential to the extent that the creditor was unsecured
at bankruptcy. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
438. See In re Ken Gardner Ford Sales, Inc., 23 Bankr. 743, 747 (E.D. Tenn. 1982). In
a similar case, In re Phillips, 24 Bankr. 712 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1982), the court held that
taking possession of the debtor's inventory by a state court receiver four days before bankruptcy would not perfect a security interest in the inventory created more than two years
earlier. Id. at 714. Alternatively, even if the interest were perfected, the delay in perfection
converted the security interest into one for antecedent debt. Id. And section 547(c)(5) was
not available because it was "directed to floating liens that have been perfected outside" the
90 day period. Id. at 715. But cf. In re American Ambulance Serv., Inc., 46 Bankr. 658
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985).
439. See supra note 429 and accompanying text.
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the ninety day period.4 40 But section 547(c)(5) is concerned with a
reduction in deficiency "as of the date of the filing of the petition."
Hence, a decision, earlier criticized for using "going concern" value
for inventory and accounts of a debtor whose business had ceased
and who had been converted from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 to find
no preferential effect under section 547(b)(5), may be on firmer
ground in using that value to find no decrease in deficiency under
section 547(c)(5).441
The most interesting case yet to arise under section 547(c)(5)
is Fairchild v. Lebanon Production Credit Association,442 which
concerned a security interest given by a farmer-debtor and apparently perfected more than ninety days before bankruptcy, covering
"all hogs" and "all offspring." The debtor in possession contended
that attachment of the security interest to piglets born within
ninety days of bankruptcy constituted a voidable preference. Although the definition of "inventory" in section 547(a)(1) includes
"farm products such as. . . livestock, held for sale," the court held
that section 547(c)(5) was not applicable because no "transfer" had
occurred.4
[A]fowing for gestation, [the creditor's] rights in the entire herd44 ' attached
440. In re Larson, 21 Bankr. 264, 266 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982). An analogous case was
In re Jefferson Mortgage Co., 25 Bankr. 963 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982), in which a bank took and
perfected a security interest in a tax refund and proceeds more than 90 days before bankruptcy. The debtor transferred the tax refund check to the bank four days before bankruptcy. The court held that the bank could not invoke § 547(c)(5) because the tax refund
was a "general intangible" under U.C.C. § 9-106 (a tax refund is also a "receivable" under
§ 547(a)(3)). Id. at 967-68. The bank, however, did not need the § 547(c)(5) exception to
escape § 547(b) because it's security interest was not voidable and the transfer of the refund
to it was not preferential. Id. But cf. In re Fitterer Eng'g Assocs., 27 Bankr. 878, 881-82
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (holding that an attorney's common-law charging lien on continuing royalties from settlement of patent infringement litigation was protected by § 547(c)(5)
and was not subject to § 552(a) insofar as the lien applied to postpetition royalties, because
§ 552(a) is confined to security interests); see also In re Lackow Bros., Inc., 19 Bankr. 601
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982), aft'd, 752 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1985).
441. In re Lackow Bros. Inc., 752 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1985). But see supra note 166.
442. 31 Bankr. 789 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
443. Id. at 794 (emphasis in original).
444. The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary (1971) defines a "herd" as
"a company of domestic animals of one kind." But, although I lived in my early years on a
California ranch where one of my duties was to feed to a company of pigs all peaches and
melons too ripe to ship, never before have I heard of a "herd" of pigs or hogs. Neither, I
learned through the good offices of my colleague and collaborator, Zipporah Wiseman, had
Professor Sarah Redfield, former Deputy Commissioner of the Maine Department of Agriculture, nor I. SPARKS, DICTIONARY OF COLLECTIVE NOUNS AND GROUP TERMS (1978). Sparks
suggests, as did Professor Redfield, a "drift" of hogs. Sparks also suggests a "drove," a
"flock," and a "sounder." But the learned Articles Editor of this review advises me that
"herd of pigs" is in common usage in Texas, where he grew up. He also advised me to
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prior to the preferential period and any increase in the herd's value was
'merely' an increase in the value of the collateral in which [the creditor's]
interest had previously attached . . . [Section] 547(c) is only applicable as
an exception to . . § 547(b). In this case, there was no transfer
during the
4 5

preference period, and

.

. § 547(b) is thus not dispositive. "

The debtor in possession's futile preference attack, however, apparently was based solely on the increase in number of the pig
population during the ninety day period. He did not raise the classic "fat pig" case, with which bankruptcy lawyers have long
amused themselves, by asserting that unmortgaged feed had been
fed (transferred?) 446 to, had fattened, and had increased the value
of the entire pig population.447 If the court had found a "fat pig"
transfer, it would then have had to inquire whether the value of
collateral had increased, and thereby had reduced the unsecured
deficiency "to the prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured
claims" within the meaning of section 547(c)(5).
Because section 547(c)(5) is confined to inventory and receivables, as defined in section 547(a), and their proceeds, there has
44 8
been some speculation whether courts disposed to follow DuBay
and Grain Merchants449 for other types of collateral are still free to
do S0.450 The answer, I believe, is that section 547(c)(5) is merely a
special dispensation for inventory, receivables, and their proceeds
from other provisions in section 547 by which the draftsmen intended to overrule those decisions. The provision in section
547(e)(3) that, "for the purposes of" section 547, a transfer "is not
made until the debtor has acquired rights in the property transconsult the King James version of the Bible, Mark 5:11: "Now there was there nigh unto the
mountains a great herd of swine feeding." The Oxford English Dictionary lists "swineherd"
as a term no longer in colloquial use but meaning, when used, either "a man who tends
swine" or "a boar, he being the head or master of the herd." A friend of the Articles Editor
from Alabama suggests a "passle" of pigs, but O.E.D. does not recognize the existence of
such a word. This matter needs more research.
445. In the 1962 version of the U.C.C., § 9-204(2)(a) provided that the debtor "has no
rights.., in the young of livestock until they are conceived." That provision was dropped
in the 1972 revision of Article 9.
446. Under 11 U.S.C § 101(48), "transfer" means "every mode, direct or indirect, .
of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property.....
447. See Hogan, Games Lawyers Play with the Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to
Accounts and Inventory Financing, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 553, 558-59 (1968). Because my
other colleague and collaborator, Andrew Kaufman, is as good at identifying nondistinguishable cases as at distinguishing others, the "fat pig" becomes a "fat steer" in COUNTRYMAN,
KAUFMAN, & WISEMAN, supra note 161 at 273.
448. See supra notes 396-404 and accompanying text.
449. See supra notes 405-11 and accompanying text.
450. At least such speculation goes on in some law school classrooms. See COUNTRYMAN, KAUFMAN, & WISEMAN, supra note 161, at 288-89.
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ferred," certainly should dispose of the "Abracadabra" or "The
Transfer Occurred Before It Occurred" theory invoked in both
cases and should dispose of the Seventh Circuit's "Entity" or
"Mississippi River" theory as well. And the Seventh Circuit's "Relaxed Substitution" theory should not survive section 547(c)(1) if
that provision is recognized, as I believe it should be,451 as a codifi-

cation of the substitution theory.452 In any event, the "Relaxed
Substitution" theory should self-destruct on its own stated but unexplained assumption that a change in state fraudulent conveyance
law somehow changes federal preference law.
6. The Statutory Lien Exception
The old Bankruptcy Act after 1952 and 1966 amendments, in
section 67c provided for either the subordination or the invalidation of certain statutory liens as defined in section 1(29a). 45 s The

Act also provided in section 67b that, notwithstanding section 60,
"statutory liens in favor of employees, contractors, mechanics, or
any other class of persons, and statutory liens for taxes and debts
owing to the United States" or any state or local subdivision "may
be valid against the trustee, even though arising or perfected while
the debtor is insolvent and within four months" of bankruptcy. 45 4
451. See supra notes 285-93 and accompanying text.
452. A substitution problem similar to that of the pig or steer fattened by unmortgaged feed exists for one type of after-acquired collateral-proceeds-whether the original
collateral is inventory, receivables, or something else. When the conversion to proceeds occurs within the preference period before bankruptcy, the substitution of proceeds for the
original collateral is simultaneous, but the value of the proceeds may exceed the value of the
original collateral. Moreover, the increase in value, although it is "proceeds" within the
meaning of U.C.C. § 9-306(1) as "whatever is received on disposition of the original collateral," also may be the product of unmortgaged raw materials, capital, labor, rent, and managerial skills. If the original collateral were inventory, receivables, or the proceeds of either,
some "prejudice" may occur to unsecured creditors within the meaning of § 547(c)(5). If the
original collateral were something else, the substitution theory would not save the increase
in value. See Countryman, supra note 395, at 272-74.
453. "Statutory lien" shall mean a lien arising solely by force of statute upon specified
circumstances or conditions, but shall not include any lien provided by or dependent upon
an agreement to give security, whether or not such a lien is also provided by or is also
dependent upon statute and whether or not the agreement or lien is more fully effective by
statute. 80 Stat. 268 § 1(29a) (1966). This definition was inspired by an effort to prevent "a
recurrence of the misapplication" that occurred when one court held that a chattel mortgage
was a statutory lien, apparently because a state statute provided for its perfection, In re
Quaker City Uniform Co., Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 58,278, although that opinion was later
withdrawn and the decision placed on another ground. 238 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 1030 (1957). See H.R. RaP. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965); S.REP.
No. 277, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1965).
454. 80 Stat. 268 § 67b (1966). Before the statutory definition was supplied in 1966,
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The Gilmore committee did not concern itself with statutory
liens, but the Bankruptcy Commission proposed to invalidate most
statutory and common-law liens in bankruptcy because recognition
of them "substantially frustrates the goals of equality and uniformity, and has generated a substantial amount of litigation and
made the Act considerably more complex. '455 For the few liens
that would survive, the Commission proposed an exception in the
preference section for "a statutory or common-law lien not invalid"
under the Commission's other proposal, or "a transfer in satisfaction of such a lien. '45 6 The Commission's proposal would have invalidated the federal tax lien 457 in bankruptcy, and the Commission also proposed to reduce the priority given to tax claims. 45 8 The
Treasury Department, in response to the Commission's inquiries,
had professed to be unable to determine the effect of the Commission's proposals on the federal fisc. Nevertheless, the Commission
concluded that, because the Treasury projected annual collections
under the existing system of $5.6 million on liens and $31.6 million
on priorities, the effect would be "insignificant for the federal
government."4 59
The Treasury Department and the Tax Division of the Department of Justice opposed the Commission's proposals, explaining that the IRS was a "nonconsensual creditor" similar to one hit
by the debtor's truck (some may feel the analogy was reversed),
which had no option but to become a creditor. By now the IRS had
the court in In re Tele-Tone Radio Corp., 133 F. Supp. 739, (D.N.J. 1955), invoked some of
the language of § 67b to conclude that a factor's lien was not a statutory lien subject to
subordination under § 67c even though a state statute authorized the parties to create such
a lien by written agreement. "The familiar doctrine of ejusdem generis here applies, i.e.,
that such 'other classes of persons' must be similar to the classes specifically named. But
financiers are not similar to the classes named, i.e., employees, contractors, mechanics, or
landlords [landlords were delated in 1966]. . . .[F]inanciers are merely ordinary creditors."
Id. at 747.
455. Commission Report, supra note 91, pt. I at 212; pt. II at 164-66.
456. Id. pt. I at 166, 170.
457. I.R.C. §§ 6321-6323 (1982).
458. Commission Report, supra note 91, pt. II at 110.
459. Id. pt. I at 216, 233-35.
In 1973, the year of the Commission's report, total federal gross revenue collection was
$237.8 billion. 1973 COMM'R OF INTERNAL REVENUE ANN. REP.at v. A Brookings Institution
study of bankruptcy liquidation cases closed in 1964 had estimated that the tax priority had
produced $5.8 million for the IRS, slightly more than 0.005% of the total gross revenue of
$112.3 billion for 1964. At the same time, the tax priority amounted to 11% of all funds
distributed in liquidation cases in 1964 and to almost one-third of the amount paid to unsecured creditors in those cases. D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRuPTcY: PROBLEM, PROCESS,
REFORM 131 (1971) (I was a consultant on this study).
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revised the projections for collections under the existing priority
system to $11.5 million for cases commenced in 1974, $15.5 million
for 1975, and $17 million for 1976. But on the proposed elimination
of the statutory lien they now had no projections and asserted only
that the proposal could "be expected to reduce recovery of unpaid
taxes from the assets of a bankruptcy estate." Their only other
contribution to intelligence was that, while gross revenues were
$293.8 billion in 1975, after refunds net revenues were about $250
billion. But when a subordinate conceded that the total collections
under the existing priorities were "infinitesimal," the Commissioner of Internal Revenue objected to that term, even though he
conceded that the total was "small, in relation to what we
' ' 46 0
collect.
Nonetheless, the congressional staff rewrote, as section 545461
in the form of enactment, a provision that authorized avoidance of
some statutory liens defined in section 101(45)462 but that did not
on its face appear to invalidate the federal tax lien. 463 The staff
also drafted an exception to section 547 in section 547(c)(6) for a
transfer "that is the fixing of a statutory lien that is not avoidable
'464
under section 545" or a transfer "in satisfaction of such a lien.
The draftsmanship was not superb, because it provided that if the
trustee could invalidate a statutory lien under section 545, he also
might attack the lien as a preference under section 547 and thus
impose a double-kill. Nevertheless, the purpose of section 547(c)(6)
was fairly clear. Having stated in section 545 the grounds on which
statutory liens would be avoidable, the draftsmen did not intend
the liens to be subject to a second scrutiny under section 547. The
Committee reports explain that section 547(c)(6) "excepts statu'46 5
tory liens validated under § 545 from preference attack.
Section 547(c)(6), therefore, exempts from section 547 a hospi460. Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House JudiciaryComm. on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
1944-45, 1951-52, 1953, 1990, 1995-96 (Apr. 2, 1976); The Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings
Before Subcomm. on Improvements in JudicialMachinery of the Senate Judiciary Comm.
on S. 235 and S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 782-83, 790, 795-97 (Nov. 6, 1975).
461. The 1984 amendments to § 545 made no changes relevant here.
462. The definition in § 101(45) is heavily indebted to the former definition, supra
note 453, but is more explicit in excluding judicial liens defined in § 101(30) and security
interests defined in § 101(42) and § 101(43).
463. As indicated infra notes 512-20 and accompanying text, the federal tax lien nonetheless may be in some jeopardy under § 545.
464. H.R. 8200 and S. 2266, supra note 254. In H.R. 8200, this provision was
§ 547(c)(7), but § 547(c)(6), which conerned setoffs, was deleted prior to enactment.
465. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 100, at 374; S. REP. No., supra note 118, at 88.
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tal's statutory lien, valid under section 545 on damages received by
a patient who had been injured in an accident." 8 Courts have
reached the same result for a statutory attorney's lien 46 7 and a
statutory lien on a condominium unit for the debtor-owner's share
of common expenses. 6 8 In another case, a state statute required
that state tax refunds be paid to a county to which the taxpayerdebtor was obligated because his spouse or ex-spouse, in order to
qualify for aid to families with dependent children, had assigned
her rights under a child support order to the county.4 9 The court
held that the statute created a statutory lien valid under section
545 and exempt from section 547 under section 547(c)(6).470 Another case concerned a state tax lien created by statute under
which the lien was not effective until a restraint warrant was docketed with a court clerk in the manner that judgments were docketed.471 The court held that when the warrant was docketed before
bankruptcy the lien was not a judicial lien but a statutory lien exempted by section 547(c)(6) because it was "a lien arising solely by
force of statute on specified circumstances or conditions" within
the meaning of section 101(45).472
In all but two of these section 547(c)(6) cases, 7 3 the trustee or
debtor was seeking to recover payments made to the creditor
within ninety days of bankruptcy in full or partial discharge of the
lien. As section 547(c)(6) was originally enacted in both houses, it
covered not only statutory liens valid under section 545 but also
transfers "in satisfaction of such a lien. 4 74 In the compromise between the House and Senate without a conference committee, the
466. See In re Howard, 43 Bankr. 135, 139 (Bankr. D. Md. 1983).
467. See In re Territo, 35 Bankr. 353, 345 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983).
468. See In re Stern, 44 Bankr. 15, 19-20 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984).
469. See In re Small, 18 Bankr. 318 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982).
470. Id. at 319. An analogous case was In re Biddle, 31 Bankr. 449 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1983), which conerned a similar provision in I.R.C. § 6402 (1982) that authorizes the IRS to
divert federal tax refunds to states to which the taxpayer's uncollected child support obligations had been assigned. The court held that § 6402 created a statutory lien that was effective more than 90 days before bankruptcy, and therefore was not avoidable under § 547. 31
Bankr. at 457. If the lien was a statutory lien not avoidable under § 545, however, the lien
would be exempt from § 547 under § 547(c)(6), even though it arose within 90 days of bankruptcy. Id. at 457 n.13.
471. In re E.W. Shields, Co., 34 Bankr. 44 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983).
472. Id. at 46; see also Stern, 44 Bankr. at 18 (concluding that the lien on condominium units was statutory rather than judicial, although enforced by, and with a priority established by, a judicial action).
473. In re Howard, 43 Bankr. 135; In re Stern, 44 Bankr. 15.
474. H.R. 8200 and S. 2266, supra note 254.
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quoted language was dropped without explanation.4 7 5 Section 545
prescribes only the circumstances under which the trustee can
avoid the "fixing of a statutory lien," and its predecessor, old section 67c, prescribed the circumstances under which the trustee
could avoid "statutory liens." Old section 67c(5), however, provided that section 67c did "not apply to liens enforced by sale
before the filing of the petition." The Committee reports explain
that the trustee may avoid under section 545 "a transfer of a lien
under this section even if the lien has been enforced by sale before
the commencement of the case. To that extent, Bankruptcy Act
section 67c(5) is not followed . . . .,76 1 have never been sure that
the draftsmen of section 545 successfully embodied in it the opposite of old section 67c(5) simply by omitting the language of section 67c(5). But, even if they have, and the trustee can avoid a
statutory lien under section 545 when the lien has been enforced
by sale before bankruptcy, does it follow that, if section 545 does
not apply, the exemption in section 547(c)(6) from section 547 for
"the fixing of a statutory lien" extends also to payments received
47 7
in enforcement of the lien?
In the cases discussed above in which the creditor had received payments in discharge of the lien, the difference between
the "fixing" of a statutory lien under section 547(c)(6) and payments in discharge of the lien that the trustee or debtor was trying
to recover was ignored. On the facts, however, the cases reached
the correct result on the payments even if section 547(c)(6) does
not extend to the payments. In every case the statutory lien was
not avoidable under section 545.478 The payments received came
from property covered by the lien, so that there was no preferential effect under section 547(b)(5) and no exception under section
547(c) was necessary. 7 9 The result should be the same if the value
of the property covered by the valid lien was sufficient to secure
475. See 124 CONG. REC. 23,400, 34,000 (1978).
476. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 100, at 371; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 118, at 85.
477. Even if § 547(c)(6) does not apply, a payment in exchange for release of a valid
statutory lien may qualify as a contemporaneous exchange under § 547(c)(1). See In re
George Rodman, Inc., 39 Bankr. 855 (W.D, Okla. 1984).
478. If a statutory lien is not perfected at bankruptcy against a bona fide purchaser, it
could be avoided under § 545(2), unless the law creating the lien also gives a grace period for
perfection, good against intervening interests, which has not expired at bankruptcy. The
liener could still perfect before the grace period expired pursuant to § 546(b). See In re
Storage Technology Corp., 45 Bankr. 363 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983), and supra text accompanying notes 232-36.
479. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
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the creditor's full claim, regardless of the source of payment.8 0
But, under the Benedict v. Ratner two-step, 8 l the result should be
different if the statutory lien, although immunized from section
547 by section 547(c)(6) because not voidable under section 545,
was voidable on some other ground.8 2 The result also should be
different when a valid statutory lien only partially secures the
creditor's claim, and the creditor receives payment from property
of the debtor not covered by the lien.48 3
I have isolated for separate treatment the ubiquitous federal
tax lien, although much of the discussion applies also to state4 tax
4
liens. Under section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), if
any person "liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the
same after demand," the amount of the tax plus interest, penalties,
and costs "shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all
property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.'' 48 This lien "arises" at the time of assessment 48 6 and continues until the amount assessed "is satisfied or
becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse of time. '4 7 But under
IRC section 6323,488 the tax lien is not valid against a purchaser, a
holder of a security interest, a mechanics' lienor, or a judgment480. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
481. See supra notes 180-185 and accompanying text.
482. A statutory lien, although valid under § 545, is not immunized from the trustee's
avoiding powers under § 544 or § 548.
483. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
484. I.R.C. § 6321 (1982).
485. The lien reaches after-acquired property of the taxpayer, see Glass City Bank v.
United States, 326 U.S. 265, 268 (1945), and property generally exempt from creditors' process by state or federal law, see United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 57 (1958); however, if the
lien is enforced by IRS administrative levy, a niggardly list of exemptions from that levy in
I.R.C. § 6334 (1982) may apply.
486. I.R.C. § 6322 (1982). When the taxpayer files a return acknowledging tax liability,
the tax is "assessed" when the acknowledge liability is recorded on a list at the District
Director's Office. Id. § 6203. A deficiency assessment is made when a taxpayer's return has
been audited and he has agreed to an adjustment. If the taxpayer does not agree with the
deficiency determination, the deficiency assessment is made after the taxpayer has exhausted his administrative remedies and either has disregarded a notice advising him that
the assessment will be made unless he files a petition with the Tax Court within 90 days, or
has lost in the Tax Court and the decision of that court has become final. See id. §§ 62116215. The IRS, however, may avoid delays in making the deficiency assessment by a jeopardy assessment made at any time the IRS believes the assessment or collection will be
jeopardized by delay. Id. § 6861.
487. Id. § 6322. The basic statute of limitations on collection of taxes is six years after
assessment under I.R.C. § 6502, but a variety of circumstances may extend the time. See W.
PLUMB, FEDERAL TAX LIENs 49 (3d ed. 1972), which should be consulted by anyone with a
federal tax lien problem.
488. I.R.C. § 6323 (1982).
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lien creditor unless filed. From the date of bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee has under section 544(a)4 19 the hypothetical status
of a creditor with a judicial lien (which includes under section
101(30) a judgment lien) on all the debtor's property that is subject to a judicial lien and the hypothetical status of a bona fide
purchaser of the debtor's real property. Therefore, the trustee can
avoid under section 544(a) federal tax liens unfiled at
490
bankruptcy.
The federal tax lien first was considered under new section 547
in a Chapter 7 case 4 91 in which the lien was filed before bankruptcy
and the government had received no payments on the tax claim.
The court concluded without difficulty that section 724(b) required
that the lien in Chapter 7 cases be subordinated to the first five
priorities for unsecured claims. 4 92 The cases are more complicated,
however, when the IRS within ninety days of bankruptcy has received a payment on its claim. In another Chapter 7 case, 9 3 the
IRS had not filed its lien for delinquent taxes, but the taxpayerdebtor made a partial payment on the delinquent taxes within
ninety days of filing a petition by liquidating all of its business
assets. The court ruled that the unfiled lien was not valid against a
bona fide purchaser, a judgment lien creditor, or the bankruptcy
trustee.' 9 ' The court did not indicate, however, whether it relied on
section 544(a) or on section 545(2), which enabled the trustee to
avoid a statutory lien that was not perfected against a bona fide
489. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1982).
490. The trustee's avoidance power is subject to the possibility of a very large exception. As indicated in note 219 supra, but apparently unknown to the draftsmen of I.R.C. §
6323, no judgment lien exists in Kentucky, Michigan, or, with two exceptions in the New
England states. Where the judgment lien does exist, with three exceptions it extends only to
realty and not to personal property. By Treas. Reg. § 301-6323(h)-1 (1976), the IRS has
attempted to define "judgment lien creditor" to mean a lien by levy, when a levy is necessary before a lien on personal property becomes effective against third parties. The bankruptcy trustee also has the hypothetical status of a creditor who obtains a lien by levy. See
11 U.S.C. §§ 101(30), 5 44(a)(1)(1 9 82 ).
491. In re Riverfront Food & Beverage Corp., 29 Bankr. 846 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1983).
492. Id. at 851-52; see supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text. In In re Debmar
Corp., 21 Bankr. 858 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982), the IRS had filed its lien more than 90 days
before bankruptcy and, within the 90 day period, levied on obligors of the taxpayer debtor.
The court found that considering the application of § 724(b) was unnecessary because no
one showed either that any claims were present within the first five priorities or that the
state was insolvent. Id. at 862; see also In re Community Hosp., 15 Bankr. 785, 788 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1981).
493. In re K & L Interiors, Inc., 34 Bankr. 118 (Bankr. D. Or. 1982).
494. Id. at 119.
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purchaser when the petition was filed.4 95 Although the court observed that payment "extinguishe[d] the assessment lien to the extent of such payment," it failed to note that no assets remained to
which the lien could attach, except for the unlikely possibility that
the bankrupt corporation would acquire some assets in the future.496 The court also rejected the IRS's argument that the payment "fixed" the lien within the meaning of section 547(c)(6) and
concluded that filing was required to "fix" the lien.49 7 Because no
valid lien existed, the payment was "nothing more than a payment
to an unsecured creditor within 90 days before bankruptcy on an
antecedent debt" and was recoverable under section 547(b). 9 8
So far, so good. But the trustee, against the possibility that
the court might agree with the IRS that the debtor's payment had
"fixed" the tax lien within the meaning of section 547(c)(6), argued
that the trustee should nonetheless be entitled to recover enough
of the payment to cover claims with the first five priorities for
which section 724(b) provided that tax claims secured by a lien on
"property in which the state ha[d] an interest" would be subordinated.499 The court did not need to consider this problem because
it had held that the trustee could avoid the lien. But, assuming the
lien had been valid but reduced by the amount of the payment,
and because no other property remained in the estate, the court
concluded: "Payment on a tax lien is payment to a secured creditor
and is not recoverable by the trustee as a preference, nor is it recoverable for distribution purposes under Section 724(b) as the estate no longer had any interest in it as required by such
section." 50 0
In the court's conclusion lies much confusion about section
724(b). Because the test of preferential effect under section
547(b)(5) is whether the creditor gets more than he would have in
a Chapter 7 distribution if the payment had not been made, it is
495. The 1984 amendments to § 545(2), substituting "the time of the commencement
of the case".for "the date of the filing of the petition," made no substantial change. 98 Stat.
333, 377 (1984). Under §§ 301-03, a case is commenced by filing a petition.
496. K & L Interiors, 34 Bankr. at 118.
497. Id. at 119.
498. Id. Perhaps the full amount of the payment was not recoverable. Under § 507(a),
as it then read, the IRS tax claim, eveh though unsecured, was entitled to a sixth priority
with other tax claims. If the unsecured claims with the first five priorities (the amount of
many of which had not yet been determined) did not consume the total amount of the
payment to the IRS, the IRS would retain its pro rata share of the balance with other sixth
priority tax claims.
499. Id. at 119.
500. Id. at 119.
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no longer completely true that "[p]ayment on a tax lien is payment
to a secured creditor and is not recoverable by the trustee as a
preference" even if the creditor is fully secured-the IRS was
not-or even if the payment is from the secured creditor's collateral-the payment was. Without the payment to the IRS, even if
its lien were valid, the proceeds of the sale of the debtor's business
in a Chapter 7 case, by virtue of section 724(b), would have been
applied first to unsecured claims within the first five priorities.5 0 1
Moreover, the court assumed that if the lien was valid, it had been
extinguished as to the proceeds from the sale of assets by the payment of those proceeds to the IRS. Consequently, the lien no
longer remained on property in which the estate had an interest as
required by section 724(b). This court, like other courts, 50 2 made
the mistake of ignoring the direction in section 547(b)(5) that
courts test for preferential effect by calculating what the Chapter 7
distribution would be if the payment had not been made. Because
the court disposed of the trustee's argument under section 724(b)
by assuming that if the lien were valid the payment would not
have preferential effect, it did not address whether, if a payment
that had preferential effect, it, as well as the "fixing" of the lien,
was excepted from section 547 by section 547(c)(6).
In a later case 50 3 before the same judge and again under Chapter 7, the IRS had filed its lien more than ninety days before bankruptcy. Within the ninety day period, the IRS levied on and sold
all of the debtor's assets and collected all of its collectible accounts
receivable in order to satisfy the liens. If the payments had not
been made, then the amount of claims entitled to the first five priorities would have prevented the IRS from receiving anything in a
distribution pursuant to section 724(b). The court recognized that
the filed tax lien would have been exempted from section 547 by
section 547(b)(6) but followed its earlier example of ignoring section 547(b)(5)'s direction that the court decide the preference
question as if the payment to the IRS had not been made. Again,
the court concluded that, because application of the proceeds of
the sale and collection by the IRS had extinguished the lien and
left the debtor without any interest in those proceeds, section
501. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text. The court's statement is also
wrong if applied to a lien securing a fine, penalty, or forfeiture, or for multiple, exemplary,
or punitive damages, to the extent that the claim is not compensation for actual pecuniary
loss. Under § 724(a), these liens are avoidable in Chapter 7 cases. 11 U.S.C. § 724(a)(1982).
502. See supra notes 165, 171 and accompanying text.
503. In re Rogers Refrigeration, Inc., 33 Bankr. 59 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983).
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724(b) was inapplicable. 0 4 Again, the court did not address
whether, if the payment were preferential, section 547(c)(6) would
exempt the payment as well as the fixing of the lien.
Much of the confusion engendered by these two cases was dissipated in In re R&T Roofing Structures & Commercial Framing,
Inc., 50 5 another Chapter 7 case. The IRS had filed its lien more
than ninety days before bankruptcy, but within the ninety day period had levied upon cash, which was the only asset of the debtor's
estate, and applied the cash in partial payment of the tax-lien
claim. Once again, claims within the first five priorities exceeded
the amount of cash that the IRS seized. Although the court viewed
section 547(c)(6) as exempting the filed tax lien from section 547,
it concluded from the legislative history of the deletion of transfers
"in satisfaction of such a lien" from section 547(c)(6) 50 6 that section 547(c)(6) would not also exempt the IRS levy.5 07 If the levy
had not been made, section 724(b) would have subordinated the
tax lien, although valid, to priority claims exceeding the amount of
the cash that the IRS seized. The seizure, therefore, gave the IRS
"far more than [it] could have otherwise hoped to receive under a
Chapter 7 liquidation," and thus had a preferential effect under
section 547(b)(5). 508
The result in R&T Roofing is consistent with the preference
policy to avoid transfers within the ninety day period that distort
the Chapter 7 distribution scheme.50 9 If the IRS had received no
payment, either by levy or by the debtor's payment without levy,
within the ninety day period, its lien would have been subordinated to the first five priorities by section 724(b), even though exempt from section 547 by virtue of section 547(c)(6). The Chapter
7 distribution is the test of preferential effect under section
504. Id. at 60-61.
505. 42 Bankr. 908, 915 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1984).
506. See supra notes 474-77 and accompanying text.
507. R & T Roofing, 42 Bankr. at 915.
508. Id. The court did observe, however, that its conclusion "might be different if the
trustee and his counsel were merely attempting to retrieve the property for the sole purpose
of creating a fund for their own [first priority] fees." Id. at 915-16. Fourth priority claimants, however, were seeking contributions to employee benefit plans in excess of the amount
seized by the IRS. Id. at 916.
509. Another case consistent with the preference policy was In re Thomas W. Garland,
Inc., 39 Bankr. 412 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1984). The IRS levied on a debtor, not because he was
the taxpayer whom the IRS was pursuing, but because he was obligated to that taxpayer.
The court held that any IRS statutory tax lien would not be on property of the debtor but
on property of the taxpayer; therefore, neither § 545 nor § 547(c)(6) was applicable. Id. at
415.
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547(b)(5), which courts are to administer as if the payment had
not been made. Although R&T Roofing was a Chapter 7 case, the
test of preferential effect under section 547(b)(5) still would be
what the IRS would have received without the payment in a Chapter 7 case even if the preference action arose in a Chapter 11 or 13
case.
Nevertheless, section 547(c)(6) can be of value to the IRS.
Under section 547(a)(2), the taxpayer's debt for taxes is incurred
on the last day on which the debt is payable without penalty. Typically, the tax lien is filed much later than that date. Also, the lien
usually is filed much more than ten days after the date of assessment; consequently, under section 547(e)(2) the transfer occurs for
purposes of section 547 when it is filed. Nearly all tax liens filed
within ninety days of bankruptcy therefore would be in jeopardy
under section 547 were it not for section 547(c)(6)'s exception from
section 547. For this great boon to the IRS, the price is subordination to the first five510 priorities under section 547(a).
But to survive bankruptcy any statutory lien must not be
avoidable under section 545. This requirement may pose a special
hurdle for the federal tax lien and for state tax liens modeled after
the federal lien. As already indicated, when sections 544(a)(3),
547(e)(1), 548(d)(1), and 549(c) employ a bona fide purchaser test
of transfers, the test is a "bona fide purchaser against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected," and the purpose
of the quoted qualifying language is to avoid requiring the impossible of the transferee.5 1 Section 545(2), however, authorizes the
trustee to avoid a statutory lien not perfected at bankruptcy
against a bona fide purchaser, 512 and the qualifying language is
omitted.
Moreover, applicable law does not permit the tax lien to be
perfected against certain types of purchasers and holders of security interests. 1 Under IRC section 6323(b), the tax lien, even
though filed, is not valid against bona fide purchasers of certain
kinds of property, such as securities, motor vehicles if the purchaser takes possession, or any tangible personal property if the
510. A tax lien may become subordinated to the first six priorities of § 547(a). See
supra note 125.
511. See supra notes 224-29 and accompanying text.
512. This is true unless the law creating the lien gives the lienor a greater period of
perfection that has not expired at bankruptcy. See supra note 478.
513. A holder of a security interest is also a "purchaser" under § 545 because § 101(35)
defines "purchaser" as a "transferee of a voluntary transfer." 11 U.S.C. § 101(35)(1982).
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purchaser is a retail purchaser in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's business. 5 14 Under section 6323(c), the filed tax lien is also
invalid against certain types of security interests in certain types of
property (e.g., inventory, accounts receivable, negotiable instruments) acquired under an after-acquired property clause without
actual notice of the tax lien within forty-five days of tax lien filing
on account of advances made within that period.5 15 Finally, under
section 6323(d), the filed tax lien is invalid for any kind of property owned by the taxpayer at the time of tax lien filing against a
security interest in that property, acquired under an after-acquired
property clause without actual notice or knowledge of the tax lien
on account of advances made within forty-five days of tax lien
51 6
filing.
Other evidence shows that the draftsmen of section 545 intended to require the impossible of the federal tax lien. Section
522(c)(2)(B) provided that the debtor's exempt property remained
subject to liens that were not avoided and to "a tax lien, notice of
which [was] properly filed, and avoided under section 545(2). ' '51
Apparently the impossible was to be required of the federal tax
lien only for the benefit of other creditors and not for the benefit
of debtors. But section 522(c)(2)(B) clearly recognized that a properly filed tax lien might be avoided under section 545(2). That effect remains even though a 1984 amendment to section
522(c)(2)(B) deleted the language "and avoided under § 545(2)."
Moreover, the floor managers of the Reform Act explained that "a
Federal tax lien is invalid under section 545(2) with respect to
property specified in sections 6323(b) and (c) of the Internal Revenue Code . . ."58 Although the floor managers did not mention
514. I.R.C. § 6323(b)(1982).
515. Id. § 6323(c).
516. Id. § 6323(d).
517. 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2)(B) (1982).
518. The House and Senate managers also explained that § 545(b), as it appeared in
the Senate bill, was "deleted as unnecessary." Id. That provision said:
If a statutory lien for taxes has been perfected in the manner prescribed by law for
perfection against bona fide purchasers in general, such lien shall be considered perfected against the trustee with respect to all the debtor's property. . . to which such
perfection may be ineffective in particular property or against particular purchasers or
classes of purchasers.
124 CoNG. REc. 32,400, 34,000 (1982). The Senate Report explained that under IRC
§ 6323(b) "certain purchasers who acquire an interest in certain specific kinds of personal
property will take free of an existing filed tax lien," and that the purpose of § 6323(b) was
"to encourage free movement of these assets in general commerce." S. RP. No. 989, supra
note 118, at 86. This reason, however, did not apply to a bankruptcy trustee "who is not in
the same position as an ordinary bona fide purchaser as to such property." Id. at 85-86.
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section 6323(d), if (b) and (c) apply, then (d) should apply as well.
There is one case recognizing that the debtor-in-possession
under section 545(2) may invoke IRC section 6323(b) but holding
that section 6323(b) does not apply to a filed- tax lien on the
debtor's accounts receivable and bank accounts.5 19 Apparently the
debtor-in-possession did not attempt to invoke section 6323(c),
which expressly covers accounts receivable, or section 6323(d),
which applies to any kind of property. Another case 20 allowed the
debtor-in-possession to invoke a state statute similar to section
6323(b), but which the court interpreted to invalidate a filed state
tax lien against bona fide purchasers of all personal property, in
order to invalidate the filed state tax lien under section 545(2).
7.

The Consumer's Small Preference Exception

The 1984 amendments added section 547(c)(7), excepting from
section 547 a transfer by "an individual debtor whose debts are
primarily consumer debts"'521 if "the aggregate of all property that
constitutes and is affected by such transfer is less than $600. ' ' 522
The Bankruptcy Commission had proposed a similar exception for
all transfers of less than $1000, not made to insiders, and not confined to consumer debtors or individuals. The Commission explained, in support of its proposal, that the exception of "relatively
small" preferences would not "seriously impinge" on the preference policy; that the "expense of recovery [of small preferences] is
often disproportionate to the benefit to creditors;" and that the
exception "is also intended to soften the impact of the Commission's recommendation to abandon the resonable cause to believe
requirement and to impose a presumption of insolvency. ' 52 3 The
National Bankruptcy Conference recommended that the maximum
exempt transfer be reduced to $500. The Conference pointed out
that, for larger amounts, "the trustee will have the responsibility of
determining when litigation . . . is too burdensome" and that the
"threat of litigation alone may be sufficient to recover many pref519. See In re Debmar Corp., 21 Bankr. 858, 861-62 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
520. See In re Tropicana Graphics, Inc., 24 Bankr. 381-84 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982).
521. "Consumer debt" is defined in § 101(7) as a "debt incurred by an individual primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose."
522. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(7) (1982). Under § 104, the Judicial Conference of the United
States was to transmit to the Congress and to the President before May 1, 1985, and every
six years thereafter, "a recommendation for the uniform percentage adjustment of each dollar amount in this title" and in the bankruptcy filing and additional fees in 28 U.S.C. § 1930
(1982).
523. Commission Report, supra note 91, pt. I, at 206; pt. II, at 166.
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erences in excess of" $500.524 The National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges and the Justice Department recommended elimination of this exception,525
leaving the entire matter to the discretion of
the trustee as before.
The congressional draftsmen did not incorporate any "small
preference" exception, and none appeared in the Reform Act of
1978. The new section 547(c)(7), with a $750 limit, originated as
one of many amendments to the Reform Act sponsored by the consumer credit industry.5 26 That industry justified the exception on
the ground that the forty-five day limit of section 547(c)(2) did not
protect them in the receipt of installment payments on long-term
debt, on current bills not paid within forty-five days, or on charge
accounts in which the payments were applied to the oldest
charges. 527 With the 1984 elimination of the forty-five day limit in
section 547(c)(2),528 the consumer credit industry now has it both
ways. For all consumer payments of less than $600, the industry
does not have to worry about the "ordinary course of business"
limitations in section 547(c)(2). Moreover, because section
547(c)(7), unlike section 547(c)(2), 2 9 is not confined to "payments"
but applies to any transfer, consumer creditors now have a $600
exception from section 547 for all consumer-credit security
interests.
It still seems to me that the small preference exception is unjustifiable. Official statistics for the year ended June 30, 1983, the
latest available, indicate that bankruptcy case filings hit a record
high of more than 374,700.530 Of these filings, approximately
524. Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House JudiciaryComm. on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
1841 (Mar. 19, 1976).
525. Id. at 2122. I also opposed the entire idea of such an exception because it was too
mechanical. When, year in and year out,
nothing is available for distribution to creditors in more than 85% of the straight
bankruptcy cases and in about three-fourths of the cases nothing is available for administration expenses either, [the matter] should be left to the judgment of the trustee
as to whether the issue is worth litigating. Moreover, if this exception were deleted,
there would be many instances where the trustee can recover preferences of less than
$500-or a compromised portion thereof-without litigating.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate JudiciaryComm. on S. 235 and S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1041
(Nov. 18, 1975).
526. See supra note 115.
527. April 1981 Senate Hearings, supra note 115, at 68 n.31, 93, 150, 158.
528. See supra notes 312-20 and accompanying text.
529. See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
530. This figure counts as a single case actions commenced by spouses' filing a joint
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251,300 were liquidation cases under Chapter 7, and 207,500 of
these cases were "nonbusiness" or consumer filings.5 31 In the years
prior to 1979, when the information was published, "no asset"
liquidation cases, in which no funds were available for administrative expenses or creditors after exemptions, were consistently from
seventy-one to seventy-seven percent of the total Chapter 7 cases.
And "nominal asset" cases, in which no assets were left for creditors after exemptions and administrative expenses, accounted for
another twelve to fifteen percent.5 32 Most of the cases in both categories were probably consumer cases, although the information was
not broken down separately for consumer cases by assets or the
lack of assets. In the "no asset" cases, the trustee, whose fee is
included in the first priority administrative expenses, 53 3 is paid
only the twenty dollars (increased to forty-five dollars in 1984)
that section 330(b) gives him from the sixty dollar filing fee. And
in the "nominal asset" cases, the trustee is not necessarily paid the
amount that the court concludes he has earned. 3 4
In these circumstances, it seems to me indefensible to give
each preferred creditor of a consumer a $600 immunity from section 547, even if we accept the consumer credit industry's debatable assumptions that, before the 1984 amendment, total recoveries
of preferences in consumer cases were consumed entirely by first
priority administrative expenses, including the trustee's fee, so
that there was "no corresponding benefit to the debtor or to any
creditor. ' 53 5 Bankruptcy judges operate within a system that, except for the judges' salaries and expenses, must pay its own costs
from its own gate receipts. Quite understandably, after a judge has
saddled a trustee with some cases in which the trustee receives no
or little compensation, the judge will try to make it up to him in
cases in which assets are available for his fee. 53 6 Thus, the creditors
petition under 11 U.S.C. § 302.
531. 1983 ANN. REP. OF THE DIR. OF THE

ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS

418, 420.
532. See V. COUNTRYMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 264 (2d ed.
1974).
533. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b)(2), 507(a)(1982).
534. See id. §§ 326, 330(b).
535. April 1981 Senate Hearings, supra note 115, at 69, 93. This assertion also overlooks the fact that exemptions are ahead of administrative expenses and that under § 522(g)
and § 522(h), the debtor is authorized to take exemptions from involuntary preferences
voidable under § 547.
536. Section 15701, applicable in pilot districts in which a United States trustee is
serving, provides for the United States trustee's appointment of trustees for liquidation
cases from a panel of private trustees for Chapter 7 cases establishes by the United States
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of consumers get their $600 immunity at the expense of creditors
in other cases.
V.

CONCLUSION

As previously indicated, it seems to me that the basic concept
of a preference, as defined in section 547(b), is in satisfactory form
with one exception. 3 Many will believe that Congress should undo
the accident by which reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent is no longer required to avoid a preference made to an insider
53 8
I
within a period of one year to ninety days before bankruptcy.

agree that something should be done about that accident, but I am
not sure that the solution should be to restore reasonable cause to
believe the debtor insolvent even for insider preferences. The reasonable-cause-to-believe requirement may enable many insiders to
frustrate the bankruptcy distribution policy by taking preferential
transfers from insolvent debtors. At the least, a study of that requirement's restoration should be combined with further study of
the breadth of the definition of an insider and of the appropriateness of a longer preference vulnerability period for insider creditors than for other creditors, without a requirement that the insider creditor have reasonable cause to believe the debtor
insolvent. 3 9 It also seems to me that the perfection requirements
of section 547(e), which operate very much as they have since the
1943 decision of the Supreme Court in Klauder,54 0 are in satisfactory form; 54 1 and I detect no significant groundswell for change in
that respect.
The large area of disarray and disagreement has occurred in
the exceptions from section 547 contained in section 547(c). In
part, I suppose it was predictable that the very idea of a substantial list of exceptions to the preference policy was bound to produce efforts for legislative change. Many preference defendants
against whom the trustee could void transfers under section
547(b), indeed many who concede the preference under section
trustee. It also provides that, if no one on the panel is willing to serve, the United States
trustee shall serve in the case. No similar provision exists for recalcitrant nominees in § 701,
which provides for the appointment of trustees in nonpilot districts by the bankruptcy
court. But the court, and not the United States trustee, allows the trustee's compensation.
537. See supra notes 186-98 and accompanying text.
538. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
539. See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
540. See supra notes 203-08 and accompanying text.
541. See supra notes 199-243 and accompanying text.
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547(b), were bound to seek an exception that would fit them in
section 547(c). Many of those who failed to fit the specifications of
any of the exceptions were likely to go further and seek congressional amendments that would either tailor an existing exception
to their needs or provide an additional exception suitable for their
purposes.
In the exception expansion process, the 1984 amendment deleting the forty-five day limit in what I have called the "current
expense" exception of section 547(c)(2) has torn the bankruptcy
preference policy asunder in a completely indefensible way. Because this exception was originally ill-conceived and, as amended
in 1984, indefensibly at war with the bankruptcy preference policy,
my solution for this exception would be to repeal it. 542 Repeal is
also the solution for the new exception of section 547(c)(7) for consumer preferences of less than $600. Although section 547(c)(7)
does less damage to the bankruptcy preference policy than present
5 43
section 547(c)(2), it is nonetheless at war with preference policy.
And, in the process of those repeals, perhaps Congress could leave
some clues in the legislative history that a check is neither the
equivalent of cash nor a credit instrument, and that the U.C.C.'s
thirty day period for presentment of a check applies only to charging the drawer in the event of dishonor and has no other
significance. 4 4
The remaining exceptions, for contemporaneous exchanges
under section 547(c) (1), 54 5 for enabling loans under section
547(c)(3), 5 for subsequent advances under section 547(c)(4),7
and for statutory liens under section 547(c)(6) , 41 and even for the
compromise on after acquired property clauses under section
547(c)(5), seem to me to be either consistent with the preference
policy or, in the instance of section 547(c)(5),549 to represent a tolerable compromise with the preference policy which does little
damage to it. Perhaps the ten day perfection period of section
547(c)(3)(B) should be conformed to the ten day perfection period
of section 547(e)(2)(A). 53 0 But, otherwise, experience with these ex542.

See supra notes 294-323 and accompanying text.

543. See supra notes 521-36 and accompanying text.
544.

See supra notes 255-62 and accompanying text.

545.

See supra notes 247-93 and accompanying text.

546.
547.
548.

See supra notes 324-42 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 343-89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 453-520 and accompanying text.

549.

See supra notes 390-452 and accompanying text.

550.

See supra text following note 342.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:713

ceptions indicates that it would be premature to encourage Congress to tinker further with section 547(c) at this point, even if we
could assume a more responsible congressional approach than we
got from the accident-prone 98th Congress in the 1984
amendments.
I realize that all do not share my views. In particular, much
disagreement will come from four young turks in the law teaching
profession. 51 Because three of them are participating in this symposium and the fourth has friends here, I will address the bases for
our differences.
By way of preface, let me say that I can sympathize with their
position. All of them began teaching after the Bankruptcy Commission had submitted its report and three of them after Congress
had begun hearings on that report. The fourth entered teaching
two years after enactment of the Reform Act. None of them, as far
as I know, was asked for his advice on the content of that Act. I
was once in a similar position. I began as an associate professor in
1948 two years before Congress, in reaction to alarums about the
Klauder decision,"' expanded old section 60a from a single paragraph to a second paragraph defining, and six more horrendous
paragraphs expanding on, the perfection requirement.5 3 No one
sought my advice on those amendments either. Nevertheless, I was
brash enough in 1949 to submit to Congress a modest suggestion
that the entire problem then perceived could be solved by the addition of eight words to then section 60a to require perfection only
against those "against whom the transfer could have been perfected. ' 55 4 Perhaps because of my youth, perhaps because I then
was teaching at Yale, or conceivably because my suggestion was
unsound, no one paid any attention to it. I placed most of the
blame for the 1950 amendments on Professor James A.
MacLachlan of Harvard Law School 5 5 and, still in my brash years,
551. Some disagreement also may come from Professor John McCoid, who is too near
my age to be classified as a young turk. A few years ago he set out "tentatively [to] suggest
that, at least in the absence of fraud, the most efficient response to preferential transfers
may be to abolish preference law." But he concluded that, for lack of empirical evidence on
the "efficiency" of preference law either in deterring or recapturing preferences, a further
"reappraisal" was necessary. McCoid, Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression of Doubt, 67 VA. L. REv. 249, 250, 273 (1981).
552. See supra notes 203-14 and accompanying text.
553. See supra notes 215-23 and accompanying text.
554. Countryman, supra note 201, at 85 n.56. My suggested language later appeared in
new § 548(d)(1), but was replaced in 1984. See supra note 227.
555. This is the same Professor McLaughlin of supra note 139, and Professor
MacLachlan of supra note 91. In 1948 he changed the spelling of his name, "correcting an
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in 1951 wrote a rather undiplomatic, if not impolite, article about
his efforts. 5 56 At that time I never had met Professor MacLachlan.
I never met him afterward, either-he would not speak to me. But
I want to assure my four young turks in advance that, because they
are neither undiplomatic nor impolite, my reaction to their criticism will not resemble Professor MacLachlan's reaction to mine.
First, I will address the views of the young turk who did not
participate in this symposium and who apparently has moved on
to other areas of the law: Professor Anthony Kronman. Professor
Kronman followed my 1949 example by not waiting to be asked for
his suggestions, but his suggestions were much more ambitious
than mine. In 1975, a few months after his graduation from Yale
Law School, and while Congress was still conducting hearings on
the Reform Act, he published an article that he had written in an
earlier draft as a student of Professor Grant Gilmore. His subject
was the treatment of security interests in after-acquired property
under the preference section, and his focus was on the Bankruptcy
Commission's version of what had primarily concerned the Gilmore
committee and what became section 547(c)(5).57 Professor
Kronman had three criticisms of the Commission's proposal that
he surely would regard as equally applicable to section 547(c)(5) in
its present form. 5
First, Professor Kronman urged that the trustee should not be
able to recover all the secured creditor's improvements in position
by an increase in the value of the collateral at the expense of the
estate.5 5 9 Some improvements in position, such as the seasonal
fluctuations in an inventory of Christmas ornaments or the increase in value of raw materials processed into finished goods, are
attributable to events occurring in the normal course of the
debtor's business. The debtor and the secured party anticipate
these improvements, and the secured party relies on them in extending credit on the terms he did. On the other hand, the secured
party should lose improvements caused by "his own fraudulent or
error made in Scotland about 1835." J. HANNA & J. MAcLACHLAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CREDITORS' RIGHTS, at viii n.1 (cons. 4th ed. 1951).
556. See Countryman, supra note 201.
557. Kronman, The Treatment of Security Interests in After-Acquired Property
Under the Proposed Bankruptcy Act, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 110 (1975).
558. He also was critical, not of the Commission's proposal that "antecedent debt" be
statutorily defined, but of the way in which is was defined. See id. at 138-41. That part of
the Commission's proposal was not enacted.
559. In § 547(c)(5), the concept is now all reduction in deficiency to the prejudice of
unsecured creditors.
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manipulative conduct," as when a party secured by receivables influences the conduct of a "fire sale" of inventory in order to "pump
receivables," or improvements caused by an unanticipated "windfall" resulting from a flurry of sales by the debtor that the secured
party did not inspire1 60 Professor Kronman's solution for this
problem was to rewrite the exception so that an increase in the
value of the collateral under its two-point test merely created a
presumption that the secured party had improved his position at
561
the expense of the estate.
But that left the courts pretty much at large, so Professor
Kronman proposed an additional refinement-a presumption for
when the presumption of improvement in position should apply
and a rule for when it should not. It should apply when the increase in value resulted from fluctuating market values or the conversion of other property into receivables in the ordinary course of
the debtor's business. In contrast, no presumption would apply,
and the increase would not be at the expense of the estate, if the
increase resulted from the manufacture or assembly of raw materials, work in process, or component parts into a product.5 6 2 For all
increases in value that fell outside of these specified instances, the
courts were to find the solution by determining whether the increase was "at the expense of the estate." 6 '
Finally, Professor Kronman argued that, by being confined to
inventory and receivables, the proposed exception raised doubts
for all other types of collateral. Because security interests in afteracquired property such as equipment did not fit readily into any
other exception, the interests would be vulnerable to attack as
preferences, "which [would] reverse the treatment of such increases under the present version of section 60. '' 5" (There is one
very good reason why Professor Kronman cites no evidence of such
present treatment. There was none.) Professor Kronman's final
recommendation was that the improvement-in-position exception
be extended to all property.56 5
In all of this, Professor Kronman offered little to justify his
proposals other than the occasional assertion that "it seems reasonable to assume" that the secured party had bargained for the
560. Kronan, supra note 557, at 144.
561. See id. at 148.
562. See id. at 157-58.
563. Id. at 158.
564. Id. at 161.
565. See id. at 162.
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increases in value that Professor Kronman would except from pref5 68
erence attack 566 and to invoke 56 7 Professor Kripke's assertion
that "[i]n the long run (not necessarily in any particular case), the
unsecured trade creditor is benefited by secured credit" because
secured credit keeps the debtor in business and enables him to pay
his unsecured creditors, "although in a particular case [unsecured
creditors] may be distressed because the dividend in bankruptcy is
small." That assertion overlooks both Keynes' dictum that in the
long run we are all dead and the fact that bankruptcy preference
law applies only in the "particular case."
While the Commission's proposals were still pending before
Congress, Professor Thomas Jackson joined with Professor
Kronman to supply a more elaborate justification for the Kronman
proposals. 569 Even though the justification was elaborate, it adhered to a precise blueprint. Preference law, like bankruptcy law
generally, must reconcile two basic aims, "neither of which is
strong enough to warrant the exclusion of the other in defining the
concept of a voidable preference. ' 570 One basic aim is "to protect
the contractual arrangements fashioned by the bankrupt and his
various creditors," including the "expectation interest" inherent in
all contracts. 57 1 The second and competing aim is "to minimize
. . . social costs associated with bankruptcy by spreading its impact among all classes of creditors. 5 7 Although strict pursuit of
the first aim would impact most heavily on unsecured creditors,
proper regard for the second aim requires some power in the trustee "to avoid the contractual rights of. . . secured creditors," including their expectation interest, "in certain limited cases. '573
The allocation of four risks determines the expectation interest of the secured creditor. Two are the risk of gain and of loss
from events "in the ordinary course of the debtor's business"-risks that can be calculated on the basis of "objective" factors.5 74 The other two are "windfall" gains or losses, whether fore566. See id. at 155, 157 n.150.
567. Id. at 143.
568. Krause, Kripke and Seligson, The Code and The Bankruptcy Act: Three Views
on Preferences and After-Acquired Property, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 278, 287 (1967).
569. See Jackson and Kronman, Voidable Preferences and Protectionof the Expectation Interest, 60 MINN. L. REv. 971 (1976).
570. Id. at 986.
571. Id. at 987-88.
572. Id. at 989.
573. Id.
574. Id. at 993.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:713

seen or unforeseen,57 that cannot be calculated on the basis of
"objective" factors.

5

"It seems plausible to conclude" that the se-

cured party expects to receive both types of gains and to suffer
both types of losses; therefore, Jackson and Kronman concluded
that the debtor and the secured party have "contracted on the basis" of these expectations and that to deprive the secured party of
his "windfall" gain "would interfere with his bargained-for expectation interest. ' 57 6 Now it is simply a matter of arithmetic to find
the best preference provision. DuBay v. Williams57 7 was taken as

establishing that the solution under old section 60 was to give the
secured creditor both the "ordinary course" and the "windfall"
gains, which furthered the first basic aim of bankruptcy law to the
exclusion of the second. The Commission's proposal would deprive
the secured creditor of both gains, which would further the second
basic aim to the exclusion of the first. But the Kronman proposal
would preserve the secured creditor's "ordinary course" gains and
deprive him of the "windfall" gains, which would balance the two
basic aims and "represent[] a genuine compromise," unlike the
578
Commission's proposal.
As I struggled through this extensive process of manufacturing
contractual "expectation interests" for many parties not given to
these rarefied expectations, and as I recalled that section 547(c)(5)
has proved to be the least important exception in section 547(c), 579
I recalled also that I was experiencing a reaction similar to one I
once provoked in my onetime colleague and longtime friend, Professor Gilmore. I once labored mightily to prove that U.C.C. section 2-502, giving a buyer of goods who had paid in advance a right
to recover the goods from an insolvent seller, and section 2-702,
giving an unpaid seller of goods on credit a right to reclaim them
from an insolvent buyer, should not be applied in bankruptcy
575. Id. at 995-96.
576. Id. at 1000.
577. See supra notes 396-404 and accompanying text.
578. Jackson and Kronman, supra note 569, at 1005. I can testify from my attendance
at meetings of the Gilmore committee, where the Commission's solution originated, that the
Commission's proposal did represent a compromise between two vigorously debated proposals but not two of the three that Jackson and Kronman posit. DuBay had its defenders on
the Gilmore committee, but so did the view that the secured party should be confined to the
lowest level of his collateral within the preference period. Jackson and Kronman do acknowledge another view but the only one they were able to imagine was one that would
compensate the secured party for windfall losses and deprive him of windfall gains. That
view was disregarded as being no better than the Commission's proposal. See id. at 1006-08.
579. See supra notes 435-40 and accompanying text.
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cases. 580 Shortly thereafter, I received a brief note from Professor

Gilmore. I have not preserved the note, but I am certain that I
remember it exactly. Those who knew him will recognize it as pure
Gilmore: "I was surprised to learn that you were so exercised about
§ 2-502," he wrote. "It was drafted merely to placate Karl
Llewellyn and was meant to be meaningless."
More recently, Professor Jackson revisited the subject of preferences, announced that he has changed the view he shared with
Professor Kronman, and came up with a new analysis.5 81 Bankruptcy rules, including rules about preferences, should be viewed
as based on a new "creditors' bargain" theory for the cases in
which not enough assets are present to pay off all creditors-"an
attempt to implement the type of collective and compulsory system that rational creditors would privately agree to if they could
bargain together before the fact.

'582

Professor Jackson reasons:

"From the perspective of the creditors' bargain theory, bankruptcy
exists at its core to maximize the value of assets in the face of
individualized pressures to ignore the collective weal for individual
gain. ' 58 3 Of course, creditors do not bargain on such matters

"before the fact," and there is in fact no creditors' bargain. Nevertheless, Professor Jackson can intuit what that bargain would be
and tell us how preference law can "bind them to their presumptive [i.e., fictitious] ex ante agreement and. . . foil the attempts of
each creditor to welsh on the agreement for individual gain.

'584

Professor Jackson intuits that all creditors would "presumptively agree" that preference law should reach both (1) "last minute grabs" through payments or the taking of a security interest
for antecedent debt, and (2) "secret liens" when perfection is
delayed. Both policies, embodied in their fictitious agreement, are
"designed to deter opt-out behavior that interferes with the goals
of bankruptcy.

' 585

But the creditors' fictitious agreement appar-

580. Countryman, Buyers and Sellers of Goods in Bankruptcy, 1 N.M. L. REv. 435
(1971). A new provision in the Reform Act § 546(c)) was designed to accommodate, at least
in part, § 2-702. The 1984 amendments add a new § 546(d) to do the same thing specifically
for grain farmers and fishermen.
581. See Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 757 n.93
(1984).
582. Id. at 728. Professor Jackson had launched his "creditors' bargain" theory earlier
in other bankrupcy contexts. See Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements,and
the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982).
583. Jackson, supra note 581, at 729.
584. Id. at 758-59.
585. Id. at 762-64.
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ently extends only to last minute purposeful behavior. "[O]ptimal"
preference law would reach only to actions of a creditor who
"'tries to change his position after the extension of credit in order
to improve his lot in an anticipated bankruptcy'" or of a debtor
who, "'at the behest of such creditor, so tries to change the position of such creditor.' "586
In other words, the purpose of preference law in Professor
Jackson's view is not to preserve the bankruptcy distribution policy but to punish culpable creditors who reveal their culpability
within a very limited period prior to bankruptcy. They are to be
punished for behavior occurring within the ninety day preference
period only. The creditor who has contracted in advance for preferential treatment during that period by a properly perfected security agreement containing an after-acquired property clause, and
who makes no other "grabs" during that period, would be immunized from preference law. For his foresight in making an "advance
grab," he gets this immunity although what his after-acquired
property clause "grabs" during the preference period defeats the
bankruptcy distribution policy just as much as does the "last minute grab" of another creditor who levies under a writ of execution
within the preference period. As I hope I have made clear, 587 I do
not believe that it should be the purpose of preference law to punish "bad" and absolve "good" creditors, but to preserve the bankruptcy distribution policy.
Professor Jackson concedes that "bright-line" rules may be
preferable to his "better fitting, but fuzzier, standard" on grounds
of administrative cost. His more "accurat[e]," albeit "fuzz[y],"
standard nonetheless provides a "useful focus . . . to examine
what sorts of transfers should be reached by the preference section."58 Which brings us back to section 547(c)(5), for which Professor Jackson believes that the proper way to view its two-point
test is "as a presumptive rule" which the creditor could rebut by
showing that "the improvements did not result from a last-minute
grab," but resulted from the debtor acquiring rights in after-acquired property in ordinary course of business, 58 9 just as Professor
586. Id. at 765.
587. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
588. Jackson, supra note 581, at 765-66.
589. Id. at 774-75. Professor Jackson would be willing to allow the trustee to rebut the
creditor's rebuttal by showing "that deliberate preferential behavior occurred during the 90
day period preceding bankruptcy even when that behavior does not produce an improvement of position." Id. at 775. The creditor being nourished by his after-acquired property
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Kronman had suggested earlier. Despite the fact that Congress ignored that suggestion in 1978 and in 1984 added section 547(g) to
put the full burden of proof on the secured creditor under section
547(c)(5), it is not clear whether Professor Jackson is proposing the
Kronman presumption as an amendment to, or as an interpretation of, section 547(c)(5). But at this point Professor Jackson, who
began by intuiting a fictitious agreement for all creditors, seems to
have narrowed his constituency to intuit a separate fictitious agreement for secured creditors only, since he suggests no reason why
unsecured creditors would agree to recognize the sanctity of the
"advance grab" of an after-acquired property clause.
Then there is Professor Ted Eisenberg, who in his original
publication on bankruptcy law started with a modest proposition:
"The new bankruptcy act is a failure." 590 I don't believe he has
established that expansive claim yet,591 although I agree with much
of what he has to say in this symposium on the section 1111(b)
election. 9 2 But, in the course of attempting to establish his claim,
he also has addressed the section 547(c)(5) problem. After advancing the proposition that bankruptcy law should depart from state
law only when some good reason exists for doing so, he focuses on
section 547(c)(5) as "perhaps the most important . . . departure
from state law" and one that was not made with good reason. 593
Amazingly, he characterizes as "the states' result," and the result
reached by "all states, '594 in the situation covered by section
547(c)(5), the result reached under old section 60 by the federal
59 6
courts in DuBay595 and Grain Merchants.
The common ground
of those decisions, however, was their conclusion that state law,
which indicated that no transfer occurred until an account came
into existence within the preference period, was not applicable but
was superseded by the perfection provision of old section 60, which
the two courts read to mean that the transfer occurred when the
clause must remain quiescent.
590. Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REv. 953 (1981).
591. See Harris, A Reply to Theodore Eisenberg'sBankruptcy Law in Perspective, 30
UCLA L. REv. 327 (1982); see also Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective:A Rejoinder,

30 UCLA L. REv. 617 (1983); Eisenberg, Some Costs of Bankruptcy Reform, 9 CORNELL L.F.,
No. 3, p. 2 (1983).
592. See Eisenberg, Secured CreditorsElection in Reorganization:A PreliminaryAssessment, 38 VAND. L. REv. 931 (1985).
593. Eisenerg, supra note 590, at 956-59.
594. Id. at 963.
595. See supra notes 396-404 and accompanying text.
596. See supra notes 405-11 and accompanying text.
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financing statement was filed outside the preference period.
Moreover, Professor Eisenberg states that no "larger economic
view" justifies'section 547(c)(5)'s departure from "state law." He
does not agree with Jackson and Kronman that bankruptcy should
take some account of allocating losses between secured and unsecured creditors. There is no impact on "the economy as a whole"
if secured creditors are favored over unsecured creditors. If the
"state result" theory were followed, any resulting increase in the
cost of unsecured credit would be roughly balanced by a decrease
in the cost of secured credit (excluding "transaction costs," of
course).5 97
Professor Eisenberg also identifies, as another of the "questionable departures,from state law, '59 8 the provisions in section
547(e)(2) that a transfer not perfected within ten days after taking
effect between the parties will be treated as a transfer occurring on
the date of perfection. In many instances, section 547(e)(2) would
enable the trustee to recover assets for the benefit of unsecured
creditors whereas, under the state law of U.C.C. sections 9-201 and
9-301, an unperfected security interest is perfectly valid against
unsecured creditors. Professor Eisenberg can find no justification
for the bankruptcy rule, although he does not expressly consider
whether proper bankruptcy policy might penalize the concealment
of security interests. Hence he does not consider whether, if such a
policy is justified, there is justification also for avoiding a duplication of notoriety requirements by invoking, for the protection of
unsecured creditors in bankruptcy, existing state notoriety requirements, even though the states do not impose those requirements
for the protection of unsecured creditors.
I have not found any pertinent published works by Professor
Douglas Baird on preferences, 5 9 but am willing to take the risk of
assuming that his views on preferences, like many of his other
views on bankruptcy, are not substantially dissimilar from Professor Jackson's. 0
597. Eisenberg, supra note 590, at 965-66.
598.
599.

Id. at 970-71.
Baird, Standby Letters of Credit in Bankruptcy, 49 U.

CHL

L. REv.130 (1982),

concerns a narrow point of preference law that I have not dealt with in this Article. See
supra note 106.

600.

See D.

BAIRD &

T. JACKSON,

CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUTrCY

(1985); D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 501-617 (1984);
Baird & Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its ProperDomain, 38 VAND. L. REV.
829 (1985); Baird & Jackson, Kovacs and Toxic Wastes in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV.
1199 (1984); Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganization and the Treatment of Diverse
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I am not prepared to say that Professors Kronman, Jackson,
Eisenberg, and Baird are 100% wrong in their views on preferences. I will leave that assertion to Professor Alan Schwartz when
and if he gets around to it.60 1 And I will admit that their approach
leaves them free from the burden of scrutinizing the vast judicial
output that reveals how the current preference law is being administered-a subject in which they evince little interest.
But I do not find their approach helpful. They assume that
every creditor-apparently including asbestos victims and other
tort claimants ("nonconsensual creditors" like the IRS), the most
unsophisticated customer or supplier of goods and services, and
the lowliest employee-will have full information and competent
legal advice in dealing with the debtor. They assume further that
every creditor will make the same assumptions they do and bring
to bear their same highly skilled free market economic analysis-which also assumes that everyone acts solely on the basis of
pure and fully informed greed-in fixing his price and other terms.
I confess to sharing the reaction of Professor Richard Markovitz
after he had listened to another preacher of the true gospel. He
suggested that the answer to the question, "How many Chicago
economists does it take to change a light bulb?" was: "None. If it
needed changing, the market would have changed it already. "602
With all their assumptions, it is not even presumptuous for
some of the young turks to proceed to invent fictitious "agreements" among all creditors concerned with what the law of preference should be.60 3 But, since their assumptions are wrong to such a
large extent, the authority some of them assume to concoct fictitious agreements is left without foundation, as are their proposals
for a preference law to implement such "agreements." For this reason, I do not find their approach helpful either in drafting a prefer04
ence law or in interpreting it.1
Ownership Interests, 51 U. CHL L. RE v. 97 (1984).
601. See Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1051
(1984), Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities:A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981).
602. Markovits, The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust: A Reply to Professor Easterbrook, 63 TEx. L. RE V.41, 86 (1984).
603. Professor Jackson recognizes that the "fresh start" policy of the Reform Act, particularly as embodied in provisions in 11 U.S.C. § 522 empowering the debtor to avoid involuntary preferences for the purpose of claiming his exemptions, may indicate that the debtor
also has an interest in the preference policy. But he assumes the debtor's interest away and
creates no fictitious agreements to which the debtor is a party. See Jackson, supra note 581,
at 727 n.8, 767.
604. Mhile Professor Kripke and I have, and frequently enjoy, our differences, see
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supra text accompanying notes 422-23 and text following note 568, I respect both his intelligence and his experience. It is therefore comforting to me to note that he finds the sort of
analysis employed by the young turks no more helpful, in other contexts, than I find it in
the context of preference law. See Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic
Efficiency of Commercial Law in A Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 929 (1985).

